A STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIPS OF POWER BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN WORKERS AND LOCAL LEADERS IN HAITI

P. QUINTILIANI

Ph.D

UNIVERSITY OF BRADFORD

2018

A study of the relationship of power between humanitarian workers and local leaders in Haiti

Pierrette QUINTILIANI

Submitted for the Degree Of

Doctor of Philosophy

Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities

University of Bradford

2018

Abstract

Pierrette Quintiliani

A study of the relationships of power between humanitarian workers and local leaders in Haiti

Keywords: Local leaders, structural violence, emotions, coloniality of power, humanitarian workers, coexistence, perception, social constructionism, power.

Like many former colonised countries, Haiti has been plagued by insecurity and conflicts caused by internal and external influences as well as natural disasters. In 1804, after a protracted conflict between slaves and French colonialists, Haiti became the first black country to gain its independence through a revolution. Today, Haiti is the poorest country in the Western hemisphere, ranking 153rd on the Human Development Index and a significant number of humanitarian organisations are present on the island aspiring at improving the standard of living of the population. The following study examines how the relationships of power emerging through the relationship between humanitarian and local leaders affect their perceptions of each other and identified the emotions emerging from these perceptions. The perceptions identified are the coloniality of power, corruption and distrust, the occurrence of conspiracy theories and the obstacles encountered in the implementation of a relief-development continuum model envisioned by general humanitarian policies. These perceptions create tensions between the humanitarian and local leaders, contributing to fuelling negative emotions such as regret, sadness, sense of failure, disappointment and anger. Negative emotions in this study affect the collaboration between humanitarians and local leaders, diminishing the positive influences and impact of humanitarian action on the well-being of the Haitian population. One of the components to increase these positive influences of humanitarian action is to lessen the asymmetricality of power between humanitarian and local leaders through the adoption of a Cultural Competence model by humanitarians.

Abstract (242 words)

Acknowledgements and Dedication

The hours spent writing were never lonely. I always felt I was in the company of the Haitians who shared their stories – and more. I also enjoyed the company of the authors and the richness of the writings that inspired and guided me. Sometimes, I could hear a slave from Haiti demanding for justice, and I hope this project confers that justice in some way. Anecdotally, my family and I live in an old house in New England, the basement of which contains a cache that was used by the slave underground railroad network to hide escaped slaves who would be smuggled to Canada along the Connecticut River in a search for freedom.

I would like to extend my gratitude to Dr Rhys Kelly, who tirelessly read and commented on my chapters and helped me stand when I was ready to fall. My appreciation also goes out to my mother, who has always believed in my projects and encouraged me to follow my dreams; my husband Richard, who supported me morally and financially during these years; my amazing daughter Lisana, who was alone many hours in her room while Mummy was working on her PhD; and to Waddles and Asparagus, who kept me company sleeping by my desk for countless hours.

Table of Contents

List of Pictures

List of Figures

List of Tables

Chapter 1: Introduction

> *The fundamental concept in social science is Power, in the same sense that Energy is the fundamental concept in physics.…The laws of social dynamics are laws which can only be stated in terms of power'. (Russell 1938: 10; Jahre 2010)*

This thesis examines the relationships of power between humanitarian workers and local leaders in the region of Léogâne in Haiti, with a special focus on how these relationships are constructed through and mediated by cultural narratives. This research first seeks to uncover the power dynamics between humanitarians and local leaders in situation of complex emergencies through the analysis of the expression and construction of their discourses. Second it unwrapped the emotions generated by these narratives and finally constructs a grounded theory on the impact of these emotions on the relationship between local and expatriate leaders. A detailed case study of Haiti, a complex site of recurring humanitarian crises and intervention by humanitarian agencies, provides the focus for exploring the main themes and questions the thesis seeks to address.

Genesis of the Research

The seeds of this study were planted in 1994 in Angola, a country whose inhabitants, like Haiti's, have suffered under colonial rule, decolonisation wars, Cold War proxy conflicts and, finally, internal political disturbances. My colleagues and I were confronted with the devastating consequences of conflicts on civilian populations. I was directly concerned with the problem of delivering assistance to internally displaced persons and the local population trapped between front lines in the region of Huambo; I was working as the relief coordinator with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). As I later discovered while working in other areas experiencing violent conflict in various countries in Africa, the former Soviet Union and South East Asia, this was but one example of situations in which unbearable cruelty and living conditions were imposed on civilians and re-enacted endlessly in regions or countries at war. Although the provenance of humanitarian assistance was not questioned in some contexts, in most, the political and cultural baggage brought by humanitarian workers and agencies to communities created tensions. This was not so much evident among the poorest, who accepted any support with infinite grace, but rather, by those members endowed with more agency and power (Dijkzeul 2010).

The humanitarian system and institutions as they became increasingly visible and gained influenced on the international scene and in communities around the world have sometimes became perceived as arrogant, inflexible and lacking cultural sensitivity despite all the assistance and support they are providing in many desperate situations. In some cases the ‘perceptions of affiliations with political and military agenda have eroded acceptance of humanitarian actors.’ (Barnett and Thomas 2011: XV) As exemplified by the recent sexual abuse scandal related to some members of Oxfam Great Britain, Save the Children and other organisations that are still emerging, institutional perceptions can be exacerbated by humanitarian staff’s inappropriate personal behaviour, conspicuous consumption and other issues, such as the ‘white car syndrome’ (Power 2008: 115), which came to symbolise the high living standards of expatriates in general in comparison with the living standards of the population and local leaders. Thus, while the civilian population’s living conditions in these contexts were often indescribable, I could not help but observe the behaviours and relationships among humanitarian staff, the population and their leaders. Later, my teaching about development/humanitarian assistance and its influence on conflicts, my readings and numerous discussions with students from regions experiencing conflicts and political instability further persuaded me of the necessity of further deciphering and explaining the content and nature of these narratives.

Background and Rationale

Although the provision of charity towards the deprived has taken place throughout human history, the institutional, conceptual, and legal roots of the modern humanitarian system as it exists today has been traced to the end of the nineteenth century (Barnett 2011: 50). Today, in times of conflicts or after natural disasters, international humanitarian organisations (IHO)[1] offer their services and support to countries or communities with the aim of alleviating the suffering of civilian populations affected. Since the 1990s, with the recognition of their capacity to reach populations in need in remote areas, (IHO) have provided significant relief and social services in lieu of governments which are not willing or able to ensure that their citizens basic needs and rights are fulfilled.

The foundational event to the construction of a more formal humanitarian system is often associated with the creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1863 (Davey 2013). The construction of the humanitarian system as we experience it today has been following the vagaries of the numerous wars and conflicts that took place in imperial Europe first, then in the colonial consolidation of Europe in Asia and Africa in particular, in the conflicts resulting from the decolonization process, with the ideological and economic proxy conflicts that took place across the globe in the struggle for economic and cultural hegemony between Russia and the United States of America (USA) during the Cold War, and the conflicts, mostly intrastate that erupted with the end of the Cold War (Barnett 2011). The events of September 9, 2001 have reconfigured the World order and, the

> 'war on terror makes the integration of large parts of the humanitarian system into the political agendas, that had already begun in the post-Cold War period. The use of aid as an instrument of foreign policy becomes fully explicit and new tools, such as Provincial

[1] For the purpose of simplicity, I will generally use the word 'humanitarians' when writing about employees or leaders of International Humanitarian Organisations (IHO)

> Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), were developed to manage the merged mission.' (Roisin 2009: 16)

in Afghanistan and Iraq in particular. It comes as no surprise that the construction of the humanitarian system is a complex endeavor requiring adaptability, creativity, and commitment.

While the usage of the term system, implies a shared understanding of its meaning, in the humanitarian field, we do not have a common agreement of what is meant by system, there is not clear definition stating 'its internal logic and functional order' (ALNAP 2015: 18). The global network ALNAP[2] describes the humanitarian system 'as the network of interconnected institutional and operational entities through which humanitarian assistance is provided when local and national resources are insufficient to meet the needs of a population in crisis.' (ALNAP 2015). The expression is used by various entities including the United Nations (UN), IHO, and people receiving aid from these organisations to describe the humanitarian community with different perspectives and agendas. Hugo Slim (2006: 19) proposes that 'the mainly Western-funded humanitarian system which works closely within or in coordination with the international authority of the United Nations and Red Cross movement. A definition proposed by John Borton (2009: 5) extends the meaning of the humanitarian system, conferring it a more organic significance by describing it as a 'multiplicity of international, national and locally-based organizations deploying financial, material and human resources to provide assistance and protection to those affected by conflict and natural disasters with the objective of saving lives, reducing suffering and aiding recovery'

The magnitude of the needs created by conflicts erupting following the fall of communism created increasing needs and humanitarian organisations activities expended geographically. This required more funding that 'western'

---

[2] ALNAP 'is a global network of NGOs, UN agencies, members of the Red Cross/Crescent Movement, donors, academics, networks and consultants dedicated to learning how to improve response to humanitarian crisis.' https://www.alnap.org/about

governments mainly, were willing to provide. As a result, the humanitarian system grew dramatically but to this day, remain dependent on government funding, 'The extent to which a system that is so reliant on resources provided by a group of predominantly 'western' governments, inevitably having national perspectives and agendas, can genuinely be called 'humanitarian' and can be regarded as an expression of universal values is highly debatable' (Borton 2009: 9). IHO are conscious about the difficulties to maintain their independence especially in contexts such as Afghanistan, Yemen, Iraq or Syria. This loss of independence is the subject of intense debates among and within IHO, they are consistently trying to diversify their funding sources to regain some freedom. Internal documents are unfortunately not available to the public about the broader substance of these internal reflections. IHO have nevertheless successfully advocated for an increase in unearmarked funding guarantying them more autonomy in the development of actions they consider the most suitable to address the effect of natural or man-made disasters.

Donors have increased their requests for efficiency, timeliness and accountability and IHO have made great progress in answering these demands, the quality of humanitarian services has improved, and organisations have become more professional. One of the ways to achieve accountability and impact has been the incorporation of elements of corporate approaches into the management of humanitarian operations, which are results rather than process oriented. Reflecting on these institutional changes, scholars and practitioners have started to question whether the corporate approach to humanitarianism was, in fact, serving the humanitarian institutions more than the people in need (Richmond 2001; Schloms 2003; Gerstbauer 2005; Hilhorst and Matthis 2005; Reimann 2005; Goodhand 2006). Several studies (Uvin 1998; Anderson 1999; deWaal 2000; Barnett and Weiss 2008; Barnett and Thomas 2011) have even found that humanitarian assistance eventually fuelled war economies, with the often-cited example of the Interahamwe militias who took refuge in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Tanzania after the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) militarily overthrew the genocidal government, ending the genocide that took place in Rwanda between April and July 1994.

On one hand, humanitarians in the field have the financial, logistical capacities to provide assistance and services to affected populations in highly complex contexts. They have to satisfy donors’ expectation and realise their organisations’ agendas, as well as deal with the reality and intricacy of daily life in the field. On the other hand, local officials, church or traditional leaders who are supposed to provide social services to their constituencies or facilitate such provisions have been weakened by the lack of finance, political crises, conflicts and natural disasters or simply do not have the logistical and professional capacities to deliver these services. The social and economic transformation experienced by mostly decolonised countries during the twentieth century have affected their governance model. As Olufemi Vaughan (2003: 3) writes,

> The interconnections between communal identities and nationalism; the reconstruction of the past in formulating the evolving hierarchies of power; and the complex manifestations of governance since the imposition of colonial rule... the modernization of indigenous political structure reveal the conflicting ideologies among elite groups as well as the manifestations of communal identities’

Modern governance in the postcolonial context has to accommodate a complex array of indigenous social forces (Sklar 2003). There are conflicting and converging interest between the official holders of power and the traditional leaders and their role in transitional states. Traditional leaders are the custodians of cultural models that are crucial to local resilience models.

Recent reflections during the World Humanitarian Submit (WHS) that took place in 2016 have emphasised the importance on localising the provision of humanitarian assistance and creating some partnership with local organisations, leaders from all areas, including church leaders, state representative and traditional leaders is among the goals set to be reached.

The weakness of local leadership influences the development or maintenance of local official and traditional social organisations, dramatically affecting the development of institutions whose role is to deliver basic services to the population. Above all, local leaders have privileged relationships with and knowledge of the communities and their residents. Depending on their socioeconomic associations, their power over their local populations can have positive or negative effects on their wellbeing.

Despite the interest on relying more on local governance. Some analysts such as Mamdani (1996), remarks that we have little knowledge about the behaviour and quality of local leaders. According to Beekman et al. and Acemogly et al. (2013; 2014), the local leaders sometimes refer to as 'chiefs' in Africa, still benefit from a vas support despite the fact that there are reports of their corruption and abuse of their power.

As Norbert Ropers (2001: 151) commented, 'The activities of NGOs have necessarily to do with power and authority. Local leaders have complained about their loss of influence due to the wealth and the level of power of humanitarian organisations, against which they cannot compete'. In other words, local leaders have lost power, and humanitarian organisations are partly responsible for this loss. This lack of equilibrium in wealth and influence actively affects the balance of power between local leaders and humanitarians.

Power is ubiquitous in all relationships, but the nature and substance of power[3] between local leaders and humanitarian personnel has not been explored sufficiently. The present study proposes to investigate the nature

---

[3] See Rob Skinner and Alan Lester's (2012) Humanitarianism and Empire: New Research Agenda in *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 40 (5), p. 742: 'One aspect of humanitarianism at least appears constant throughout the global transformations that we have skirted…that is the power imbalances between those who "issue" humanitarian empathy and material aid and those who are in receipt of it. This is, of course, perhaps the most important relationship of all within the histories of humanitarianism, and yet it is often elided in accounts focusing on the entanglements between humanitarian agents and those donors and supporters to whom they are accountable'.

and content of this power and how it affects the relationships between members of the humanitarian community in the field and local leaders. The nature and content of these relationships influences the level of well-being of local populations. Research on community members' and international humanitarian organisation members' perceptions of each other has provided a partial understanding of the opinions and stereotypes shaping the content of their relationships, but the mutual perceptions among humanitarians and local leaders have been neglected and require more attention.

As research in other fields in the social sciences and social psychology has suggested, the understanding of perception is a fundamental step in appreciating relationships (Young 2011; Bodenhausen 2012). Nevertheless, it does not provide sufficient information for grasping the influence of these perceptions on decision making and behaviours. The substance and meaning of the perceptions of external events or stimuli must be combined with the 'micro dialogue' (Bakhtin 1973) that triggers emotions, providing the primary interface in human relationships. Emotions have a strong influence on individual or group motivations, and they are at the centre of human decision making and actions (Averill, 1980; Dolan, 2002; Doyle McCarthy, 1994; Gordon, 1981; Harre, 1989; Lutz, 1988; Maruska, 2005). The understanding of expatriates and local leaders' respective worldviews are intersecting with different roles and power within the communities. New perceptions and stimuli feed their internal dialogue, generating emotions that are important to decipher if one wishes to understand to the content of their relationships and ultimately improve their partnerships to service the populations in need.

Emotions have increasingly become central in transectional and social science research; they have been recognised for their role in shaping the world, in the 'making and remaking of the social' (Sharp 2009: 75). These emotions are responsible for individual or group motivation, and they are central to all human actions and interactions. Thus, they also require increased understanding. They represent an area that has been insufficiently addressed in humanitarian research, which is another gap that this study starts to explore.

Research Questions and Objectives

The main question in this study is as follows: What is the significance of cultural narratives in shaping and explaining the relational and power dynamics between humanitarian personnel and local leaders in the context of humanitarian actions and activities? Additional sub-questions clarify the main research questions, as follows:

- What are the origins of contemporary humanitarianism and its world view? What events have shaped humanitarian thinking and practices?
- How is the social construction of the Haitian society affecting the cultural understanding between humanitarians and local leaders?
- What are the underlying relationships of power that may be constitutive of emotions between humanitarians and local leaders? How are these relationships produced?

This study achieves four objectives. First, the study explores how humanitarianism based on Western culture has become a social construction emerging through a complex genealogy of political and ethical concepts. Second, it analyses the historical and cultural contexts that have influenced the social construction of knowledge in Haiti. Third the study investigates how these social constructs affect the relationships of power between humanitarians and local leaders and the emotions emerging from these interactions. Finally, the study proposes a theory to develop the relationships between local leaders and humanitarians.

Chapter 2: Methodology

> *Humans are storytelling organisms who, individually and collectively, lead storied lives. Thus, the study of narrative is the study of the way's humans experience the world. (Connelly & Clandinin, 1990, p. 2)*

This section expands on the methodological approach and methods involved in conducting this study. Social constructionism is the methodology chosen to develop and unpack the evolution and social construction of the humanitarianism and of the Haitian society. Social constructionism has its origins in the field of sociology and is associated with the postmodern movement in qualitative research concerned with the nature of knowledge. Although the origins of social constructionism have been traced to an interpretive approach to idea formation, the major influence on its development has been attributed to Berger and Luckman's (1967) seminal publication *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge.*

Berger and Luckman's (1967) main research interest was concerned by the nature and construction of knowledge, in other words, how knowledge emerges and becomes significant for societies. One of the main aspects of their thesis is the definition of the difference between subjective and objective reality. While the *objective reality* is represented by the natural world, including omnipresent phenomena, such as the stars and the oceans, *subjective reality* is socially constructed, for example, the role and status of people in a society. It is through the socialisation process experienced by members of a group and their repeated interactions that the model of knowledge of this society becomes real. Through repetition, these modes of interaction become habitualised. Accordingly, the authors define *habitualisation* as:

> Any action that is repeated frequently becomes cast into a pattern, which can then be reproduced with an economy of effort and which, ipso facto, is apprehended by its performer as that pattern. Habitualisation further implies that the action in question may be performed again in the future in the same manner and with the same economical effort. (Berger and Luckmann 1967: 71)

Habitualisation is considered the first step towards *institutionalisation*, which Berger and Luckmann (1967: 72) defined as ‘a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors. In other words, institutions are the product of reciprocal interactions becoming typified. This typification (knowledge) is disseminated and shared. Institutions also have historical roots and are constructed by the process of habitualisation. To ensure that institutions acquire sustainability, they undergo a process of *legitimation.* ‘Legitimation explains the institutional order by ascribing cognitive validity to its objectivated meanings. Legitimation justifies the institutional order by giving a normative dignity to its practical imperatives.’ (Berger and Luckmann 1967: 111)

In the present study, the use of social constructionism’s theories allows the unraveling of the ways in which the social construction of the contemporary humanitarian culture and of the Haitian society are impacting their relationship and partnership. This provides the background for the elaboration of a grounded theory, those concepts were originally developed at the end of the 1960s by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1967). Their theories permeated the social sciences through their book *The Discovery of Grounded Theory.* However, shortly after the publication of *The Discovery of Grounded Theory,* the authors ended their collaboration and generated two new, separate movements. Glaser developed one that would subsequently be termed *the classical grounded theory* (1967). Meanwhile, Strauss joined a nurse researcher, Juliet Corbin, for a new venture that resulted in a book titled *Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and Techniques* (Strauss and Corbin 1990). According to Jorg Strübing (2017), the major critical difference between Glaser’s approach and Strauss and

Corbin's was Glaser's 'empiristical' mode of inquiry, infused with critical and rationalistic thinking. However, Strauss had been influenced by interactionist and pragmatist thinkers. It must be acknowledged that Strauss and Corbin's approach to grounded theory refutes Glaser's positivist position. Strauss and Corbin insisted on the importance of listening to the voices of informants to include subjective factors in the research process since the theories generated are created realities.

From this perspective grounded theory is constructed through a transactional process that involves the researcher and data and the result of grounded theories should be useful in practice and the studies' finding should be verified during the research (Strauss and Corbin 1990). Glaser (1992: 16) adopted a new position on grounded theory in his later writings, emphasising the importance of interpreting meanings in the perspective of social interaction and analysing 'the interrelationship between meaning in the perception of the subjects and their actions'. While individuals make sense of the world and others by interpreting events, grounded theory discovers and translates new insights concerning human behaviours produced from the meanings of these events.

During the earlier decade, social constructionism was instrumental in refashioning grounded theory. Kathy Charmaz and Bryant (2007) in particular, distinguished between objectivist and constructivist approaches to grounded theory. Their central argument was that Glaser's classical grounded theory was based on the premise that data are facts and interpretation is intrinsic to data, with the researcher discovering pre-existing meanings. As such, the theory is positivist. Charmaz and Bryant (2007) developed a constructivist model of grounded theory based on the idea that an individual's reality is the result of his/her interpretation of the world, as well as his/her experiences related to personal belief systems. Thus, there is no one reality, but multiple realities. According to Charmaz and Bryant (2007) the researcher's role is to approach the subject of his/her research from a reflexive position, determining how and why informants construct certain meanings and take certain actions following specific events. The authors' approach to grounded theory reflects the interpretative tradition that emerged at the beginning of the twenty-first century (2007). Interpretive qualitative approach seeks to translate observed phenomenon into definable units of meaning.

Methods

Grounded theory allowed me to develop a set of propositions describing the significance of cultural narratives in shaping and explaining the relational and power dynamics between humanitarian personnel and local leaders in the context of humanitarian actions. The grounded theory was constructed through the objectives described earlier along the following process, the social construction of the humanitarian and Haitian society was developed through existing literature published in the fields of anthropology, social science, history, and social psychology. The elements influencing the relational and power dynamics were extracted from primary data collected *in situs* through unstructured interviews performed with the purpose of unveiling the emotions experienced by both local leaders and humanitarians in relation to these relationships. The construction of the theory was an inductive process elaborated from the findings of the data and its comparison with literature about the object of inquiry.

Primary data was collected through unstructured interviews, a method particularly appreciated in the field of sociology and anthropology as it serves to elicit people's social realities. Several definitions of what is meant by unstructured interviews can be found in the literature. For example, Punch (1998) defines them as a method to appreciate people's complex behaviors without imposing *a priori* categorisations that could reduce the field of inquiry. Another definition provided by Patton (2002) describes unstructured interview a natural extension of participant observation because they so often occur as part of ongoing participant observation fieldwork. Minichiello et al. (1990) define them as interviews in which neither the question nor the answer categories are preestablished. These definitions provide different perspectives; however, they all agree upon the fact that the researcher initiates the interviews with no preconceived theoretical framework, thus with no specific hypothesis about the social reality of the participants in the study. The unstructured interview takes the form of a conversation in which the interviewees are speaking freely about a chosen subject that has been presented by the interviewer(s). While unstructured interview does not make use of some predefined questions, it does not imply that these interviews are nondirective and random, as explained by Patton (2002), unstructured interviews cannot be undertaken without preparation, including previously acquired contextual and historical knowledge. Fife (2005) remarks that to collect meaningful data, the researcher needs to keep in mind the purpose of the study and its general scope. Another essential aspect of unstructured interviews resides in the minimal control over the conversation by the researcher, who follows the narration of the interviewees, spontaneous questions might surface based on the ongoing micro dialogues[4] emerging.

The interviewer practicing unstructured interviews should be open and become ‘an integral part of the research instrument, in that there are no predefined frameworks and questions that can be used to structure the inquiry (Zhang 2005: 3). The role adopted by the interviewer is critical in the outcome of unstructured interviews and is constrained by several characteristics such as age, social status, gender, ethnicity, and race. Burgess (1984) recommends that the interviewer presents her/himself as a learner, as a friend, and as sympathetic to interviewees’ life experience. Adopting this kind of role makes building contact between the interviewer and interviewees smoother. However, Denzin (1989: 9) warns that being sympathetic does not mean that the interviewer should express judgmental views or provide advice to the interviewees.

[4] Ian Burkitt (Burkitt 2010) define micro-dialogue as,’ silent and invisible series of dialogues we hold for ourselves with the images and voices of others, which can emerge in surprising and unwilled ways... micro-dialogue is important in understanding the dialogical interaction between person, as not all aspects of the self will enter into dialogue with others, leading to miscommunication, misunderstanding, and misrecognition.’

The conversational nature of unstructured interviews allows the interviewer to be responsive to situational and individual differences. This type of inquiry requires some particular skills including the capacity for active listening[5], for reflecting more than talking and for generating 'rapid insights [and] formulate questions quickly and smoothly' (Patton 2002: 343). In general, the interview should be initiated by an open and broad question, the initial question used to engage the topic with local leaders was as follow: Do you remember of a particular experience that has shaped your understanding and feelings towards members of a non-governmental organization bringing relief assistance in your community? And for expatriates: Can you share your experience working in Haiti and with Haitians local leaders? Sometimes, when the conversation was testing to start, I initiated the interview by asking a few open-ended questions. This introductive conversational approach allowed an adjustment of the respondent and for me to assess situational and individual variations. In the case of the interviews conducted in Haiti, being sensitive to these differences was essential to take into consideration the various backgrounds and life experiences of the interviewees. Finding some common ground was supportive of establishing some meaningful connections with the interviewees who felt they could speak freely. Finally, as Patton (2002: 343) suggests, the interviewers should 'guard against asking questions that impose interpretations on the situation'.

While unstructured interviews offer a high degree of flexibility and freedom of expression for the respondent, they also present a few challenges. First, this method is time-consuming to collect information, particularly in cases when interviewers have limited knowledge about the settings. Gaining access to interviewees, developing connections and trust might be limited by time constraints (Patton 2002), in the case of Haiti, it represented a logistical challenge too. Second, the advantage of the unstructured interview being

---

[5] Active listening has been defined as a method to listen to others with empathic understanding, congruence behavior and unconditional positive regard (Rogers 1959). In close studies, it has been found to improve others' social behaviors. According to Hiroaki Kawamichi et al. (2015: 16) 'active listening in social interactions is accompanied by and improvement in the recollected impressions of relevant experiences and is thought to arouse positive feelings.'

open and giving some freedom to the interviewees to speak at length about the subject more often than not result in long interview sessions (Attfield 2003), creating massive amounts of data. Another challenge identified by Patton (2002) concerns the risk of the interviewees to follow some interests than are not necessarily connected with the original topic. The difficulty for the interviewer is to decide if the time has come to redirect the interview or to leave the conversation to escape his/her ‘control’. In these situations, the experience of the interviewer, his or her degree of familiarity with the overall field of research (Whyte 1960) is useful in estimating how these diversions are leading to some potentially interesting material.

As a complement to the data collected from the unstructured interviews during the fieldwork, I kept a field journal with some, reflections on discussions, questions, intuitive thinking, notes from readings but more importantly about the micro-dialogues that had appeared while interacting with respondents or other persons of interest. Besides, as I was working on a subject linked with emotions and could not take note during the interviews, I had to take the time as much as possible soon after the meetings to write down some emotional feelings I had perceived during the interview. Field notes have been defined by Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) as a written record of observations during fieldwork. According to Jackson (1990: 3-4), they characterise ‘the process of transformation of observed interaction to written public communication.’ As Malinowski (1961: 3-4) remarked that fieldnotes fill the space between ‘the brute material of information (...) and the final authoritative presentation of results. This approach has been refined by Nigel Rapport (1991: 11), who describes fieldnotes ‘as something which simultaneously immerses them [anthropologists][6] and the self they become there’. This often-underappreciated tool was essential to interpreting my data. It became a sacred document to which I regularly return, sometimes it helped reconstruct or contextualise some events relative to some interviews. They also bring back vivid images of atmospheres. The field note diary entries not only incorporated daily observations, but they also included

[6] Added by author

spontaneous comments and emotions experienced. During my fieldwork, the diary became a patchwork of information and reflections, with glued-in leaflets grabbed from NGO offices or churches. When possible, I also took pictures for professional and personal use. Including them in the diary brought another dimension to the notes. Field notes were not written in front of participants, as it would have affected the relationship, transforming them into objects.

Sampling

While the current trend in the evaluation of humanitarian actions is to interview recipients of humanitarian aid, I chose to interview local leaders and expatriates working in the field of humanitarian aid. Local leaders[7] were interesting as subjects of study due to their pivotal and dual roles as 'negotiators' and leaders. Local leaders represent the government or various officials, and traditional institutions in the area in which they are involved. They also act as intermediaries between citizens and higher authorities. Also, according to a study performed by Denis Dijkzeul (2010) the relationship of power is more detectable between local leaders and humanitarian workers than between humanitarian workers and recipients of humanitarian assistance or services.

Humanitarian leaders were identified on the basis that they:

- Worked in a field of humanitarian practice
- Worked in a role that involved contact with local leaders
- Had been in the country for at least 6sixmonths

This aimed at ensuring that respondents had sufficient knowledge of the local and international context of humanitarian practice and could articulate their experience in Haiti.

Regarding local leaders, given the objectives of the study, limited time and resources available, I primarily focused on those who had some direct relationship with international humanitarian organisations, including local community leaders, representatives of the clergy, and local government officials. These representatives had to be living within the region of Leogane. The respondents had to:

- Occupy an intermediary role, with a meaningful experience of contact with INGO organizations
- Hold a leadership position in the community

The potential participants were first approached directly by visiting their office and asking for a short meeting, which was almost always granted[8]. During this brief meeting, I introduced them to my research project and left them with an information sheet (Appendix 2) and an informed consent form. In general, the local leaders were reluctant to sign a consent form, and a few refused to be interviewed if they had to sign it, which is understandable in contexts where people's lives are always on the line and in which most contracts are still performed orally. One of the difficulties with informed consent was related to convincing potential participants (again, local leaders especially) that their names, the date, and specific locations would remain confidential. One of the advantages of visiting potential interviewees was the possibility to create the first contact, discuss the research topic and answer questions as they arose.

The first participants were contacted following recommendations by the two first gatekeepers[9]. Subsequently, a snowball sampling method was used to recruit more participants[10]. The length and richness of unstructured interviews determined the number of participants I decided to involve, which

[8] Only two international organisations refused to meet with me.
[9] Although I had contacted several of my former students before travelling to Haiti, none were available once I arrived; this delayed the start of the interviewing process for I had to initiate new contacts while in the field. This caused a lot of stress during the first week, since my time in Haiti was limited to two months.
[10] One of the two gatekeepers was also acting as a driver in some instances.

included nine local leaders (three religious leaders, three traditional or independent leaders, and three representatives of the local administration) and five expatriates working for humanitarian organisations of various sizes. After a first overall review of the data collected from the originally planned interviews, I used the principle of saturation[11] to decide if more interviews needed to be organised.

Method of Data Analysis

Thematic analysis was appropriate as a method to discover, report, and explore data for the meanings produced by the respondents, (Riessman 1993; Boyatzis 1998; Patton 2002). A theme is referred to as a '. . . patterned response or meaning within the dataset' (Braun and Clarke 2006: 82). According to Boyatzis (1998: 4-5), thematic analysis functions as a way of making sense from seemingly unrelated material, analyzing qualitative information, systematically observing a person, an interaction, a group, a situation, an organization, or a culture; and, converting qualitative information into quantitative data. In this study, the themes were determined by their 'substantive significance' (Patton 2002: 467) rather than by their frequency due to the nature of unstructured interviews.

One of the purposes of using qualitative methods of analysis is to gain some knowledge on the ways people make sense of their lives and integrate new experiences into their worldviews, as well as how these contents contribute to shaping their behaviours. According to Paul G. Hierbert (2008: 86), 'people in a society more or less share the same worldviews, they can communicate with one another. Individuals may have their mental maps, but social life is possible only if they share common languages, beliefs and worldviews.' Thus, worldviews are intertwined with social systems reflecting social classes, religions, economic models, and cultural rituals. To understand people worldviews, the researcher must access the perceptions

[11] Saturation in this case means that additional interviews would not add anything new to the overall story.

and experiences of people. Dennis K. Mumby (1992), argues that facts drive decision making. Thus, emotions must be set aside in data analysis to allow for rational analysis. The concept of removing one's emotions and providing analysis based on logic is certainly appealing; however, is this possible? Sibylle Artz (1994) argues that emotions and feelings affect decision making and that they have a profound influence on the way people make sense of events and construe meaning from information and facts. Instead of severing emotions from analysis, qualitative research allows to include both facts and emotions as ways of knowing and often in consideration of each other. Acknowledging feelings as a way of knowing extends the potential to understand interpersonal communications. Moreover, it enables the additional appreciation of people struggling with the tensions created by rationality and feeling and the difficulties in reconciling them (Artz and Riecken 1994). That is why the choice of coding is two-layered. First, it started with classic thematic coding and then with emotional coding, the method and purpose of which are explained later in the chapter.

Data Analysis

Data analysis started, by listening to all the interviews recorded to bring back the fieldwork experience and capture parts of the interviews that sounded interesting or which were not found particularly relevant during the interviews and might include some added information. I realised that several events were taking place during the interviews such as silences, cough, voices and cars in the surroundings which I had not noticed, I took additional notes regarding what stood out with my particular research subject in mind. The interviews were then transcribed verbatim to prepare the first transcript.

The second step included a thematic analysis of the transcripts to recognise the topics emerging that could help understand the emotions generated relationships between expatriates and local leaders. The transcripts were imported into Atlas.ti, a computer program adapted for the qualitative analysis of texts, graphics and audio and video data in various disciplines including architecture, communication, market research, sociology and psychology, among others. Using the coding and annotation functions of the program, I proceeded to general thematic coding to develop an understanding of the meanings produced by participants' narratives of events and the circumstances in which they occurred (Floersh 2010: 3).

Richard E. Boyatzis (1998) describes the functions of thematic analysis as a method of giving sense to apparently unrelated content, a way of looking at a situation, a procedure to analyse qualitative information and a technique to systematically observe an event, a person or an interaction among a people or culture. Once several themes emerged, they were explored and a list of the themes was established to define their connectedness and detect some patterns. Overarching themes were further established to assess their relationships and links to the research objectives. The patterns in the data were also established by 'comparing discovered themes with prior experience with the phenomenon, or with literature about the object of inquiry. And, of course, a hoped-for outcome is that a theme emerges that is not found in the literature or prior experience of the researcher'. (Floersh 2010: 3)

Once the thematic codes were organised, an exploration of the types of emotions associated with each theme was undertaken. Johnny Saldana (2009: 263) describes *emotional coding* as the labelling of 'the emotions recalled and/or experienced by the participants…Emotional coding is appropriate for virtually all participants…Emotion Coding is suitable for nearly all qualitative studies, but particularly for those that explore intrapersonal and interpersonal participant experiences and actions.' (Miles Huberman 2013: 75) Emotional coding also provides insight into the participants' perspectives, worldviews, and living conditions. Working with emotional coding provided an additional understanding of the interpersonal and intrapersonal relationships of power between local leaders and expatriates and the way they were affecting or may affect these relationships.

Emotional Coding

This interpersonal qualitative research intent is to examine the role of emotions in the constitution of meaning, and it was chosen to develop a typology of emotional experiences of local leaders and expatriates based on the underlying relations of power. The intent is to present an interpretation of the kind of emotions we can expect in these relationships.

Different theories about emotions have been developed to explain what they are, how they operate, and they can be studied from different perspectives. For this study, emotions are approached contextually and in relation to the social interaction and relationships (Scherer 1986; Parkinson) between local leaders and expatriates. As Keltner and Lerner (2010), remark, if we think of emotions as social events, our conception of emotions is different than if we think about emotions as reactions to events, in the case of this study, if we think about Haiti in relation to the earthquake that rattled the country in 2010, the analysis of emotions experienced by Haitians and expatriates alike will be based on this particular event. However, if we consider emotions as experienced in the interaction of expatriates and local Haitians leaders, emotions are contemplated as the result of social events. When approaching emotions as a result of interaction and relationships, we realise that the development of these emotions is contingent on the context in which they develop (Harré 1986; Lutz 1988; Hochschild 2006). In other words, emotions from this perspective are socially constructed. Parkinson (1996: 680) describes emotions as:

> ... something that emerges directly through the medium of interaction. Interpersonal factors are typically the main causes of emotion, and emotions lead people to engage in certain kinds of social encounter or withdraw from such interpersonal contact. Many emotions have relational rather than personal meanings ... and the expression of these meanings in an emotional interaction serves specific interpersonal functions depending on the nature of the emotion.

Rom Harré (1989) adds that social practices, language and other cultural elements play a significant role in the formation of emotions. Individuals' emotions emerge on the bases of the situations they have been exposed to and on their individual experiences they have lived either directly or indirectly. However as Michael Boiger and Batja Mesquita (2012: 221) remark, the construction emanates 'from the interplay between several components (cognitive, motivational, and physiological) rather than being unitary entities.' Emotions are psychological constructs representing evaluative reactions to events or agents varying in intensity (Clore and Ortony 1988). In cognitive theories, these evaluative reactions suggest that individual assess new stimulus which determines the emotional experience based on the assumption that individuals have goals, personal tendencies and desires already present before experiencing a stimulus which is met on the premises of these underlying factors (Boigier and Batja 2012).

Another element relevant to the discussion in the field of emotional studies is related to agency. While our emotions tend to be considered individual and involuntary, instinctive, and determined by biological elements, social constructionists have created new interpretations by assuming that emotions are defined by attitudes construed by social environments. That is, '[T]hey are ways in which we engage actively and even construct the world. They have both mental and physical aspects, each of which conditions the other' (Jaggar 1989: 159). If we assume that emotions pertain to human agency and, thus, are deeply connected to values, we 'presuppose emotions to the extent that emotions provide the experiential basis for values. If we had no emotional responses to the world, it is inconceivable that we should ever come to value one state of affairs more highly than another' (Jaggar 1989: 153). The emotions produced by an object or event such as pride, greed or grievance evaluated; this entails that each emotion produced is the results of the evaluation of several aspects of a context.

Robert Solomon (1993: 125-126) asserts that emotions are 'a basic judgment about our Selves and our place in our world, the projection of the values and ideals, structures and mythologies, according to which we live and through which we experience our lives’. Judging refers to individuals' mental ability to develop an emotion when they experience a particular stimulus or the occurrence of a particular state of the world; what Martha Nussbaum (2004: 191) calls "assent[ing] to an appearance". Taking anger as an example, Solomon's theorises, "What constitutes the anger is my judging *that I have been insulted and offended*" (1977: 47). Nussbaum has an analogous, but a more causal and explanatory account of anger ‘that there has been some damage to me or to something or someone close to me; that the damage is not trivial but significant; that it was done by someone; that it was done willingly; that it would be right for the perpetrator of the damage to be punished’ (2004: 188).

Nussbaum further discusses the example of anger to interpret how nonidentical beliefs are affiliated to emotions, anger in this case. She discerns that, ‘each element of this set of beliefs is necessary in order for anger to be present: if I should discover that not *x* but *y* had done the damage, or that it was not done willingly, or that it was not serious, we could expect my anger to modify itself accordingly or recede’ (2004: 188). In other words, an individual change in beliefs or worldview affect her/his emotions or might even suppress an emotion altogether. In this case, our emotions are dependent on our worldviews, ‘the judgments and objects that constitute our emotions are those which are especially important to us, meaningful to us, concerning matters in which we have invested our Selves’ (Solomon 1993: 127). However, although judgement theories recognise that emotions are a cognitive process, they do not assert that they are the product of a deliberative or conscious process, Salomon explains ‘by 'judgment', I do not necessarily mean 'deliberative judgment' ... One might call such judgments 'spontaneous' as long as 'spontaneity' isn't confused with 'passivity' (1977: 46).

In terms of the construction of emotions, five components have been consistently advanced by leading researchers in the emotional process: a cognitive evaluation and appraisal of an event, an object or agent behaviour, the physiological components of stimulation, the integration of new events within the pre-existing mental state through micro dialogues[12], the motivation or change in motivation including intentional behaviours and actions, and finally, the expression of these emotions (Plutchik and Kellerman 1980; Scherer 1984; Fiske and Neuberg 1990).

The origins of emotion coding has be traced to Prus' (1996) research on symbolic interactions in ethnographic work. He was particularly interested in the way emotional meanings permeate particular social contexts. However, it was Johnny Saldana (2009) who developed this nascent methodology into an advanced analytical tool. He proved their usefulness and practicality using data from interviews with people visiting bars in search of sexual relationships. Emotional coding was based on the the assumption of Strauss and Corbin (1990: 7), who consider emotions as a universal human experience. Their acknowledgement allows more profound insights into world views, perspectives and well-being or life conditions. They observe, 'One can't separate emotion from action: they flow together, one leading into the other' (p.7). This unusual coding method was adapted to the enquiry about the impact of the asymmetrical relationship of power on local leaders and expatriates' construction of meanings.

While the literature reviewed above mostly acknowledges that emotions and actions are interrelated, in the realm of humanitarianism, these aspects have yet to be further explored. As Jimmie Manning and Adrianna Kundel (2014: 59) remark in their method to collect and analyse data on interpersonal relationships, '[U]sing emotion coding allows qualitative researchers an exciting chance to make sense of the sometimes conflicting and often multi-layered articulation and demonstrations of emotion within a social scene'. The task, in this case was to study how emotions affect or even constitute meanings in the relationships taking place between humanitarians and local leaders, relatively to the background and contextual analysis developed. The

[12] Ian Burkitt (2010) define micro-dialogue as ,' silent and invisible series of dialogues we hold for ourselves with the images and voices of others, which can emerge in surprising and unwilled ways... micro-dialogue is important in understanding the dialogical interaction between persons, as not all aspects of the self will enter into dialogue with others, leading to miscommunication, misunderstanding, and misrecognition.'

use of emotional coding requires researchers to take into consideration the ‘entire social scene as part of their analysis and not simply the words used in a research situation.’ In addition to the interviews, it was thus crucial to develop a comprehensive knowledge about the historical and cultural setting of both humanitarians and local leaders. According to Manning and Kunkel (2014: 60),

> Coding occurs when emotions are explicitly articulated, made evident through discourse, or observed through action ... However, coding some portion of text might lead to the … of a limited range of emotions, thus, the contextualisation of the study and the use of notes, comments and observations in journals or analytical comment became essential to avoid acting as an inexperienced psychologist.

While part of an interview might have revealed or pointed to a specific contextual emotion and provided a limited understanding of the broader dimensions of the relationship between expatriates and local leaders, examining the intersectionality between the interviews and the global context offered insights into the various emotions experienced about similar events and what they might suggest. The predominant emotions experienced by expatriates and local leaders interviewed were afterwards, identified and contextualized.

Challenges in perceiving emotions

When we try to discern others’ emotions, there is a significant barrier to their identification, which has been determined by Gross (1998) as emotion regulation, a process in which individuals influence which, when and how positive and negative emotions are felt and communicated. Wirtz et al. (2006) explain that emotion regulation strategies are used in an adaptative or maladaptive way depending on the purpose and context, and Mennin et al. (2002) studies defend that emotions regulation can lead to increase stress and that emotion regulation can lead to worry and according to Côte et al. (2010) to unhappiness. Gross and John (2003) have identified two primary forms of emotion regulation: excessive suppression and cognitive reappraisal. Expressive suppression indicates that one is not showing emotion experienced internally explicitly to others while in cognitive reappraisal one controls the emotional response and it tends to reduce negative feelings and increase positive ones (Gross 1998; Lieberman et al. 2011). Cheng (2001) also comments that cognitive reappraisal was increasing well-being and psychological flexibility. In the context of this study and the coding of emotion, both excessive suppression and cognitive reappraisal were considered to take place during the various interactions.

Emotions give meaning to our lives; both expatriates and Haitians are not necessarily aware of the historiographies and processes behind these constructs. As Alison M. Jaggar (2015: 384) writes, ’lack of awareness of emotions certainly does not mean that emotions are not present subconsciously or unconsciously, or that subterranean emotions do not exert a continuing influence on people’s articulated values and observations, thoughts and actions.’ Unearthing the emotions experienced by local leaders and humanitarians in the Haitian related to the themes mined from the interviews shed some light on their influence on the content of their relationships.

The Classification of Emotions

The progression of any scientific field needs a fully elaborated, differentiated and defined conceptualisation of its elements. While this was achieved in fields such as chemistry or biology, there is not yet a comprehensive and universal study of human classification of emotions. Theodore D. Kemper (1978: 24) observed, ‘[W]e have no general statement concerning either a full range of emotions or a full range of interaction conditions that might produce emotions’.

Traditionally, the approach to classifying emotions has been the assignment of numbers to lead human emotions, often termed *basic emotions*. Aristotle named fifteen of them; Descartes, six; Hume, two; Hobbes, seven; and

Aquinas, eleven (Weiner 1980). Plutchik (1980: 102) commented, ‘the appearance in all languages of words like *angry, afraid,* and *happy,* suggests that these words represent universal experiences’[13]. Weiner (1980) observed that the labelling of emotions had not produced any agreement about the number or the naming of emotions. Scholars have not succeeded yet in defining the differences among a wide range of emotions categories in a systematic manner. For example, they have not achieved a differentiation of the specific meanings of universal emotions such as regret, guilt, or shame. Robert A. Thamm (2006: 12) suspects that one of the reasons is that ‘[T]hey failed to reach agreement on which emotions are elemental and which are not. In most cases, labels are equated with the emotion (e.g. shame is the emotion).’

Two main approaches have raised controversy in the last few decades. One is the structural dimension approach, and the other is the prototypal label categorisation. Prototypal labelling is based on emotions’ conceptual resemblance and focuses on their internal structure, considering that emotions do not display defined boundaries. The structural dimensional approach assumes that there are enough mutually exclusive and sufficient conditions to differentiate emotions (Russel 1991). Shaver’s (2001) argued that a prototypical approach is more perceptive to the nuances of emotions. However, as Thamm (2006: 12) wrote,

> Initiating the classification of human emotions by attempting to demonstrate interconnections among a list of emotion “concepts” or “labels” is rather futile. It is analogous to labelling the various species of “flowers” prior to examining the necessary and sufficient conditions that define and differentiate their foliages and other inherent structural attributes.

---

[13] *Li Chi,* an encyclopedia compiled during the first century B.C. reads ‘What are the feelings of men? They are joy, anger, sadness, fear, disliking, and liking. These seven feelings belong to men without their learning them’ (Chai and Chai 1967: 379). (Chai 1885/1967 p379)

According to Thamm, categorising phenomena before elaborating on their underlying structural conditions, states and dimensions are elusive. Only after understanding the differences in the structural conditions defining emotions should we label these emotions. Clore and Ortony (1988) proposed a combination by arguing that the aim should not be to label emotions with words, but rather, to discover the social structural conditions to which such words relate and the social conditions that predict them, which is the method I follow in the upcoming data analysis.

Coding Process for Grounded Theory

As expected, most of the transcribed interviews produced long narratives[14]. The goal of the coding was to identify the social structural conditions underlying the relationship between expatriates and local leaders and what emotions resulted from them. The coding was implemented in several steps. First, the data was imported into Atlas.ti, a computer programme adapted for the qualitative analysis of texts, graphics, and audio and video data in various disciplines, including architecture, communication, market research, sociology, and psychology, among others. The software was particularly useful in developing theoretical memos. Memos document the research thinking process, they are not accounts of the social context (Montgomery 2007: 68).

According to Schreiber (2001), there are three levels of coding in developing grounded theory. A first-level coding which utilises the words from interviewees from a line by line analysis, the second level of coding which categorises the codes extracted from the first-level coding, and finally, the third level of coding which includes the selection of labels representing the connections between the categories. In the data presentation, some of the line by line analysis is included to illustrate some of the themes developed.

---

14 Some sections of three interviews could not be transcribed. The high temperatures affected the performance of the recorder.

The thematic analysis gave meaning and connected the content of the material collected (Boyatzis 1998), giving sense to apparently unrelated content, providing a way of looking at a situation, a procedure to analyse qualitative information and a technique to systematically observe an event, a person or the interactions among peoples or cultures.

General Remarks about the Data Collection

Researching countries such as Haiti demands patience, cultural sensitivity, creativity and inventiveness. In Haiti, as in most 'impoverished' countries, most people who are at leadership position are cumulating several positions, for example, a Haitian doctor might work at the hospital but also be the health care representative for the government (often these positions are pro-bono or the remuneration is so minimal and frequently unpaid)[15]. Expatriates are often overworked and have busy schedules. For the local leaders, after visiting a potential participant, a phone call might be received that the participant was willing to be interviewed, but in the next hour. Finding the driver who was working somewhere else and convincing him that we had to leave in the next five minutes was sometimes challenging on one side but, on the other side I would give me the opportunity to accompany him to his other commitments, with the chance to visit a number of places I would not have thought about and meet Haitians in their everyday life and activities. I was pleasantly surprised that Haitians, as well as expatriates in general, were interested in the topic of the research project and most welcoming. I even sensed that they were eager to share their experiences. Only two of the largest international organisations in town refused to see me, and some Haitians formerly employed by humanitarian organisations declined to be interviewed, as they had signed a non-disclosure form with their former employers. When I was visiting the country, most humanitarian organisations were leaving or downsizing their programmes for various reasons, including the consideration that the programme's cycle was completed, they were facing funding difficulties, or they had a specific budget to spend.

---

[15] From notes in field journal

Another general remark concerns the use of language. As already explained, language is an important indicator of the position of various stakeholders in the power relationship. Most of the field officers still referred to Haitians as *our beneficiaries*, a term that has been criticised widely in the literature, as it corroborates the perception that humanitarians tend to objectify and victimise the populations they assist. Although the literature has criticised this attitude, in practice, humanitarian jargon retains its strength and creates distance between the initiated and uninitiated. In the case of this study, speaking French and English facilitated and improved the quality of communications. All expatriates were speaking some English. Two out of eight spoke French. Two of the local leaders were speaking English, the other six spoke French, and all were also speaking Creole.

It was not possible to interview an equal number of men and women, finding women in leadership positions among either expatriates or Haitians did not materialize. Out of the 14 interviews, only two were women working with secular humanitarian organisations at middle leadership positions. The interviews were of various lengths, the shortest interviews lasted 35 minutes, while the longest one lasted one hour and 47 minutes.

Distribution of Interviews

Local Leaders	Church (3) Gender: 3 Males	Traditional: (3) Gender: 3 Male	Local Administration (3) Gender: 3 Males

Expatriates	Faith-Based (1) Gender: 1 Male	Secular (2) Gender: 1 Males; 1 Female	Red Cross Movement (1) Gender: 1 Female

Table 1 - Author (2014). Distribution of Interviews

Unfolding of Interviews

Interviews conducted *in situ* facilitate the connection with the participants in their usual and familiar surroundings, giving some power to the interviewee. In general, all respondents invited me to sit in their office. The interviews also allowed for an opportunity to visit health posts, public offices, orphanages, vodou temples and churches[16]. They opened the possibility of sensing and immersing myself in the atmosphere. Even though it was for a few hours, it was a unique moment to observe the surroundings and meet other staff members, and often the visit would last all morning or afternoon. As mentioned earlier, the fact that I had worked and lived in other countries experiencing political instability or conflicts created an instantaneous connection with both Haitians and expatriates, as we could find common ground for discussion in our introductions. All interviewees were welcoming, according to some of the most thorough studies conducted by Gerarld, F. Murray (1977; 1980; 1984), culturally, Haitians try to avoid any potential personal conflicts when interacting with outsiders, and this was maybe the reason. In some communities, after a while, people were entering the room and joining the conversation. These occurrences could not be categorised as focus groups, and I would stop recording. These open discussions were often more spontaneous, and emotions were flowing freely (in the manner of a focus group).[17] I also had several opportunities to have conversations with

[16] Pictures in Appendix 3
[17] All these remarks are derived from the observations and reflections I consigned to my journal.

people at the markets, temples, churches, or the street. Finally, I was staying in a small inn, the only one opens in the town, of which the pleasant terrace was always a welcoming spot for an enjoyable break and provided opportunities to talk with expatriates, UN personnel and Haitians who enjoyed this friendly place.

Choice of the Case Study: Haiti

Like many former colonised countries, Haiti has been plagued by insecurity and conflicts caused by internal and external influences as well as natural disasters. In 1804, after a protracted conflict between slaves and French colonialists, Haiti became the first black country to gain its independence through a revolution (Douglass 1893; Debien 1973; Dubois 2004; Popkin 2012). Today, Haiti remains the poorest country in the Western hemisphere, ranking 153rd on the Human Development Index[18]. In January 2010, the most powerful earthquake of the last 200 years struck the country, with its epicenter about 15 miles from the capital of Port-au-Prince. The death toll was estimated at 300,000 people, and more than 1.5 million Haitians were left homeless and utterly destitute (François 2011). As explained more thoroughly in Chapter 5, the country has been troubled not only by natural disasters but also by constant political instability and violence. Since its independence, the country h has been governed continuously by greedy and despotic dictators (Diederich and Burt 1972; Ferguson 1987). It must also be noted that foreign interventions (Plummer 1988; Plummer 1992; Clement 1997) in the internal affairs of the country have contributed to the political instability and violence prevailing to this day.

Since 2004, the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUTSAH) has been working in the country to re-establish and maintain civil order. The mission includes 6,685 military personnel and a 2,600-member police force

[18] The Human Development Index (HDI) is used to rank countries into four tiers of human development and is maintained by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The HDI is a composite statistic including life expectancy, education and per-capita income indicators.

supported by 443 civilians[19] (*Why we need continuing MINUSTAH presence in Haiti* 2008; Panchang 2011; Lemay-Hébert 2014). The country is also widely populated by humanitarians and development agencies. Before the earthquake, their number was estimated at 3,000, but it reached over 10,000 afterward (Plummer 1988; Dubois 2012; Farmer 2012). However, the precise number is not possible to define since many organisations were not able to register with the government (Katz 2013). At the time of my visit to Haiti, three years after the earthquake, many humanitarian organisations were downsizing their programmes as they had reached their objectives or ran out of funding {Katz, 2013 #214;Galada, 2014 #377;Research, 2012 #960;Widmer, 2014 #373}. Thousands of Haitians young men had lost their employment with these organisations, and their respective organisations had declared several areas out of reach for foreign personnel due to security reasons.

Fieldwork: Location and Conditions

The fieldwork was conducted during a six-week period in October and November 2013 in the *arrondissement* of Léogâne, an urban, peri-urban and rural area located in the Department Ouest of Haiti (see map 1 below). The population of the area was estimated to be around 300,000 inhabitants before the 2010 earthquake[20] that destroyed 80–90 percent of the infrastructure.

[19] A more complete picture of MINUTSAH is provided in Chapter 4.
[20] No census has been performed since the 2010 earthquake, which means that the total population in the area may be lower today due to the region’s location at the epicentre of the earthquake



Figure 1 - Map of Haiti and the Domenican Republic (Source: World Food Programme)

The two following pictures provide an overview of the level of destruction of the city of Léogâne a few days after the earthquake of 2010. Although the thesis does not focus on the earthquake *per se*, its impact on people's life could still be felt at the end of 2013, and humanitarian organisations' programmes were still affected by its impact, although humanitarian needs and poverty are constant on the island.

Picture - 1 Haitian-Truth.org (2010) Léogâne after the earthquake.

Picture - 2: Haitian-Truth.org (2010) Picture showing the massive destruction of an urban area in Léogâne.

One of the main constraints during the fieldwork was the difficulty of finding safe and affordable transportation. The costs were prohibitive (a day with the driver would cost me around 300 US$), forcing me to abridge my field visit by one week due to funding shortages. This limitation on the fieldwork time was remediated by the intense discussions that took place outside the interviews' schedules with Haitians and expatriates in various settings. Information and observation were also collected spontaneously through daily visits to markets,

Picture - 3: Author (2013): Central Market in Léogâne

Picture - 4: Author (2013) Market in Léogâne

participation in church activities,

Picture - 5: Author (2013). Before the Mass at the Adventist Church in Léogâne

visits to health posts,

Picture - 6: Author (2013). Health post in Léogâne

Good fortune can play a compensating role in challenging research environments: The chauffeur was extremely knowledgeable, well-connected, and well-appreciated by many local leaders, employees of humanitarian organisations as well as local NGOs. Being born in Léogâne, he took the time between interviews to share various aspects of his society and surroundings. He was eager to help once he understood the purpose of the research, and it would not have been possible to gather as much information in such a brief time without his involvement.

Limitations

This study has the following limitations, inquiries related to perceptions and stereotyping tend to agree that personal behaviours are mostly interpreted in terms of group belonging or membership, confirming the perceiver's initial stereotype-based expectancy. Thus, '[W]hereas a particular behaviour may be viewed as being appropriately assertive when coming from a white child, the same behavior may be perceived as being overly aggressive when displayed by a black child' (Neuberg 1996: 228). As the researcher interviews and observes, he/she has expectations that can be inconsistent with the responses of the participants. Steven L. Neuberg (1996: 537) proposes two ways in which the perceiver (researcher, in our case) may experience these inconsistencies. First, he/she may have formed expectations transforming into established confirmations in which the target behaviour becomes consistent with these expectations. Second, the researcher may present 'a cognitive bias, through which they inappropriately view target behaviour as being expectancy-consistent'.

It must be acknowledged that, although I am conscious of my own subjectivity and emotionality, I am especially sensitive to postcolonial attitudes and practices, and a priori, I was quite critical of some expatriates' behaviours in Haiti or in any other contexts in which I have worked. Although aware of this personal subjectivity, I experienced moments of anxiety while interviewing and interpreting the data, in regard to my objectivity. Thus, the reader must be informed that, although conscious of these tendencies, I cannot avoid them altogether. In light of these acknowledgements, I followed Rowan (1981) in his review of Aaron Esterson's (1972) work recommending to not avoid emotions, but instead, to use them to build reciprocity with those we interact with, in this case, the participants who were interviewed. As Rowan (1981: 167-168) further suggested:

> The observer, with the cooperation of the other, constitutes himself as part of the field of study, while studying the field he and the other constitute…. [The researcher] must be able to reflect upon, and reason about, a reciprocity that includes himself as one of the reciprocating terms. The narrative interview is particularly adapted to this reciprocity.

Increasing attention has been given to adopting interactive ways in the co-production of knowledge through the collaboration between academics and non-academics (in this case between interviewees and interviewers) (Robinson and Tansey, 2006; Lemos and Morehouse, 2005). In this co-production, ways of knowing the world are intrinsically connected to the ways in which we organise them. It also takes a comprehensive approach in the relations between power, culture, and knowledge (Jasanoff, 2004).

Structure of The Dissertation

Chapter three presents the historical events and social changes that have contributed to shaping modern humanitarianism in Europe and North America. A review of Western humanitarian foundational events, the evolution of its principles and the examination of the effect of its institutionalization provides a background allowing to identify some of the challenges and orientation of the contemporary humanitarian movement.

Chapter four explores the position of humanitarians in the social hierarchy of communities through the exploration of the perceptions emerging from the relationships of power between humanitarians[21] (expatriates) and the populations they are serving.

The earthquake that shocked the island of Haiti in January 2010 was supposed to represent a turning point in the history of the country, in which

[21] Expatriates are referred to as humanitarians in the study.

50 years of relentless efforts to bring ‘development’ had not succeeded. As Jonathan M. Katz (2013: 2) remarks, ‘I wanted to understand how people could endure not only the catastrophe that befell Haiti...but also the hardship and absurdity that followed’. Chapter five examines the contents of the Haitian society social construction through the exploration of the vagaries of its history and the internal and external powers that have influenced it.

Chapter six presents the analysis of the data collected through the unstructured interviews conducted in Haiti between October and November 2013. The first part of the analysis included a general coding of the interviews collected; the analysis was refined by identifying some of the emotions experienced through these relationships. The identification of the emotions experienced by both local leaders and humanitarians provides a new appreciation of the sociocultural processes that are constitutive of these relationships.

Chapter seven reflects on the findings generated by the data analysis and proposes an adaptation of the Cultural Competence theory to improve and develop the relationship between local leaders and humanitarians.

Chapter 3: Humanitarianism

The mandate for humanitarian imperium has been acquired by default, driven not by grand design in the metropolis but more by the incremental logic of trying to address these complex emergencies themselves without appreciating the endpoint…this humanitarian empire has been acquired in a fit of absence of mind.(de Waal 2010: S136)

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present the historical events and social changes that have contributed to shaping modern humanitarianism in Europe and North America. A review of Western humanitarian foundational events, the evolution of its principles and the examination of the effect of its institutionalization provides a background allowing to identify some of the challenges and orientation of the contemporary humanitarian movement.

Modern Humanitarianism: Origin and Foundational events

Although compassion and assistance to fellow humans in dire needs has been present in historic recording throughout history, the modern expression and concept of humanitarian action have emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century in Western Europe and North-America through the intricate progression of armed conflicts, technological development and changes in societal organisation. The apparition of the term humanitarianism has been traced in the nineteenth century. In its general form, humanitarianism is the belief in the equal value of all human lives. It is also an ethic of compassion, benevolence, and consideration of the Other (Barnett 2011). One of its overarching characteristics resides in its mission to ‘do some good’ by improving some of the aspects of the human condition with a focus on those who suffer. Humanitarianism is not just an ideal; it is also a practice and is frequently implemented through the provision of services and material assistance to populations and individuals affected by the effect of conflicts and/or natural disasters (Davey 2013). A narrow definition proposed by Michael Barnett, a leading scholar in the field, reads that humanitarianism is ‘the impartial, independent, and neutral provision of relief to those in immediate danger of harm’ (2005: 724). Before the 18th century, the closest terminologies associated with the concept were *charity* or *benevolence* representing some forms of humanitarianism that have been present throughout human history, even though etymologically, the term appeared only in 1794[22].

Since the middle of the eighteen century a variety of definitions of *humanitarianism* have revealed a range of understandings, and there is no single and straightforward definition of the concept, but various authors bring some nuances to our understanding. Bornstein and Redfield (2010: 9) define it as ‘the impulse to alleviating suffering’ and ‘a structure of feeling, a cluster of moral principles, a basic for ethical claims and political strategies, and a call for action’. Norman Fiering (1976: 195) described *humanitarianism* as ‘the widespread inclination of protest against obvious and pointless physical suffering’. Ruth Leys (2007) locates the kernel of humanitarianism in the shame and guilt experienced by humans towards the unjust suffering of the other. Robert Crane (1934: 206) described a doctrine of humanitarianism which was ‘something new in the world – a doctrine or rather a complex of doctrines, which a hundred years before 1750 would have been frowned upon, had it ever been presented to them, by representatives of every school of ethical thought’.

Through these definitions, two ethical trends emerge, one is a form of humanitarianism concerned mostly with the relief of suffering, while the other

[22] The Late Middle Ages comprise the period in European history lasting from AD 1250 to 1500. Etymologically, the term *humanitarian* first appeared in 1794 (n.): ‘In the theological sense “one who affirms the humanity of Christ but denies his pre-existence and divinity”, From humanity + suffix from Unitarian’ (2000).

is concerned with protesting and challenging those who inflict pain and torment on others. Philosophically, humanitarianism is the belief in actions that improve the fate of human beings. Scholars and historians of humanitarianism have attempted to provide an origin for the Western humanitarian movement and most trace it to the Enlightenment period of the eighteenth century (Parmelee 1915; Crocker 1969; Fiering 1976; DeChaine 2005; Redfield and Bornstein 2010; Barnett and Weiss 2011), which is often called the birth of modern humanitarianism.

The concept of humanitarianism is complicated, complex and fluid as it needs to adapt to the needs of its times, ‘humanitarianism has this remarkable capacity: it fugaciously and illusorily bridges the contradictions of our world and makes the intolerableness of its injustices somewhat bearable. Hence, its consensual force’ Didier Fassin (2012, xii). The fact that humanitarianism has to adapt and evolve according to the needs of changing contexts provides a substantial indication of the difficulties and the necessity of progress and reinvention for humanitarians to fulfil their ideals.

The founding moment of modern humanitarianism has often been identified in the effort undertaken by Henri Dunant to establish a permanent system of assistance for soldiers wounded in the field which materialized in the drawing of the founding charter of the Red Cross in 1863 (Barnett and Weiss 2011; Skinner and Lester 2012; Lester and Dussart 2014). The names ' classical humanitarianism' or 'Dunantism' have been attributed to his efforts and his actions to relieve suffering of wounded soldiers abandoned on the battlefield during the Napoleonian wars for which he organised relief and assistance (Barnett 2011; Davey 2013) (Barnett 2011; Lest. Dunantism has been associated with a ‘conventional narrative’ considered as ‘a narrowly conceived form of civil action based on the duty of care, guided by the principles of impartiality (the quality and quantity of aid is set to correspond with people’s needs), neutrality (humanitarian action is motivated by a direct response to people’s suffering and nothing else besides), and independence (humanitarian action operates outside the fray of politics).’ (Wilkinson 2017)

These principles have been broadly recognised and accepted as ethical guidance by most humanitarian organisations until the end of the Cold War. They have become the dominant norms shaping humanitarian ethic through official documents and resolutions including but not limited to, the United Nations resolution 46/182, the Red Cross movement and NGOs Code of Conduct of 1994, the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) initiative, the Sphere Project Core Humanitarian Standards and more recently the reports and commitments issued from the World Humanitarian Summit that took place in 2016. The humanitarian principles have represented the moral ground for humanitarian action for more than a century, and the Red Cross Movement created by Dunant has contributed to the elaboration and evolution of International Humanitarian Law (Barnett 2011). Although this form of humanitarianism has provided and still provide immense relief to those suffering from the effect of international or internal conflict, it was 'born during the age of European colonialism and maturing in a period of unprecedented US power and reach, the formal system of UN agencies, the Red Cross Movement and the large international NGOs is the outcome, not of an inevitable and ineluctable process, but of a particular period of Western economic and political hegemony.' (Bennett and Foley 2016: 4-5) After the end of the Cold War, the new international system emerging made the abiding to these principles increasingly difficult. However, some changes in the system started to emerge as soon as WWI.

The architecture of the humanitarian system as it is today, started to take shape in the aftermath of WWI when the League of Nations and the High Commissioner for Refugees (HCR) were created. The roles of the HCR were to aid Russian refugees and create an international travel document for refugees (Davey, 2013: 8). The League of Red Cross Societies (LRCS) -- now known as the International Federation of the Red Cross and Save the Children were instrumental in the provision and coordination of humanitarian assistance and provided the backbone on its road to institutionalization.

WWII further influenced the development, consolidation, and institutionalisation of the humanitarian system as it is today. The United

Nations was created at the end of the war and remain today the largest providers of humanitarian aid, the central coordinating, advocacy and managing fund body. The end of WWII was also crucial the creation and adoption of international treaties aiming at protecting civilians affected by conflicts, among them must be cited, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, as well as the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Convention for the Protection of Refugees of 1951. WWII and its aftermaths also contributed to the establishment of hundreds of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) mostly in Europe and the United States.

The decolonisation process and the Cold War had a great impact on European humanitarianism and ‘The skills, material and money wielded by Northern organisations were called upon to supplement those of the newly established Southern governments, many of whom were struggling with inadequate resources and infrastructure after the rapid withdrawal of the colonial powers’. (Davey, 2013:11) The amount of humanitarian assistance delivered outside Europe increased significantly; however, the decolonisation process was superimposed with the ideological competition between the US and Russia which were preoccupied in securing allegiance to their particular ideology by the newly established nation-states (Barnett and Weiss 2008). For humanitarian organisations from the US to remain operational, had in some cases to foresee the principles of independence, impartiality, and neutrality. US relief organisations closely worked with their government in countries representing a strategic interest. In Vietnam in particular, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and CARE were working with the South Vietnam regime backed by the US, the ‘thoroughgoing penetration of humanitarian activities by political agendas’ (Minear 2012: 45-48) were standard. According to Larry Minear (2002) and Abby Stoddard (2003: 2), ideologically and normatively, an increasing number of organisations adopted US president Woodrow Wilson’s agenda ‘who hoped to project US values and influence as a force for good in the world, the Wilsonian tradition sees basic compatibility with humanitarian aims and US foreign policy objectives’ . It was based on the paradigm that by changing the economic, cultural, and political structured of countries affected by conflicts following the end of the Cold War, peace would ensue as a trickledown effect. Furthermore, according to François Bugnion (2000: 44), the normative humanitarian frameworks, mostly established in Europe, were ‘rejected by the developing countries, which had had not taken part in the 1949 diplomatic conference[23] and resented being bound by rules in whose drafting they had had no say’. A narrative emerged about the influence of post-colonialism and imperialism on humanitarian action linked both by the paternalist approach of Dunantism and politically Wilsonian motivated humanitarianism.

According to Doctor without Border, in 1997, 43 internal conflicts were raging mostly in Africa and Eastern Europe (MSF, 1997: 7). The UN Security Council empowered by the end of the Cold War agreed on the first military interventions on behalf of the United Nations (Barnett 2011: 163-167) [24] in an attempt to control and end these bloody conflicts. As Soguk (1999: 183) wrote, ‘a new rule is emerging: There are circumstances in which the world community can, in defence of our common humanity, interfere in the national affairs of a sovereign nation state’. The enhanced role of the United Nations allowed the negotiation, not only with governments but also with armed groups to open access for humanitarian organisations allowing them to reach populations in both governments and rebel-held areas (Collinson 2012: 6). One of the most cited humanitarian actions that took place during this period based on this new *modus operandi* is Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS)[25].

As the limitations imposed by the cold war on the UN were lifted, the international organisation institutional arrangement was restructured with the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 1991. Resolution 46/182 was instrumental in delineating the architecture of today’s international

---

[23] The 1949 Conference met in Geneva to finalise the drafting of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Howard2)
[24] From 1948–88, the United Nations were involved in only five peacekeeping missions, and from 1989–94 it launched 20 missions and the number of peacekeepers increased from 11,000 to 75,000 (Peacekeeping 2020).
[25] Mark Duffield (2014) offers a thorough account on Operation Lifeline Sudan in his book titled ‘Global governance and the new wars: the merging of development and security’, especially chapters 8 and 9.

humanitarian system. The resolution pushed forward the creation of humanitarian mechanisms that are still relevant in current humanitarian responses. One example is the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), established in June 1992 it includes the various UN agencies and other large humanitarian organisations (Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance). It serves as an inter-agency forum for improving coordination, policy development and decision-making body which include. A review of the performance of the IASC states that it,

> [H]ad made considerable progress in establishing field-based and field-oriented mechanism for allocating responsibilities in humanitarian responses, and in the generation of informal mechanisms for problem-solving (a key achievement). However, 'it has not been successful in tackling issues of mandate gap and even less so on issues of capacity gap, and its performance in resolving system-wide policies has been weak. (Jones 2003: VI)

Resolution 46/182 also prompted the creation of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). OCHA has a critical role in coordinating humanitarian responses, mobilising urgent funds to respond promptly to humanitarian disasters, developing guiding policy and advocating victims of conflict or natural disasters. The resolution was also instrumental in the future establishment of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) created in March 2006.

NGO also became prominent players as governments increased the amounts of funding to support their activities and Larry Minear (2002) coined the term 'humanitarian enterprise' to describe how the growing size of these organisations was calling for more bureaucratic developments but also were giving them more economic, political and cultural power. The growth of the sector attracted praise but also criticism among which bureaucracy and lack of accountability were often cited (Barnett 2004). Influential humanitarian scholar Alex De Waal (1997: 65) wrote that humanitarianism had been taken over by

> [T]he humanitarian international', the international elite of the staff of international relief agencies, academics, consultants, specialist journalists... A generation ago, this group did not exist: governments, UN agencies and NGOs were staffed by different kinds of people who more often disputed common assumptions than share them. Since 1980 there has been a marked convergence towards a common culture.

The humanitarian system entered not only in a crisis of legitimacy but also in an existential one. Following the humanitarian response after the genocide in Rwanda, the first comprehensive evaluation of its impact – the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (JEEAR) – was performed under the Danish government's aid agency (DANIDA). The findings of the evaluation were extremely critical, and they included the mediocre performance of some NGOs and a general lack of professionalism, the proliferation of NGOs and the lack of regulations, coordination, and demarcation of responsibility (1996: 23-25). One of the thorniest issues concerned the responsibility of separating the genocidaires from the *bonafide* refugees. Following this sobering report, a group of humanitarian organisation launch the Sphere project in 1996 to 'strengthen the accountability of humanitarian agencies and to find ways of improving performances in humanitarian response' (Buchanan-Smith 2003: vi) This led to several collective accomplishments such as the 'Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief' (International Committee of the Red Cross 1994). A set of common standards were later developed and consigned in the Sphere Handbook, which is an influential guide in the humanitarian community (*The Sphere Project* 2018).

The attacks of September 11, 2001, on the United States led to new challenges for U.S. humanitarian organisations working or which wanted to work in the Middle East in particular. When the United States conducted international policy and military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq in particular, it conditionalized the funding of US humanitarian organisations upon the collaboration of humanitarian agencies with the US political and economic agendas (Donini 2011). As Christopher J. Coyne (2013: 39) remarks, ‘One central implication of this approach is that humanitarian action has become militarized, as diplomacy, development, and defense have become more unified so as to be viewed as inseparable.’ Humanitarian organisations faced a new challenge, this time involving the principles of impartiality and independence which had been conserved by both Dunantists and Wilsonians, the line between the military and humanitarian organisations were blurred by the agenda of the U.S. Militaries which were providing humanitarian aid with the aim of winning ‘hearts and minds’ of the population in Afghanistan. The humanitarian space[26] as writes Roisin Shannon (2009: 16) ‘which has depended on these principles being upheld, is shrinking’. The space for humanitarian action was clearly determined by the US and its allies. Giving instructions to NGOs receiving some funding from USAID in a speech given in 2003, Andrew Natsios (2003) who was the administrator of the institution at the time said ‘I’ve told them, the contractors, if you even mention your own organization once when you’re in the villages, I will tear your contract up and fire you... You are an arm of the U.S. government right now.’

The first decade of the 21st century was also marked by the conflict in Darfur and the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, the humanitarian response was criticised concerning its coordination capacities and its lack of leadership. In 2004, the UN emergency relief coordinator and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, commissioned a Humanitarian Response Review (Adinolfi C. et al. 8-9) which concluded that there was ‘a mixed image of the present response capacity of the international system, with some positive indicators, but also elements of concern. In particular, it highlights several of well-known, long-standing gaps that the system has failed to address in the past.’ and ‘The major gap identified is the low level of

[26] There is no clear definition of the concept of humanitarian space, it is generally used to express the extent to which the conduct of humanitarian action is possible along with the principles of neutrality and impartiality in particular (Leader, 2000; Ignatieff, 2003; Patel et al. , 2005; Phelan and Woods, 2005)

preparedness of the humanitarian organizations, in terms of human resources and sectoral capacities.' To address these criticisms, the United Nations created the Cluster Approach, a system organising each humanitarian response sectors under a lead agency to strengthen the coordination of humanitarian response and to improve the coverage of humanitarian assistance (Jahre 2010). Also, the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) was established to improve the timeliness of funding (Stoddard et al., 2007).

The Transformative Agenda (TA) was another initiative undertaken by the United Nations in 2011 after the earthquake in Haiti. The relief effort met major challenges going beyond the humanitarian crisis following the earthquake. Although the humanitarian crisis in Haiti came directly because of a severe natural disaster, the country has also suffered many years of political turmoil fueling violence before the massive earthquake. It had undergone periods of violence and social strive, not least under a succession of repressive dictatorships that have contributed to the extreme poverty under which live most of the population. In 2007 'crime and urban violence remain[d] pervasive… Anti-Government demonstrations have increased… [and] political groups [have] orchestrated acts of violence'[27]. In a conflict assessment report, published in 2006, the United Agency for International Development (USAID) found '"five groups of concern in Haiti" which can quickly mobilized, and which pose a substantial risk of "violent unrest"' (Hamlin K. 2006: 14).

Before the earthquake in 2010, the severity of political unrest in Haiti necessitated international intervention in the form of the U.N. stabilization mission in Haiti (MINUSTHA) which was established April 30, 2004, after determination that the situation in Haiti continued to be a threat to international peace and security in the region. The U.N. Security Council established the MINUSTAH[28] under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The

---

[27] According to the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights. Online at: < http://www.adh-geneva.ch/RULAC/current_conflict.php?id_state=84
[28] More details are provided about MINUSTAH in Chapter 4

mission’s role included three broad areas: ‘a secure and stable environment, the political process, and human rights’ (United Nations Security Council 2004)

After the earthquake, due to its proximity to the US, unorganised and uncoordinated relief poured into the country. The TA introduced the Level 3 Emergency to be applied to major crises and support a more rapid mobilisation and a system-wide response (Krueger et al. 2016). Six crises have benefited from the Level 3 Emergency, the Typhoon Haiyan in the Philipines, Syria, South-Sudan, the Central African Republic, Iraq, and Yemen. Although it is still early to draw some conclusions about the added value of the TA, it seems that it has improved the timeliness of response by promptly deploying humanitarian coordinators and personnel in affected areas. Furthemore, by triggering CERF allocations automatically and attracting donors and media’s attention to these emergencies, they have been better funded. In term of limitations, Krueger states that the TA has ‘led to little or no change in areas such as the humanitarian country team’s collective leadership, accountability to affected populations, security and protection’ (Krueger et al. 2016: 17).

As discussed earlier, independence has been one of the overarching principles of humanitarian action. Despite all the efforts undertaken to diversify the source of funding for humanitarian actions, five donors continue to dominate the scene of humanitarian assistance financing, the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom count for more than half of global humanitarian assistance, followed by the European Union and the United Arab Emirates (Figure 1 below).



Figure 1 - Global Humanitarian Report, 2015 - Note: although Turkey is shown to be the highest donor, most of the funding is from US or EU donors to contribute to the refugee crisis

With a concentration of total funding among only a few numbers of donors, ‘aid dollars flow to areas of political importance to the donor group while leaving other areas and activities critically under-funded’, and humanitarian assistance ‘emits more readily from governments to countries that are in their backyards and/or where they perceive national security interests at stake’ (Stoddard 2004: 6). One of the initiatives supported by The Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative is to ‘encourage and stimulate principled donor behaviour and, by extension, improved humanitarian action’, however, its members are limited to the ‘largest donors and supporting the role of the United Nations and associated IASC organisations in the coordination of the overall system’ (GHD, 2015). In addition, the funding provided to UN agencies and large INGOs is disproportionate compared with medium-sized and small international NGOs, as well as national and local organisations

(Collinson and Elhawary, 2012). In countries with a weak and corrupted government which have a low level of legitimacy (South Sudan, Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan for example), humanitarian organisations can be perceived as a parallel system acting in place of the governments in large portions of territories. Unlike the illegitimate, isolated governments, humanitarian organisations are well equipped logistically, are well resourced financially and benefit from a network of various international actors with which they can cooperate (Duffield, 2007). A few large humanitarian organisations' annual budgets are as high as some nation-states.

Well established organisations tend to resist opening up financing channels to local NGOs and national government, first and foremost because of the transaction costs associated with sub-granting, another reason advanced is that these actors could become competitors for funding (British Red Cross, 2015). When these organisations are encouraged to apply for funding, they frequently remain under the umbrella of international humanitarian organizations as sub-contractors or under some partnership arrangements leading to the perception that international organisations seek to maintain their power. Such modus operandi favours international standards and blueprint activities rather than local and communal solutions, in addition, 'The local' is often characterised as corrupt and unable to deliver the same quality of assistance (British Red Cross, 2015). These perceptions are at odds with the general rhetoric in favour of shifting power to affected people which was featured prominently in preparations for the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) of 2016, because 'actors outside the traditional power structures of the humanitarian system have little real influence over humanitarian financing and programming' (ALNAP 2015). The reminiscent asymmetrical power dynamics have limited the changes expected.

In order to address these issues, following the WHS, 16 large humanitarian organisations and 18 donor countries signed a 'Grand Bargain'. The bargain spelt out 51 commitments across ten thematic goals, the second goal is to provide 'More support and funding for local and national responders' and goal number 6 is to 'Include the people receiving aid in making the decisions that affect their lives' and has been named 'the participation revolution' (Metcalfe-Hough 2018b: 11). In other words, localisation of humanitarian assistance is one of the top priorities of humanitarian policy for the coming years even though the role of local actors in response to humanitarian emergencies as well as their relationship with international humanitarian organisations have been a subject of discussion for a long time (Smillie 2001; Pickard 2007; Ramalinghan et al. 2013). The importance of collaborating with and supporting local organisations has been acknowledged in several founding documents framing the humanitarian system, including: the UN General Assembly resolution 146/82, the Code of Conduct for the Red Cross and non-governmental organisations, the 'Operational Guidance for cluster Lead Agencies on Working with National Authorities' of 2011 (Committee;). Other documents have specifically addressed the importance of the role of local organisations or civil societies. In essence, the U.N. and the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) recommend that states "provide and enabling environment for the capacity building of local authorities and of national and local non-governmental and community based organisations' in the U.N. GA resolution 61/134 (United Nations General Assembly 2006) and ECOSOC resolution 2006/5 (2006). Also, the Global Humanitarian Platform that took place in 2007 developed a set of Principles of Partnership identifying local capacity as 'one of the main assets to enhance and on which to build' (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2007) and the Good Humanitarian Donorship included the commitment to strengthen local organisations through increase direct financing. Finally, the Core Humanitarian Standards, the Humanitarian Accountability Report of 2015 (Humanitarian Accountability Partnership 2015) and the Charter for Change all acknowledge the importance of the role of local organisations. From a theoretical and policy perspective, the humanitarian system has moved a long way to become inclusive of other societal organisations, such as governments, local non-governmental organisations and civil societies.

The success of transforming these commitments into practice has been mitigated. The Real-Time Evaluation into the Haiti earthquake (Grunewald

2010), the review of the Asian tsunami (2007), the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) State of the Humanitarian System Report (2012) all conclude on the limited success in implementing these commitments. The issue of financing figures at the top of the list, according to Els and Carstensen (2015: 1) ‘the available data on humanitarian funding directly from the largest donors does privilege a few large international agencies over other international agencies --and to an extreme degree over local and national actors.’ In 2014, the Global Humanitarian Assistance report stated that local organisations received US$49 million of the total amount of official humanitarian funding; this corresponds to 1.6 % (Global Humanitarian Assistance 2015: 6). Zyck (2015) remarks that the debates about localisation are often driven by discussion revolving around institutional politics and interests as well as partnership model, they do not focus enough on the practicality of working with local partners.

Some international humanitarian organisations have also launched initiatives to evaluate and better understand the state of partnership with local organisations. Among the finding Pantuliano and Svoboda (2015: iii) note ‘the formal humanitarian sector finds it extremely difficult to establish genuine, inclusive partnerships’. Regarding the identification of potential partners, a study conducted by Chudacoff et al. (2015, p30), reports that international humanitarian organisations mostly identified local partners by ‘Contacting other INGOs to inquire about which organization they were partnering with; participating in coordination meetings where LNGO presented themselves; considering LNGOs that self-presented to INGOs offices'.

While the term localisation has become widely used in the humanitarian sector, we do not have a clear definition of its meaning. Karim (2006: 28) remarks that international relief workers describe localisation as the recruitment and the promotion of national staff and the implementation of programmes through the local staff. Another definition of localisation is articulated around the way international organisations collaborate with local organisations, it is usually designated as 'partnership'. However, Zyck (2015: 15) warns that 'Where local aid agencies are drawn upon, it is often as subcontractors for international NGOs'. Another understanding of partnership is also related to working with communities and the term 'participatory' indicates that international organisations consult the people affected. Critics of this approach complain that the participation of communities in the design of programmes is often reduced to commenting on blueprint projects (Time to Listen, 2012).

The growing humanitarian sector has brought challenges to handle finance, logistic and coordination leading to an increased bureaucracy. The numerous coordination and accountability mechanisms developed since modern humanitarianism emerged have added layers of bureaucracy which have to be reconciled with swift and timely response to emergencies.

A sociological approach

A sociological approach to modern humanitarianism is a difficult task when it comes to an understanding of how it should be assessed in relation to its history. Ian Wilkinson (2016: 73) argues that 'most contemporary social scientists tend to adopt a highly critical stance toward humanitarian moral culture and social practice, he also asserts modern humanitarianism is considered as a matter to be placed under ideological suspicion.' For the last thirty years, when documenting humanitarian actions, scholars have often been more concerned to draw attention to how they operate as forms of abuse and exploitation rather than as authentic movements to restore human dignity and advance social justice (Slim 2002; Sorensen 2008; de Waal 2010; Barnett and Weiss 2011; Ticktin 2011; Minear 2012). In this context, it seems that critique is advanced as the end purpose of social science[29]. This approach runs the risk of losing sight of the historical idiosyncrasies, the sociological complexity, and the moral challenges of modern

[29] For books and articles critical of humanitarian action and response see: (DeMars 1996; de Waal 2010; Dijkzeul 2010; Barnett and Weiss 2011; Chen 2014; Cohen 2014; Beckett 2017)

humanitarianism. The moral experience of modern humanitarianism includes many components and, it sets it for some unresolvable conflicts in interpreting its values (Wilkinson 2017).

Only a limited number of philanthropists and idealist seemed concerned with the moral sense of humanitarianism during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. However, during the second half of the eighteenth century, it became a widespread and ardent concern for the new urban middle classes of western European and America. Keith Thomas (1983: 173-175) describes it as an eruption of ‘spontaneous tenderheartedness’, which participated in the evolution of civic consciousness and action. Thomas Haskell (1985a, 1885b) associates the popularisation of humanitarianism to the emergence and spread of modern capitalism in western Europe in particular. The advancement of laissez-faire economy is a central argument proposed to explain this ‘humanitarian revolution’ (Pinker 2012), which inspired early modern movements to end slavery, the initiation of campaigns for the rights of children and women and to have provoked the first response about the suffering experienced by people as a result of their impoverished working and housing conditions (Fiering 1976; Sznaider 1998). The rapid growth of urbanisation and trade development increased human contacts, yet boroughs’ expansion created many challenges, and the lives conditions of the newly urbanised population in Europe was achieved through appalling conditions. From this perspective, modern western humanitarianism is the result of social arrangements particular to the evolution of the western culture and the processes of socialisation induced by this evolution.

Another thread of analysis advanced to explain this explosion of humanitarian feelings and action has been advanced by Giddens (1971) and Vogt (1993). They argue that people living under settings promoting individuality and within a social organization that create conditions for them to relate to others as well as themselves as distinct individuals, tend to be more psychologically inclined to develop humanitarian convictions and moral feelings. Robert Cotterrell (2011) and Hans Joas (Joas) also observed that a ‘religion of humanity’[30] is more likely to resonate with those who evolve in social contexts that are more heavily individualized.

Western scholars such as Hill (1993) and Pinker (2011, pp 172-174) attribute the origins of moral sentiments leading to humanitarian actions to strands of Christian theology and pastoral traditions that promoted beliefs in a God of compassion along with the conviction that it was part of one’s Christian calling to practice acts of charity and kindness to all people on the understanding that all possess a common humanity. The authors suggest that the prolonged suffering experienced by many people through the wars of religion and internal civil strife that followed in the wake of the Protestant Reformation played a significant role in this regard. In the same vein, Ronald Crane (1934) argues that the ‘genealogy’ of the eighteenth-century ‘man of feeling’ has been partly influenced by the emergence of Protestantism in Europe. Charles Taylor (1989: 211-302) contends that Protestantism has contributed to the ‘affirmation of ordinary life as a matter of sacred value and as a realm of experience that we should be seeking to ameliorate in a bid to combat the causes and effects of human suffering.

Another sociological element advanced to explain the development of modern western humanitarianism is that the moral responsibility towards pain is emotionally charged. By the end of the medieval era in Europe, pain and suffering increasingly become viewed not only as unnecessary but also as forms of experience that were to be opposed. At the same time that the western European society evolved toward individualisation it also developed a sense of responsibility towards others, a ‘sympathy for all that is human, a broader pity for all sufferings, for all human miseries, a more ardent need to combat them [and] a greater thirst for social justice’ (Durkheim 1898 [1973]: 49). This assumption assumes a revision of the early and medieval understanding of people’s pains and miseries either as an inevitable part of

---

[30] Auguste Comte in his road map to resolve the crisis of the early industrial society, published in 1851 the “Système de politique positive ou Traité de sociologie’ advanced the idea of the *religion de l’Humanité* (religion of humanity) (Comte 2013), in which ‘humanity would solemnly rededicate himself (or herself) to a life of service’ (Wernick 2001: 3) within the nascent Western Europe liberal society.

life or as connected to the workings of the Divine Providence. The interpretation of a substantial amount of human suffering shifted from being the results of ‘the theatre of God’s judgments’, to a terrible and unwarranted misfortune (Beard [1597] 2012). This shift led to the beginning of a distancing from the explanation of suffering as the result of the will of God against which there was no alternative, to an earthier and more causal explanation. The expansion of individual consciousness became closely associated with debates over what it means to be human and how this bind “us” in ties in bonds of moral responsibility towards “others”. The moral feelings engendered by the spectacle of human suffering came to represent not only a form of social revelation but also the need to question the moral meaning of human sociality and the forms it takes (Smith 2006) (Smith [1759] 2006).

Drawing on Durkheim’s (2011 [1894–1895]) theory, modern humanitarianism and its cultural influence are fostered by their social construction and sustained by integrated forms of social life and systems of human social contracts. Bennett (2016) remarks that humanitarian ideals and practices might develop in diverse and contrasting institutional arrangements. They are seeking to address a wide range of causes, however they remain the products of moral principle and political philosophy that cannot be overviewed. Humanitarians are deeply convinced that some fundamental values must be protected, and they are doing so through their actions and the codification of these basic values. While humanitarian ideals and the way they are set into practice may be critically questioned, they represent the expression of fundamental social state that cannot be accepted or denied along with the idea that they represent a political or economic choice. Humanitarianism cannot be reduced to the ideologies of politics, and the fact that it is today a field of transdisciplinary inquiry is indicative that humanitarianism is instrumental in shaping the global civil society (Barnett 2011; Calhoun 2008).

Haiti

The case study of Haiti offers the possibility to discuss some of the themes developed above, including financial relationships, the partnership between local and international organisations and the relationships between international organisations and local leadership. Before the earthquake, according to Alex Dupuy (2010), Haiti was the country on the American continent with the highest privatised social services sector, with more than 80 per cent of essential services to the population provided by NGOs. Haitians often refer to their country as the ‘NGOs’ Republic’. Between eight and ten thousand NGOs were estimated to operate in the country before the earthquake, Collier 2011 p 152-153) states that after the earthquake, there were fifteen thousand.

As mentioned above, after the earthquake, hopes were raised that the billions of dollars of assistance that were supposed to pour into the country would address the underlying chronic conditions that had rendered it so vulnerable. The primary reaction of the international community was to increase the amount of humanitarian aid, and the humanitarian community saved numerous lives in the initial months after the earthquake. The generosity of states and private citizens was astonishing; the immediate emergency assistance provided reached $5.2 billion US, with $1.4 billion US given by private citizens. Nevertheless, only one year after the earthquake, Haitian non-governmental organisations were stating, ‘Our analysis and evidence lead us to conclude that Haitian society continues to be locked into the same traps of exclusion, dependency, and ignorance of our strengths, our resources, our identity…The structures of domination and dependence have been reproduced and reinforced by the constellation of agencies including MINUSTAH, IHRC and large international NGOs.’ (Groupe d'Appui aux Rapatriés et Réfugiés 2011)

According to a report published by the Associated Press (Fishstein 2010) on 27 January 2010, the Haitian government had received less than one per cent of the funds for relief aid in the first month after the earthquake. Later, according to the Office of the UN Secretary-General Special Adviser, the delivery of aid to Haiti from 2010–2012 was broken down, as shown in the figure below:



Figure 2: Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti; US Fact Sheet (2021), Chart designed by Vijaha Ramachandran and Julie Walz for the Center for Global Development

In 2012, according to Jacob Kushner (2014), only 5.4 percent of the US government's spending in Haiti was directed to Haitian companies or organisations and 'aid programs from USAID and international NGOs have long been active in Haiti, but it seems that there has been little success in building successful locally controlled governmental and NGO structures that the US government trusts enough to turn the funds over to them'. The long history of the corrupted elites in Haiti was not enticing to transfer some funds to the government. This old recipe, as Hillary Clinton warned the aid community in the middle of 2010, would lead to another failure. The perception of Haiti as a champion of corruption prevailed in the approach adopted by the reconstruction commission, which did not consider the possibility of supporting the government further. The Chambre de commerce et d' Industrie d' Haiti (CCIH) evaluated the amount of fraud in customs to US$200 million. The same elite was accused of intimidating competitors and raising the prices of goods they were exporting to Haiti. Accordingly, 'If this were the U.S., we would go to jail, some of the enterprises' CEO mentioned'. (Cited in Katz 2013: location 2233)

Following the earthquake, the UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon and donors' rhetoric was that Haiti was at a new juncture. The UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon stated' As we move from emergency to aid to long-term reconstruction... what we envision, today, is a wholesale national renewal, a sweeping exercise in nation-building on a scale and scope not seen in generations.' An international donors' conference named 'Towards a New Future for Haiti,' took place in New York in March 2010 during which 58 donors pledged to support the Government of Haiti's Action Plan for Recovery and Development (Office of the United Nation Special Envoy 2011). A total of $5,5 billion was pledged for the year 2010 and 2011 (Chambre de commerce et d'industrie d'Haiti 2011). A total of US$ 402 million was pledged for immediate assistance, but only 15 percent of the $402 million pledged was disbursed ($61 million) (Farmer 2012). From this $61 million, only 1 percent went to the public sector. After the first two months of emergency aid, a conference was organised in the Dominican Republic, which shares the island with Haiti. Paul Farmer (2012: 151), the creator of Partners in Health in Haiti wrote:

> Without much to contribute, I listened and watched, often disquieted, as foreign ministers, international organisation representatives, and disaster relief experts improvised in what often felt like political theatre. Different players – some powerful, some less so – tried to get a word in edgewise, taking turns sitting and standing in a dance that seemed to reassert an unspoken hierarchy of power and prestige. The more interesting conversations occurred dans les coulisses – 'in the hallways' – where it was possible to be frank and find those who were deeply committed to Haiti.

Paul Farmer reminds us of the asymmetry in power between international and Haitian organisations during these meetings, but also about the complexity of implementing ideals in a politicised context. The prime minister of Haiti at the time, Jean-Max Bellerive, who was also present at the conference confided to Farmer (2012: 151): ‘Look, I don’t want my country to look like the Dominican Republic or Indonesia or some other place. We’re searching for a genuinely Haitian way of rebuilding’. The prime minister was referring here to the struggle of Haitians to improve their living conditions without becoming the host of foreign investors. One outcome of the conference was the establishment of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC), which proclaimed a mission to ‘conduct strategic planning, coordination and implementation [of projects using]…resources from bilateral and multilateral donors, non-governmental organisations, and the business sector, with all necessary transparency and accountability’. According to its mission statement, the IHRC aimed at maximising benefits from external aid through needs assessment and investment prioritisation per the Haiti Action Plan (HAP)[31]. One of the IHRC’s essential functions was to work in coordination with the Haitian Ministry of Economy and Finance to facilitate the identification and mobilisation of land ‘for the purpose of relocating displaced populations, building long-term housing and schools, and creating jobs’ (Interim Haiti Recovery Commission 2010). The issue of land became sensitive and murky from the beginning and will be discussed at length in Chapter 5. Most of the sites established by the IHRC to house the internally displaced Haitians ended not being occupied. Overall, the population settled in areas that they had chosen or returned to their family in rural areas.

Major criticisms of the IHRC, which served as the main decision-making body during the 18 months after the earthquake, were its composition and voting arrangement. According to one aid advocacy group:

---

[31] The HAP’s priorities were to address ‘the urgent situation immediately, relaunching economic, governmental, and social activity, reducing Haiti’s vulnerability to natural disasters, and putting Haiti back on the road to development. The plan was divided into two phases. The first was in the immediate future, which lasts 18 months, covers the end of the emergency period and includes preparation for projects to generate genuine renewal. The second stage has a time horizon of 10 years, allowing it to take into account three programming cycles of the National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction’.

> The committee has more seats for foreigners than for Haitians, and voting power is determined in part by amounts of aid money committed. Donors offering more than $100 million have their own votes; those offering less must share one vote. Non-governmental organisations operating in Haiti share one seat on the committee but don't have any voting power. (Altman 2010)

Primary donors channelled funds through international financial institutions such as the World Bank, which relied on advice from the IHRC to disburse aid money to projects on the ground. The IHRC ended as a heavily bureaucratic structure. It did not allocate the funds necessary to pay the civil servants who were still alive[32]. Instead, it allocated the majority of the funds to international contractors and international humanitarian organisations. The relief operation and reconstruction of Haiti occurred before the Grand Bargain was established.

Financial struggles and competition over large amount of humanitarian assistance have been at the heart of the re-construction of Haiti after the earthquake and are significant in the power relation between international humanitarian organisations and local actors. Participation and inclusion in the relief effort were almost impossible for Haitians. Mark Schuller (12) points out that for Haitians who possess a great deal of indigenous knowledge and social capital, access to finance was almost impossible, 'for Haitian aid workers and their local knowledge were also similarly marginalized by what one employee called an "internal colonization" or another, an "invasion" of often young inexperienced foreign employees in supervisory positions.' An evaluation of humanitarian assistance conducted after the first three months of the humanitarian response states that the international response was 'highly' exclusive', that Haitians were 'not consulted, informed or included in the design, planning, and implementation' of the relief effort.' (Grunewald 2010: 41). Another report published in November 2011 noted 'the lack of

[32] The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report of June 2010 found that 40 per cent of civil servants had been killed or injured during the earthquake. Available: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html (accessed March 28, 2014).

any kind of systemic approach either to sharing information or to listening, gathering feedback or collecting and responding to complaints' (Imogen 2011: 6) of affected populations. Participation, however, is no only linked to financial opportunities, and one of the difficulties to transform the rhetoric of participation into practice according to Tania Murray Li (2007: 7-9) comes from the fact that participation is almost all the time tied to projects, limiting the participation to the logic behind the project elaborated. The lessons learned from Haiti regarding the complexities of reconciling participation with effectiveness have been instrumental in the development of the agenda of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS).

The Sphere Project's Minimum Standards in Disaster Response were found to be valuable in the post-Earthquake situation in Haiti. According to Amanda M. Klasing (2011: 12-15), using the Sphere Standards to evaluate projects helped identified problems in project implementation promptly. According to Margaret L. Satterthwaite and Scott P. Mosses (2012: 14) during the first six months following the earthquake 4.3 million Haitian received some food assistance, 1 million received access to potable water daily, and 1.5 million were provided with some form of shelters. The authors observed that the international humanitarian organisations managing the camps had little to no experience in operating them[33], however, in their randomised study including eight camps performed in the summer of 2010 they concluded that the 'camps with NGO management are far better serviced than camps without management' (Satterthwaite 2012: 16). Experienced international relief personal quickly evaluated that the Sphere indicators could not be met, especially in spontaneously settlements. For example, one of the indicators of the Shelter Cluster in Sphere spells that 'temporary planned or self-settled camps are based on a minimum surface area of 45m2 for each person.' (Satterthwaite 2012: 943). In this case, humanitarian organisations had to contextualise the standards to the prevailing circumstances. Nevertheless, they could use the standards as a point of departure to measure and adapt

[33] A census conducted in February 2012 estimates that 500,000 internally displaced people were still living in camps.

their response to the Haitian context. By using the standards developed by the Sphere Project, they could bring the management of the camps to a certain level of decency. In contrast, the residents of camps that were unmanaged by international organisations suffered from irregularity and a limited amount of good and services distribution (Satterthwaite 2012).

International humanitarian organisations tried to ensure participation through their interaction with camp committees composed of Haitians living in the camps. This is a strategy that is frequently used to ensure that the population is represented in the decision-making process as well as in the distribution of humanitarian assistance. However, working with committees in Haiti or other contexts is often problematic as international humanitarian organisations adhere to the principles of impartiality and independence while local committees are not necessarily adhering to these principles or simply cannot due to external pressure. This problem was studied by the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International (HAP), which found that the camp committees were not reflecting the 'community governance structures, and committees use their decision-making power for personal gain'. (Humanitarian Accountability Partnership 2010) The HAP report illustrates the lack of impartiality in the committees' selection of locations for the distribution of relief assistance, the selection of individuals in Cash for Work program, and the selection of new tents' recipients. One of the problems with establishing committees to enhance local participation resides in their constitutive process (2010). They lack the organic development of existing committees that have gained some legitimacy over time in the communities and are existing within a complex system of power-sharing. Creating committees without social grounding results in artificially constituted groups.

As one of the results of the World Humanitarian Summit (WHS) of 2016, the general humanitarian policy framework has become more defined and specific about localisation, there is more pressure on international humanitarian organisations to develop strategies to support local initiatives. The START Network[34] initiated during the WHS of 2016 calls

> [F]or a more decentralized global humanitarian system comprised of highly diverse local, national and international organisations all operating according to the principle of subsidiarity, that is to say taking decisions and actions at appropriate levels with the affected people themselves and those closest to them. Such subsidiarity requires several major changes in the ways the humanitarian system operates, most importantly a rebalancing so that considerably more capability and leadership resides at the local level, an increase in funding for local organisations, new specialized international capacity and a real shift of power to crisis affected populations.' (World Humanitarian Summit 2015: 96).

As Christina Bennet and Matthew Folley (2016: 3) comment, the Red Cross Movement, UN agencies and international humanitarian organisations are not 'indispensable and represent 'just one part of the broader universe of assistance made up of a myriad of other actors, with their own distinctive traditions and culture of care'. Some of the findings of a conference supported by Save the Children and the ICRC highlighted that one of the difficulties in the relationship between local actors and international organisations remain based on their different understanding of humanitarian action. For local actors, humanitarian action is not only about the delivery of services and 'big budgets don't make aid more effective but understanding the needs and expectations of those affected by conflict and disasters does.' (JSIA 2014 p11). Another significant finding of the conference was that the local response to disaster is not only about the delivery of assistance but also in the social interaction that takes place during the distribution of assistance. These findings also questioned if the criteria of effectiveness as

[34] The START Network is composed of forty aid agencies from various sizes across the five continents. Its main goals are localization, new forms of financing and collective innovation. https://startnetwork.org

set up by international organisations should remain the overarching models for the evaluation of humanitarian response.

The relationship between local leaders and international organisations is also affected by access to finance, local actors mostly depend upon international organisations transfer for programmes' implementation. Also impairing the partnerships are the obstacles experienced by local organisations to access the international humanitarian system. For this reason, the Charter for Change (2015) specifically refers to the necessity to reform the current cluster system, which is exclusive of local organisations, it mentions the example of Haiti in 2010, about which Binder and Grunewald (2010) remark that the offices of the majority of major international organisations were off-limits to Haitians. Other factors described as affecting the relationship include the hiring by international humanitarian organisations of the staff from local administrations and entities, weakening their capacities (Ramalinghan et al. 2013: 180).

For a long time, the term power was sparingly used by international humanitarian organisations, recently, however, some like Oxfam have started to acknowledge in their policy that the dynamic of power are at the center of the debate and success of localisation, and that 'there is urgent need from international actors for shifting more power, resources, and responsibility' (Oxfam 2016: 1) towards local actors. The WHS (2015: 96) call,

> [F]or a more decentralized global humanitarian system comprised of highly diverse local, national and international organisations all operating according to the principle of subsidiarity, that is to say taking decisions and actions at appropriate levels with the affected people themselves and those closest to them. Such subsidiarity requires several major changes in the ways the humanitarian system operates, most importantly a rebalancing so that considerably more capability and leadership resides at the local level, an increase in funding for

local level organisations, new specialized international capacity and a real shift of power to crisis affected populations.

Finally, in one of the latest reports published by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) on the subject, Bennett (2016) also argue that ‘greater local autonomy, ceding power and resources to structures and actors currently at the margins of the formal system’.

While modern Western humanitarianism had an intricate relationship with politics from the beginning, today, it is part of politics. As Michael Barnett (2005: 733) rightly observes, ‘Humanitarianism and politics are no longer discursively constructed in binary, oppositional terms; instead, their points of intersection are many’. Humanitarianism is increasingly perceived as defined by politics rather than by a duty of care. The principles of neutrality, independence and impartiality which among others, fulfilled the purpose of creating a humanitarian space have become increasingly challenged and weakened. However, humanitarianism is indispensable to ....

Chapter 4: Relationships of power between populations, local leaders and humanitarian workers

Whether consciously or not, the activities of NGOs have necessarily to do with power and authority. (Hilhorst and Matthis 2005: 554)

In the previous chapter, humanitarianism was established as a social construct which paradigm is to alleviate the suffering of those affected by conflicts or natural disasters or both. Within this paradigm, humanitarians are often filling a vacuum left by inefficient, unwilling or unorganised nation-states in achieving their duties toward their citizens. The financial growth and the development of the humanitarian field in an increasingly organised and professional field are sometimes perceived as competing with the various authorities in some contexts. Power is playing a crucial role in the relationship between humanitarian organisations, humanitarian workers and local populations and authorities. This chapter explores the perceptions of power in the relationship between humanitarians and local populations and leaders.

About Power

Bertrand Russell (1938: 10) wrote, ‘The fundamental concept in social science is Power, in the same sense that Energy is the fundamental concept in physics. The laws of social dynamics are laws which can only be stated in terms of power’. A broad definition of power sheds so light on the concept describing it as the capacity of an individual or a group of individuals to influence the conduct, action or behaviours of others and that it ‘is a basic force in social relationships’ (Keltner et al. 2003: 265). Power is not only relational but also relative; for example, a program manager may have a different relationship of power with his supervisor than with representative of local committees or ladies receiving some humanitarian assistance. S/he may experience different psychological states and act differently depending upon the partner s/he is interacting with, which makes the study of these relationships complicated. Studies conducted by Cameron Anderson and Sebastien Brion (2014) have identified that individuals with higher access to valuable resources are less dependent on others that those with less access, they have a higher personal control and autonomy over their own and potentially other's outcomes. Considering the relativity of power is of importance for this study since local leaders and humanitarians have probably more access to valuable resources than the general population. In most cases, humanitarians have more access to valuable resources than local leaders. Access to resources has significant implications in the relationship between these three groups. Another important feature of power advanced by Furthermore and Smith (2013) is that powerful people pay less attention to those with less power. They also tend to disregard the actions and perspectives of those with fewer resources.

Theories on the psychology of power have underlined that power can alter social perception in ways that seem likely to corrupt social relationships. Social perception is concerned with the study of how individuals form impressions of and make inferences about other people. In the field of cognitive sciences and psychology, social perception is associated with the process of how one is acquiring, selecting, interpreting and organising stimuli in social and interpersonal environments (Fiske and Neuberg 1990; Fiske and Berdahl 2007). Investigations undertaken by Fiske and Goodwin (Fiske 1993; Goodwin 2000) highlights that power increases the tendency to rely on stereotypes in the formation of impressions. In this study, the identification of stereotyping is used as a proxy to interpret how power plays in the relationships between local leaders and humanitarian workers. In another set of study, Keltner et al. (2010) have elaborated on the impact of power in the formation of impressions and shown that power tends to reduce prosocial behaviours[35] and to intensify tendencies of relying on stereotypes when forming impressions with the effect of reducing the accuracy of inferencing the emotions and attitudes of others. Ena Inesi (2012) proposes a different

---

[35] According to Nancy Eisenberg and Paul H. Mussen, prosocial behaviour srefers to 'voluntary action that are intended to help or benefit another individual or group of individuals' (1989: 3).

approach to the effects of power on relationships, by exploring ‘the possibility that certain types of subordinate actions trigger an explicit awareness among the powerful that they have asymmetric control over valued resources that can taint their understandings of those actions’. This theoretical perspective shows that power may harm interpersonal relations not only by altering the amount of consideration given to others but also by changing the meaning of others' actions. Fiske (1993) and Galinsky (2006) have shown that power-holders are less inclined to focus on others in general and in some instances, they can even become unmindful and even unconscious of the asymmetries of power in their relationships (Keltner et al. 2003; Guinote 2008). These findings are supporting other observations that power creates emotional and psychological distance with others.

However, another theory on the form of power developed by Max Weber (1947) contends that there is a probability that some persons or groups can carry out their will even when opposed by others. Weber’s conception of power was concerned with the independent powers of bureaucratic forms of organisation in which the decision making power of officials, in our case humanitarians, might consider the survival of their organisations in answering to the needs of other stakeholders (Barnett 2005). He argued that managers who are imparted legitimate power through their place in the organizational structure support the influence and existence of the bureaucratic structure rather than the mission of the organisation.

Asymmetricality of Power

Negotiation of the Gift

One particular point in the relationship of power between humanitarians and local people is that its point of departure does not fit more traditional relationships of power and the way they are negotiated. In the case of humanitarian assistance, the negotiation of the relationships between members of humanitarian organisations and their partners, the recipients of assistance, is significantly affected by the theory of the Gift established by

Marcel Mauss (1954). This relationship is based on a model in which A (expatriate) is coming with a gift for B (recipient of assistance). In this particular case, the negotiation process in the relationship is affected by the asymmetricality of the terms for negotiation (Emerson 1962: 31). Marcel Mauss (1954) theorised that, initially, the gift was a form and function of exchange in traditional societies and represented an element in the construction of relationships between tribes or societies. Mauss' (1954) analyses shed light on how the effects of the exchange of objects/gifts influence relationships among humans. He deconstructed the act of giving into three stages. The first stage is the action of conferring the gift, which is the first step in building the social relationship. The second stage is the act of receiving and the impossibility of refusing the gift. Finally, the third stage is the reciprocation of the gift, which demonstrates social integrity. All the acts involved in the transaction between the giver and the receiver are designed to transcend the division between the spiritual and the material worlds. The giver does not just engage in the transaction of a material object; it is also the gift of a part of himself or herself, as 'the objects are never completely separated from the men who exchange them' (1954: 31).

Applying Mauss's theory, the gift of humanitarian assistance is the material expression of the relationship between partners constituted of givers (expatriates/outsiders) and receivers (indigenes/insiders). Although the donor and his/her intermediaries conceive the gift as an expression of solidarity[36] or prosocial behaviour, there is no actual gift; there is always a reciprocal dimension in giving. Mauss' theory of reciprocation of the gift is altered because of the context in which the exchange takes place. In the case of giving humanitarian assistance, the recipients do not have the means to reciprocate. This unique form of the transaction alter its meaning and creates political and material dominance between givers and receivers (Mauss 1954: 31). The recipients in need accept the gift, becoming complicit in a process they cannot control. Subsequently, a social bond is established

[36] The donor would considered and considered his/her gift as coming from God or being God in the eventuality that the gift would be considered sacred, which could have been thinkable a century earlier but is definitely not the case today.

with the giver (A), in which the negotiation power of the receiver (B) remains extremely limited (B). This receivers (B) remains in debt, even if both sides may not be aware that this colored transaction creates an asymmetrical relationship of power.

The loss of symbolism in the gift through humanitarian assistance creates an altered form of social negotiation, in which receivers, especially those at the bottom of the local social hierarchy decide not to contest, because this form of power is still in their best interests. Although there is not open negotiation, forms of resistance emerge. Of particular interest to the study of resistance in relationships is stereotyping which, according to Susan T. Fiske (1993: 621), tends to act by ‘reinforcing interaction between power and stereotyping, mediated by attention’. In this theory, Fiske proposes that A, who is powerless, attends to B, who is powerful and controls the outcomes of their relationship. A pays attention to B to ‘enhance prediction and control, so forming complex, potential nonstereotyped impressions.’ (Fiske 1993: 621) Meanwhile, A ‘need not attend to the other to control their own outcomes’. Fiske (1993: 621) concludes that power and stereotyping mutually reinforce each other’s influence ‘because stereotyping itself exerts control, maintaining and justifying the status quo.’.

Social Perceptions of Expatriates by Recipients of Assistance

Since power is present in all social relationships, the nature of most relationships will affect that one of the parties has more power, either from a hierarchical or social status. Thus, social behaviour and judgment or social perception are affected by power and has received attention from sociologist and social psychologists. Cognitive psychologist and scientist Jerome Bruner (1973; 1990) and his students and followers are at the source of the constructivist approach to the study of impression formation through social perception. Social perception has been described as the identification and use of stimuli to make judgements about roles, relationships and characteristics about other individuals and social groups (Keltner et al. 2003; Bodenhausen 2012). Social and personal perception can be interpreted as the way in which people make inferences or form impressions about others (Young 2011). Through observations and other stimuli received, individuals collect the data that will serve to form his/her social perception of others. The object observed, the context in which the observation occurs and the behavior of the object of observation represent the main sources of social perception for impressions formation (Anderson 2014). These sources are used as evidence in supporting the perceiver's impression or inference about the other. The complexity of using social perception as predictors of judgement formation comes in part from the fact that social perception is shaped by an individual's current motivations, emotions, and cognitive load capacity (Sweller 1988)[37]. All of this combined determines how people attribute certain traits and how those traits are interpreted. Jerome Bruner (1973; 1990: xxii) remarks that perceptual stimuli are inherently ambiguous, and do not provide sufficient information to form a mental representation from these observations. Thus, according to Bruner, the perceiver must go 'beyond the information given' by the stimulus and supplement information received from a stimulus with previous knowledge, personal expectations, and beliefs. With inferences retrieved from memory, the perceiver then forms a mental representation of the stimuli. Bruner, who was influenced by the field of psychoanalysis, supported that the emotional and motivational processes are interacting with cognitive process, meaning that our feelings and desires affect what we see. Also, according to Helmholtz (1927), some of these inferences are unconscious, but they are still inferences.

Perception itself is formed partly by information gathered on various issues. When new information received corresponds with the perceiver's world view or if he/she has deep respect and trust in the person or institution providing the information, he/she will give it more credibility. Thus, the information received is interpreted through the receiver's objective and subjective views. Empirically, in the field of humanitarian action, these perceptions have been narrated in diverse reports. For example, an in-depth evaluation of

[37] The cognitive load theory was developed by John Sweller (1988) to explain the limitation in the number of information a person can absorb, he also used the term working memory to signify the limit of the memory to absorb stimuli.

humanitarian aid in Somalia performed in 1994 found ‘[t]he lack of a common understanding between Somalis and the international community produced a mutually unintelligible dialogue. Very distinct perceptions and respective operational norms became the context for operating in the country’ (Dutch Operation Review Unit 1994: 98-99). The report highlights a ‘clash of perception’ (Operation Review Unit 1994: 98-99) in which humanitarian organisations perceived themselves as benefactors trying to help, whereas the Somalis perceived the organisations and aid workers as aggressively and arrogantly imposing themselves. Each of them is ‘making sense not only of the world but of themselves’ (1990:2)

As seen in the earlier paragraphs, social perception is useful in providing some insights in the interpretation of others behaviours and how they are affected by their behaviors, status and conditions in forming their judgement/impression of others. The following study conducted by Dennis Dijkzeul and Claude Iguma Wakenge (2010) in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, revealed significant differences in the social perceptions of representatives of international organisations and local agents. First, they found that ‘Local perceptions of aid are in particular more diversified than most aid professionals expect’ (Dijkzeul 2010: 1139) and,

> [T]hat it is surprising that the study of local perception of humanitarian organisation has taken so long to receive regular attention, given that, as non-profit organisations, they lack the consumer feedback that sales figure and, ultimately, the bottom-line provide to commercial enterprises.

According to Dijkzeul and Wakenge (2010: 1140), there are distinct levels of perception, and ‘most people are open to professional explanations regarding medical or nutritional priorities, but the perception that the organisations have a political agenda or are corrupt can be far more difficult to address’.

When perceptions regarding values are negative, the elements constitutive of these perceptions become integrated into the impression/judgement of others and might reinforce some previous or create new stereotyping. Perceptions concerning values are the most difficult to change. For example, local leaders in South Sudan found it unacceptable to receive orders from young and inappropriately dressed women. The lifestyle of Western aid workers has sometimes been decried as unsuitable (Schuller 2007a; Redfield 2012), and their attitude is often described as arrogant. In another study analysing the role of rumours in Hutu refugees camps after fleeing Burundi, anthropologist Simon Turner (2004: 237), observes that ‘living in uncertainty, having their symbolic order crumble due to violence and flight, they attempted to create some sort of order through rumours, and…many of these rumours circle around global issues’. Many stories were driven by conspiracy theories. Narratives concerned the role of the U.S. influence on the situation prevailing in the Great Lake region of Africa. The significance of rumours is often disregarded, but they offer valuable insights regarding people’s interpretation of the world around them, affecting the trust and cooperation essential to the formation of partnerships (2010: 1146).

Rumours and Conspiracy Theories as Forms of Resistance

Allport and Postman (1947: 121) observe that ‘in ordinary rumour we find a marked tendency for the agent to attribute *causes* to events, *motives* to characters, a *raison d’être* to the episode in question’. Like conspiracy theories, rumors help make sense of an uncertain world, and they also help to understand the way people perceive others and think of themselves. Unlike conspiracy theories, rumours tend to spread and get distortion. Rumors provoke interest, influence attitudes and actions, and stir emotions. Nicholas DiFonzo (2008: 4) observes:

> Understanding rumour has widened my knowledge of how attitudes arise and are altered, how people process data, how we collectively cultivate explanations, how prejudices and stereotypes surface and stay afloat, how conflicts spiral out of control, how person-to-person

> relationships and rapport are preserved in conversation…Rumor has a lot to teach us about the psyche of Homo sapiens. (4)

Not only do rumours provide a channel to make sense of uncertainty, but they also give sense to adverse events or situations and represent a strategic emotional coping mechanism. They also signify a collective process of problem-solving, as a ‘recurrent form of communication through which men caught together in an ambiguous situation attempt to construct a meaningful interpretation of it by pooling their intellectual resources’ (Shibutani 1966: 17). When situations are unclear, rumours are a process in which human beings compensate by inferences to make sense of events.

One of the respondents observed that little had been done and that more community engagement in defining development priorities was required. The interviewees thought that the ‘appropriate community structures had been bypassed’, which resulted in the perception that this contributed to the ‘corruption and the consolidation of noxious criminal or tribal elites’ (Gordon 2011: 44). Although efforts have been made to include communities in deciding what type of intervention best fits their needs, the perception remains strong that their opinion is disregarded or not considered when programmes are designed. Such findings contradict the rhetoric by almost all humanitarian organisations about their focus on inclusion and participation (Feldman 1995: 231).

Another significant finding, in the pre-mentioned study undertaken by Dijkzeul and Wakenge (2010), was that the perceptions of local authorities and non-medical civil society organisations concerning the two humanitarian organisations involved were more negative than perceptions by patients and civilians benefitting from the assistance provided by these organisations. As mentioned earlier, this was one of the bases for focusing on interviewing local leaders who have, in turn, some power ‘over’ (Lukes 1974; Lukes 2005) the well-being of the population and ‘over’ the expatriates to a certain extent.

‘Power Over’ and the Social Negotiation of Assistance

The asymmetrical relationship of power between humanitarians and indigenous populations and leaders is reinforced by the agency of the humanitarian organisations which ultimately decide who will receive assistance and on what terms. It becomes the object of the social negotiation of assistance. This type of power has been defined by Lukes (2005) as ‘power over’, this power is created by the existing social order. Traditionally, it can be backed by the threat of coercion. In the case of humanitarians, a proxy for coercion could consist of the exclusion from programmes.

Regarding ‘power over’, humanitarians consistently use the process or action of labelling performed by the field staff of humanitarian organisations supported by locally hired employees. For our purpose, a pertinent definition of labelling is provided by Geoffrey D. Wood (1985: 1): ‘Labelling refers to the process by which policy agendas are established, and more particularly the way in which people, conceived as objects of policy, are defined in convenient images’. The categorisation of individuals is the first act of labelling and defines the boundaries between who is eligible to receive some assistance. Rules are established or used from manuals such as the *Sphere Handbook* (*The Sphere Project* 2018) to include or exclude recipients. Modern humanitarianism, through its development and social construction, has become a culture with rituals. A necessary ritual precedes all interventions: the assessment, during which external representatives of humanitarian organisations translate the local ‘narrative’ into professional language. Victims will be labelled as a *widow*, a *vulnerable groups*, an *internally displaced person* and a *child soldier*, to cite only a few. Although labelling may be associated with an innocuous system to organise the distribution of assistance, it is interwoven with power. It includes profound consequences for the person who needs assistance, the humanitarian organisation, the implementation of services and the legitimisation of assistance. Those labelled as “beneficiaries” have gained recognition that they are real victims in the humanitarian narrative. This rhetoric provides some entitlement for some and the possibilities of new inequalities. This objectification of recipients in terms of ‘vulnerabilisation’ almost always results in resistance. Thus, labelling re-enters a negotiation through what Foucault calls the 'strategic reversibility' (Foucault 1978: 92-102) of power relations.

The power of labelling becomes significant when it is translated into action and influences relationships, as elaborated by Michel Foucault (1977) in *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Hence, power occurs in and through relationships and is not an abstract 'object'. Instead, it regulates social interactions and demarcates the terms through which people relate to each other. As it has been well documented by now, the victims of conflicts do not wait passively until humanitarian aid arrives. Not only are they using their own coping strategies to survive, but they also 'work on strategies for reaching agencies and becoming eligible for their services' (Kibreab 2004: 1). Kibreab identified various strategies devised by refugees to increase their control over the food aid distributed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its implementing partners, which are mostly international humanitarian organisations. Some of the strategies include the

> [H]ost government officials; inflating numerical sizes of families for purposes of registration; withholding of information on death; registration in different sites in order to obtain multiple ration cards; double or even triple registration; splitting of families between different camps (the latter may even happen during repatriation); and exhibition of physical helplessness in the presence of aid givers.' (Kibreab 2004: 1)[38].

The vulnerability syndrome as reversibility of power

Foucault's theory of strategic reversibility provides the basis for reflecting on the micro-politics of power relationships and their strategic reversibility at work in these contexts. Strategic reversibility supports the possibility of

---

[38] On the issue of labeling, see also Oliver Bakewell and Ian Christopulos (1999).

observing how groups and individuals experience power relationships and contest the structures of power. Humanitarian organisations and local leaders are involved in a web of micro-power struggles in which power is not only oppressive but also productive of knowledge, allowing social actors to develop and implement their agendas and adapt to new forms of power. As seen through the previous examples, target groups and their leaders have the potential to influence the interventions of international actors and do not passively accept assistance strategies.

For those at the bottom of the economic and social ladders, receiving humanitarian assistance may be a matter of survival, especially during active conflicts and sudden-onset natural disasters. In order to become a ‘beneficiary’ one has to prove her/his vulnerability and at the end, the expatriate and her/his team will decide who fulfil the criteria. This is a form of ‘power over’ (Lukes 1974; Lukes 2005). The strategy of the ‘vulnerability syndrome’ is a well-rehearsed form of the reversibility of power. The following example illustrates how individuals use this stratagem to become labelled as victims and receive assistance. When Gaim Kibread (*La corruption: un obstacle au developpement et a la democratie* 2004) visited Fatah el Rahman, a refugee camp in central Sudan, he met an elderly refugee who looked healthy and vigorous for his age. During their discussion, a young expatriate arrived looking for Kibread. As soon as she appeared in the tent, the older man suddenly acted ill, saddening the young women, who tried to discern what was wrong with him. He exposed his body, showing her where the extreme pain originated. Kibread was puzzled by the sudden change in the old man’s health and visited him three days later. When he was asked what happened, the older man confided that, when he appeared healthy, nobody wanted to listen to him, and nobody would assist him. He further explained that to obtain the help he needed: he had to pretend to be sick, weak and vulnerable (Kibreab 2004: 11). Examples of refugees or civilians using subterfuge to obtain assistance are widespread, but what is more surprising is that, in general, they do not feel guilty for abusing the agencies coming to assist them. In fact, ‘cheating aid agencies by presenting false stories or [misrepresenting themselves] were often regarded with respect and admiration by …neighbours and kin' (Kibreab 2004: 9).

The distribution of power influences the relationships and behaviour of all agents involved in the humanitarian network. Although there is a common perception that local authorities have limited agency, this agency is mostly based on their legitimacy and status, giving them authority and decision-making power, in other words, they have 'power over' the population. In turn, expatriates and local authorities or leaders have a dynamic power relationship. In the cases presented, there were robust negotiations between the various agents, and power was expressed through status and prestige (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Status and prestige lead to stereotyping due to interpersonal and intergroup competition. Uncovering these stereotypes can provide a decent proxy for understanding further the construction of the relationship of power between expatriates and local leaders.

A superimposition of power 'over'

One of the goals of this study is to understand the relationship of power between leaders, humanitarians and local. Although there is a general sense of the power of humanitarians and the reversibility of power, the following example helps to understand the power of local leaders, in this case, it is a combination of official and traditional leaders refugee camp in Somalia which narrative helps explain how power circulates between humanitarians, the local leaders and local population.

This case study was developed by Thomas Jamieson (1987), the emergency coordinator for a refugee camp in the Ogaden region of Somalia. The case illustrates the power 'over' of the official and traditional leaders engaged in social negotiation of assistance with humanitarians leaders. The cohesive action of community leaders and aid recipients in inflating the number of camp residents in Somalia. Somali refugees from the Ogaden region of Ethiopia had fled the 1977–78 wars between Somalia and Ethiopia. The camp where they had taken refuge was located seven kilometres from the border which is creating additional insecurity in the camps since the border is porous and belligerents can easily come and attack the camp. Thomas Jamieson the emergency camp coordinator for the UNHCR at the time, described the level of security in the camp as concerning[39]. A decision had been made to relocate the refugees further into Somali territory to reduce the cross-border violence[40]. Despite the risks to the refugees' physical safety, the process of moving was delayed because the leaders of the refugees' communities and the Somali government refused a registration process organised by the UNHCR that would entail 'a headcount'[41] of all refugees. The field staff of the UNHCR argued that they needed these numbers to arrange the logistics for the transfer and to relocate the refugees to the new site identified conjointly. After stiff resistance, the degree of violence in the camps became so high that it had to be officially acknowledged. Finally, authorities and camp leaders allowed the census. It resulted in the count of 32,000 refugees, rather than the 87,000 provided earlier by these authorities to the UNHCR (Kibreab 2004: 1).

When the refugees arrived in Somalia, the country's economy was collapsing, mainly because of the war against Ogaden in Ethiopia. The massive amount of humanitarian aid that arrived in the country became a blessing for the Somali government. Inflating the number of refugees increased the amount of food delivered by humanitarian organisations significantly. There was very little supervision of how, to whom and by whom the aid was distributed. The government and all those holding a certain

---

[39] Unless there is a minimum of security on the ground, humanitarians can operate, but with increased difficulty. On one hand, they are endowed with a certain amount of power that is in great part the result of external impulses, but on the other hand, they are dependent on the local and national will for operating, as a minimum of security is necessary. To continue to work in insecure conditions, they often collaborate with security providers, private or military, which often affect the level of trust from regular citizens and their representatives and can be perceived as collaborators or as taking sides. This, of course, is a different perception from the neutral one that is part of their social construction of reality. Furthermore, the fact that they are associated with individuals or organisations carrying military equipment and that they travel in convoys protected by military vehicles alter their portray themselves as non-violent movement promoting social justice.
[40] Refugee camps located close to a national border tend to attract insecurity, as warring groups cross the borders easily and seek revenge, loot or rape refugees.
[41] Most humanitarian organisations and UN agencies still use this expression, *headcount*, which I find very insulting.

amount of power in the communities were able to divert supplies worth a significant sum of money[42]. Jamieson (1987) explains, '[B]ecause the donors complied with the inflated refugee figures, the trade in refugee commodities soon became the largest industry in Somalia, increasing the country GNP[43] by an estimated 40 percent in 1980'. The author specifies that the research team collected the information, but it was also confirmed by key informants from the local population and the refugee community. Jonathan B. Tucker (1982) clarifies that the international organisations and donor countries were aware of the discrepancy between the number of refugees provided by the Somalis and the real number, but each stakeholder had reasons to keep the matter silent. The US, the major donor in the operation, was at the time negotiating with the Somali government to obtain access to the abandoned Soviet airbase at Berbera for its Rapid Deployment Force. Members of international organisations did not say anything because there were careers and contracts to protect (Jamieson 1987). As previously mentioned, the Somali authorities wanted to benefit economically from the situation, and the humanitarian organisations could not jeopardise their humanitarian work.

Although the issues were not made public to protect the operation, there were internal measures devised by international organisations to address the problem of inflated numbers of refugees[44]. However, they met harsh resistance from the Somali government official and Somali more traditional leaders involved in the camps as well as the refugees themselves. Again, Tucker (1982) provides a methodical analysis of the collective efforts undertaken to thwart the counting of refugees. An Australian doctor working for an Australian humanitarian organisation describes how, two nights before the count was planned, his organisation, Community Aid Abroad (CAA), was visited by several members of the Somali authorities. They warned him that it would be extremely hazardous for CAA field workers to travel during the

[42] Although today, there is more oversight of who and how aid is distributed, it remains challenging to prevent goods' diversions.
[43] GNP stands for the gross national product.
[44] At the time, the government of Somalia was asserting that it had registered 1.3 million refugees and that another half million was living in the surrounding towns and rural area. The UNHCR and other agencies estimated the number at 650,000.

census. The night before the poll, meetings took place in the camps, during which camp authorities showed refugees how to use a chlorine solution to clean the ink off fingers after being counted (Tucker 1982).

Other strategies were implemented the day of the census, at first hidden from the observers of the process. Nevertheless, as the day progressed, refugees and Somali authorities openly thwarted the entire registration process. The behaviour of the refugees, camp representatives and Somali officials insulted and frustrated the Australian doctor involved in the registration. When he made a remark about recipients cleaning their fingers and repeatedly returning for registration, one of the Somali officials answered, ‘How could simple nomads know how to wash off this ink’? (Tucker 1982: 23) The Somali official referred to the superiority complex often exuded by expatriates in the camps and towards local and government officials. (Barnett and Weiss 2008: 38). As the counting became increasingly uncontrollable, the expatriates decided to stop, but the Somali authorities were not willing to do so. At this juncture, ‘[N]o one seemed to have the authority to stop the count or to accept responsibility for it. During the next refreshment break, a rumour spread among the refugees that the count had been stopped. They became furious and aggressive’ (Tucker 1982: 23). The expatriates and the camp leaders reached an agreement that the people present in the camp could pass one more time and, afterwards, the count would be stopped. Local leaders are strategically using the population to reach political agenda or others such as in this case, using the force of the mass to scare the expatriates and obtain more assistance.

On other occasions, when the team wanted to complete surveys in the same area using the data they had collected during the census, the Somali authorities seemed to support them. Often, the team would be approached the day before the survey and informed that they were concerned about the safety of the team and that they could not ensure the security of the expatriates. A key informant discovered later that official authorities and the leaders of the refugee camps or communities had decided together to withhold protection. It was interpreted as a refusal of permitting to use the registrar to proceed with surveys with individuals in the community. The names probably would have led nowhere, since most had been made up (Tucker 1982: 26). This example might seem extreme, but it is not unique. Many reports confirm the complexities of the social negotiation of humanitarian assistance, the fluidity of power and the resistance to external control.

This example first illustrates the technics of power used by the government and the small circle of elites (local official and traditional leaders), at the difference of expatriates (relief workers) who use their power to support the population affected by a combination of drought and conflict. Humanitarians sometimes like in this case, fulfil their mandate at the risk of their life. The menaces against the relief coordinator were lightly veiled.

Second, it sheds some light on how the local leaders use their power 'over' (Lukes 1974; Lukes 2005) to involve the camp population in thwarting the counting of refugees. The majority of the population probably does not benefit from this strategy, and the example shows the power over that local leaders can exert on the camp population but also on the humanitarian workers. This power is superimposed with the power of humanitarians to decide who will be receiving some assistance. The complex circulation of power permeates the relationships between the three groups involved, humanitarians, local population and local leaders. Finally, this example also brings the issue of corruption as a constant feature in the relationship between expatriates, local leaders and population. Corruption permeates both the public and private sector, some organisations such as Transparency International have developed a corruption index in which Haiti ranked 168 out of 180 countries in 2019.

The Complexity of Local Leadership and Power in Haiti

As Chelsey, Kivland (2012: 257-8) explains, *Pouvwa* (power) in Haitian Creole refers to two different concepts; first, the powers that are associated with civic posts or offices. Second, the concept can be understood as a translation of power, fos (moral force) referring to the ‘moral force’ of a community, a broader definition.

Interestingly, during the years preceding the earthquake, in Haiti, humanitarians often wished that they had the power to ways to ‘fix Haiti’. One alternative was humorously named the ‘Marshall Plan’ and was preoccupied with building a new country, piece by piece. The second was to ‘drop a nuclear bomb and start over’. While newly arrived expatriates would be very keen to the first proposal and be shocked at the second, those who had come to work in the country several times would laugh at the first and ‘lower their voice and, a mad gleam in their eyes, detail their latest plan for evacuating the population’ (Katz 2013: 109). In other words, disenchanted aid workers and academics were convinced that the problem with Haiti was that the country was hopeless.

> Reformers argued that going around governments made fragile states weaker. Local officials looked miserly beside foreigners handing out free stuff, while foreign firms hired away talented nationals…when funding ran out or the source of funding bailed, a foreign-run program often left nothing behind. Nobody knew whether giving money directly to foreign governments and building up local infrastructure and resources would work better. But they knew that the current system was not working at all. (Katz 2013: 111)

As it frequently occurred in such situations transferring funds directly to governments or local authorities results in widespread abuse of power by these bodies, which are diverting large amounts of the funding towards their personal use. When humanitarian organisation bypass the officials leaders and create some committees to manage project or funding, ‘a perverse mechanism is set into motion when donor agencies skip the empowerment phase by asking intended beneficiaries to form groups or partner associations, and to ‘elect’ leaders to lead them’ (Platteau 2003: 7). Several studies have found that the formation of community-based groups encourages the entry of leaders or wealthier members of the community to access the funding (Gugerty 2000; Rao 2001).

In the current study, two main branches of local leadership in Haiti were identified. As mentioned earlier, local leadership is a complex construction in which traditional and official are intertwined (Vaughan 2003). Even though local leadership has undergone a rapid political and social transformation, traditional structures still are highly present, especially in the domain where communal values are expressed and in term of land attribution. The traditional leadership structures retain a critical influence in public and private spheres where local aspirations are articulated. Not only the modern and traditional interaction of leadership is affecting local communities, but it also affects the interaction between local, national, and global powers.

In the case of Haiti, like in most administration in decolonised countries, the Haitian administration is a juxtaposition of hybrid forms, neither modern nor traditional. These forms are issued from the legacies of colonisation and occupation, the subjugation of the administration by successive governments, the survivals of traditional forms of organization, and by discriminatory and unfair political practices towards the territories and their populations (Elie 2006). As such, local leadership in Haiti is a complex construction intertwining traditional and official.

With a more rural than urban population—despite the more recent phenomenon of overcrowded urban centres—the territories remain low in urban areas with a population dispersed into hamlets or towns in the vicinity of small agricultural areas and are know under the denomination of *Lakou*[45]. Public institutions and services, both in their decisions and in their actions, are circumscribed to the urban parts, they penetrate villages and towns occasionally to try to contain recurrent natural and humanitarian disasters. The growing rural poverty due to a misfunctioning agricultural system[46], the

[45] A thorough description and cultural importance of *Lakou* is provided in the next Chapter
[46] I come back to the agricultural issues in Haiti in Chapter 4

rural exodus, the ecological disaster, have overtaken the isolation of the communities, and have eased the gradual integration of international and local non-governmental organisations. Their leaders play an important part in the Haitian leadership at the local level. (Elie 2006)

Usually, the official local leaders are not directly involved in local administration which is implemented by local intermediaries such as traditional leaders and Vodou leaders in particular[47]. Thus, the public administration organisational structures are characterized by a doubling of posts and the official leader in charge has no more authority than a subordinate 'branch' to the person of the president of the republic or a parliamentarian from whom he derives a degree of de facto authority power (Sheller 2004). Although the content and nature of expatriates' power are better understood, that of local government officials still needs to be clarified. Often, if government officials are not elected, they are the product of massive encouragement from liberal policies to decentralise governments' administrations. They embody a social category of representatives located between the state and the members of local communities; they are 'both 'messengers' and 'messages'. They are individuals of various origins who are mandated to work in a locality for some years and become members of it. Like humanitarian workers, local government officials[48] negotiate between bureaucratic necessities and the practical implementation of policies and projects. While local officials are supposed to implement government policies, seldom have we found a copy of a legal document or any material to work within the 'offices' of local government officials (including Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Gambia, Angola and Rwanda, among other places where I spent significant time visiting, negotiating and networking with local officials). A second reason local officials do not implement policies is often the result of intentions and a way to misuse their authority for personal gains.

[47] I come back on more detail on the role of Voudou leaders in the next chapter
[48] When using the term *local government officials*, I refer to any government employee based in a given community, town or village.

The Catholic Church is one of Haiti's most powerful institutions, and while much of its leadership has maintained close links to Haiti's ruling elite, the parish priesthood are probably representing one of the most robust sense of stability in the rural parts of the country. Other religious orders, Protestant ones have also played a critical role in fostering the development of civil society in Haiti. Pastors and evangelists' parishes offer spiritual guidance but also education and health services which are essential to the rural population, which have inadequate national healthcare facilities. Following the earthquake, the Evangelical Lutheran Church, the United Methodist Committee on Relief and Catholic Relief Services raised US$ 12.5, 43, and 194 million respectively, US$ 50 million came from the various dioceses (Evangelical Lutheran Church of America 2011; Methodists 2011; Catholic Relief Services 2012)

Local actors who have an official role such as representatives of local NGOs or government representative are the easiest identified, however, during a crisis, the number of volunteers, the private sector, or groups uninvolved in disaster response increases. For example, after the earthquake in Haiti, communication with people trapped in rubbles or isolated because the roads were damaged was provided by the two national telecommunication centres, invaluable assistance believed to have saved many lives in the days following the earthquake. Generically, the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) has adopted a broader definition of what entities are considered as providing local relief activities: 'charities, civil society groups, faith-based organisations, volunteer groups, private sector, communities and diaspora bodies'. (WDR, 2015 p152). In Syria, Pantuliano, and Svoboday (2015: 9) include 'professional bodies that existed before the outbreak of the war, such as medical associations not providing emergency relief; charities; networks of anti-government and community activists, which have morphed from protest movements into relief providers, diaspora organisations; coordination networks; and fighting groups engaged in aid delivery'. The concept of local humanitarian actors and who and what constitutes local humanitarian assistance is fluid and include a diverse range of entities, it is often localized to the geographical areas where disasters occur. (Myrtho-Casséus 2016)

Often, local elites are interested in maintaining their economic and political power, while regular citizens are more focused on daily life issues such as working, feeding their family and living in a stable environment. Like most cultures in Africa and Southeast Asia, the Haitian society still functions along with the logic of clientelism, ‘for those at the very bottom of the social order, the material prosperity of the better off and leaders is not itself reprehensible so long as they too can benefit materially from their association with a patron linking them to the elites’ (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 42). It is essential to acknowledge and assume that, in these societies, the population will tolerate abuses of power if the patron ensures protection and basic economic survival.

As we can see through the examples in this chapter, the relationship between expatriates and local leaders is infused with agency and power. The assistance provided through humanitarian organisations plays an important economic role at the community level. As James K. Boyce (2000: 1161) argues, ‘[A]id affects not only the size of the economic pie and how it is sliced but also the balance of power among competing actors and the rules of the game by which they compete’.

The difference in economic well-being between expatriates and local leaders is not particularly appreciated by local elites, who feel like they are competing with relief workers and are losing some of their leverage and legitimacy as leaders in their communities. It results in a loss of power, which is transferred to outsiders, generating mixed emotions that impact their willingness to cooperate with members of humanitarian organisations. In this situation, expatriates, who are often highly respectable individuals, become the victims of the wealth and agendas they have to manage and implement. For example, in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a focus group conducted by Dijkzeul and Wakenge (2010) with several traditional leaders revealed that religious and other local authorities in and around Bukavu (a small town in eastern Congo) were highly critical of international aid organisations. These officials felt that they had lost power and that international organisations were pursuing their interests. The narrative they shared with the researchers was that they should carefully assess the interests of humanitarians, as these interests may not be purely humanitarian.

Navigating area networks of local leaders, power and hidden agendas is a time-consuming exercise which does not combine well with the responsibilities and agenda of humanitarian organisations, according to the directive provided by donors, their headquarters and in the urgent needs of assistance of communities. In contexts in which partnerships between local leaders are frequently changing, it is often very problematic to find a coherent way to interact with local holders of power.

Conclusion

Local leaders and members of international humanitarian organisations both have an influence on the well-being of populations at the communal level in particular. Both exercise power, but one issue of significance is the unbalanced relationship of power between the aid community and local leaders and the effect this can have on local populations. The example provided of the power game engaged between expatriates and local leaders who were trying to increase the number of registered refugees in a camp to receive more assistance provided an illustration. In short, a population can be supported by some local leaders but abused by others. Although structurally speaking, the local population has limited power from an outsider's perspective, as we will confirm in the next chapter, power is expressed in various ways. It exists in the shadow of seemingly accepting or submissive subjects. Power occurs in and through relationships and is not an abstract object, but rather, regulates social interactions and demarcates the terms with which people relate. While expatriates' power rests on financial superiority, differential, asymmetrical power and structural power and a kind of immunity from local drama. Local leaders have authoritative power and power ‘over’, the legitimacy of which can be sometimes questioned in a Western socially constructed society. By deciphering the perceptions of both leaderships, we gain knowledge about the difficulties of the negotiation of social space.

Chapter 5: The Social Construction of Reality in Haiti

Haitians in Cap Haitien are in a worse situation than some of the internally displaced persons I saw in Darfur. (Guehenno 2013)[49]

The earthquake that shocked the island of Haiti in January 2010 was supposed to represent a turning point in the history of the country, in which 50 years of relentless efforts to bring 'development' had not succeeded. As Jonathan M. Katz (2013: 2) remarks, 'I wanted to understand how people could endure not only the catastrophe that befell Haiti...but also the hardship and absurdity that followed'. This chapter examines the contents of the Haitian society social construction through the exploration of the vagaries of its history and the internal and external powers that have influenced it.

Colonisers and Dictators

The invasion and conquest of Latin America's cultures and societies are at the root of what today we call the global world. However, this process has consistently implied a concentration of resources under the control of a small European minority and, later, their North American descendants. Direct and indirect control of social, political and cultural ways of life was established when the Europeans conquered entire continents establishing the colonial system. Although it seems to have been uprooted following the wars of independence, it was replaced by Western imperialism (Mignolo 2008), a more insidious form of control, based more on 'association of social interests between the dominant groups ('social classes' and 'ethnies') of countries with unequally articulated power, rather than an imposition from the outside' (Quijano 2007: 168). After independence was gained in 1804 through a bloody revolution against the French, Haiti's history has been mostly constructed through fearful and stereotyping narratives using 'a powerful and persistent meta-narrative that Haiti is Africa' or with a culture that is resistant to "development" or change, driven by powerful racial ideologies shaped by slavery' (Plummer 1988; Dubois 2004). Reconstructing Haiti's *istwa*[50] along its evolution with the international system provides clues to grasp the impasse in which the country remains and, by extension, the difficulties and frustrations of humanitarian organisations and Haitians, respectively.

The original inhabitants of the island, the *Taino* first encountered internationalism when Christopher Columbus disembarked at the northeast of the island in December 1492 and left the first settlement: La Navidad. When he returned a few months after the establishment of the Spanish settlement, a system of exchange was established between Taino, who provided gold and food to the Spaniards in exchange for metal items, beads and ceramics. Soon, the Spanish penetrated the island's interior, causing uprisings of the Taino (Keegan and Machachlan 1989: 625-627). The Europeans retaliated and enslaved many American Indians. Hispaniola is suspected to be the first area to lose its native population from death in combat, flight or disease. Later, once the Spanish discovered gold and silver in other areas in South America and Mexico, they mostly abandoned the island. (Keehnen 2012)

France took control of Hispaniola under the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697. The colony became the richest in the world at the time, with the establishment of sugar cane plantations and sugar mills: wealth produced by slaves under extreme cruelty (Price-Mars 1956: 19). The life expectancy of slaves working on the plantations has been estimated by Frank Tannenbaum (1947: 46) to be seven years. As plantations expanded and required more and more slaves, the slave system became unstable as the number of whites was

[50] *Istwa* is creole for *history.*

greatly outnumbered. According to Jean Price-Mars (1956), around 1789, there were 600,000 slaves; 21,000 free local people; and 28,000 whites, who were dependent on the free local workers and local leaders to control them (Mintz 1977).

During this period, mainland France was weakened by its internal revolution and in Haiti by slaves' revolts. About half the slaves of the French colonies came from Africa and were born before 1789. They brought with them African guerrillas' strategies probably used in their countries before being captured. The final slave rebellion freed Haiti, which became the first colony gaining independence in 1804 (Popkin 2012). The decolonisation and de facto end of slavery in Haiti produced ripples that resonated throughout the American continent, from Venezuela to the United States (Nesbitt 2013). The successful revolution worried the colonial powers, as Liliana Obregon (2018: 604) remarks 'Haiti had become a symbol of a successful slave revolt and a dangerous example to all surrounding colonies.' The access of the island to independence could jeopardise the existing system of slavery and colonialism in the Americas and Europe that was at the centre of its fast economic growth. First, the colonial powers tried to recolonise the newly independent country by force (Popkin 2012; Katz 2013: 708). Unsuccessful, they turned to financial strategies to strangulate the country indirectly by establishing an economic and diplomatic embargo, which succeeded in bringing the recently formed state to its knees. Ruined, extremely isolated and fragile, with French naval forces nearby (Dubois 2012), the Haitian government had to agree to pay 150 millions of francs to France (Chatterjee 2008: 616) as compensation for the Empire's loss of property, which included both land and slaves. Schuller (2006) calculated that today, that figure would represent US$21 US billion. Hans Schmidt (1971: 43) evaluated that, in 1915, for example, 80 percent of the government's income went to service the debt[51]. The debt was finally paid off in 1947.

[51] For a specific description of the servicing of the debt see Laurent Dubois (2012: 101-103)

Although to many, the history of Haiti in the twentieth century is associated to the brutal dictatorship of François Duvalier commonly nicknamed "Papa Doc" who ruled the country from 1957 to 1971, and his son Jean-Claude named "Baby Doc" Duvalier, who governed Haiti from 1971 to 1986 (Renda 2001). A brief historical contextualization is useful to understand how this period and the successive ones have shaped contemporary Haiti. While instability and violence still prevailed in Haiti at the dawn of the twentieth century and foreign economic control continued (Schmidt 1971: 43), the country was invaded in July 1915 by the United States' Marines under the administration of U.S. president Woodrow Wilson (Plummer 1992).

The U.S. Marine Corps invaded Haiti from the North under the justification of suppressing unrest prevailing on this part of the island after the assassination of its president. However, the invasion of the country was part of a borader strategy of interference in the Caribbean and also included the occupation of Nicaragua, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba. The occupation of the island was also geopolitically motivated by the construction of the Panama Canal between 1904 and 1914 (Schmidt 1971: 43). Haiti represented an important strategic point to protect the passage between the island and Guantanamo Bay, which was also occupied by the U.S. This critical trade route connected the US to the new canal. Frank Everson Vandiver (2005: 49) alleges that, after the Marines invaded the Island, they installed 'a puppet president, Philippe Sudré Dartiguenave[52]. Subservient to American interests, Dartiguenave accepted --virtually at gunpoint-- a treaty that nearly gave his country to its new northern ally'. The Marines decreed martial law, press censorship, and also modified the Haitian constitution to give foreigners the right to own land in Haiti and declared French the official language. Americans remained in control of Haiti for nearly twenty years (Plummer 1992; Renda 2001: 32).

---

[52] Philippe Sudré Dartiguenave (1863-1926) served as the President of Haiti from August 1915 to May 1922. According to Mary A. Renday, he supported the U.S. occupation and worked closely with the U. S. administration (2001)

According to Gaddis Smith (1995), the U.S. occupying power established puppet regimes and an army, which suppressed the opposition and removed future resistance against the dictatorships established under its auspices. Plummer (1992: 101) describes the occupation of the U.S. as, ‘unprecedented in its duration... the racism that characterized U.S. behavior . . ., and the brutality associated with pacification efforts. To cement governments or overthrow opponents’. The United States Intelligence (CIA) has undertaken secret interventions for almost forty years in Haiti’ (Whitney 1996: 303). The CIA funded death squads or paramilitary operations that destabilised and helped overthrow governments or presidents that were not aligned with the US’s ideology (Mellen 2012). The US military occupation of Haiti and the provision in the new constitution of the right of acquisition of Haitian land by foreigners permitted a growing number of U.S. agricultural companies to enter the country. They bought or confiscated large amounts of land, taking it from Haitian subsistence farmers, who migrated in large numbers to find work on neighbouring Caribbean islands or in the capital, Port-au-Prince, which had become the trading post with the United States. Powerful companies such as the United Fruit Company, which were already present in the Caribbean and Central America, were strong supporters of the military occupation of Haiti which help them to get established in the country to grow high-value export crops (Plummer 1992: 111).

What has been named the second independence of Haiti occurred in 1929, this time the fight for independence was led by a massive student uprising which was joined by Haitian government employees in October 1929 (Moise 1988: 158-59). Despite the martial law and arrests, by December, fifteen hundred *paysans* marched against the Marines who opened fire on the crowd (Millet 1978: 131) but could not resist the strength of this mass revolt. According to Dubois (2004: 8-9),

> The U.S. occupation transformed Haiti in ways that are still playing out today. The United States, like other colonial powers, touted its building of schools and roads, and it is still recognized and appreciated for having brought significant medical assistance. But

> while the United States justified the occupation as a project to improve and democratize Haiti's political institutions, it ultimately exacerbated the rift within the society.

However, internal governance issues did not end, and the election of François Duvalier as President in 1957 was the beginning of another long reign of terror in Haiti. While the peasant majority elected him, he 'spent the rest of his life consolidating absolute power through terror, bringing the smallest mountain municipality under the control of his National Palace through the apportionment of loyal "section chiefs."' He established a lethal death squad called the *Tonton Macoutes*[53] (Diederich and Burt 1972). An estimated 60,000 progressives, peasants and suspected communists were assassinated by the *Tonton Macoutes*, while hundreds of thousands were detained and tortured (Gaillard 1990). Laurent Dubois (2004: 328) estimates that by the mid-1960s, the *Tontons Macoutes* were twice as numerous as the Haitian armed forces and were consuming two-thirds of the government's budget. The prevailing climate of terror established by Duvalier resulted in 80 per cent of professionals, intellectuals and members of the political opposition to flee the country (Jackson 2011: 185-204).

After World War II, the government had adopted an interventionist economic model, and nascent industrialisation took shape mostly financed by international loans but owned by the Haitian state, these included sugar, cigarettes, flour mills, cement production. High tariffs and quotas protected these ventures. The state also controlled food prices by administrative measures and by the purchase and storage of production surpluses that would be released in times of shortage. Although these instruments were not ideals and often abused by the elites, it nevertheless shows that the state had some control over its macroeconomic policies. Due to its dependence on agriculture and its geographical location, the country has always experienced

---

[53] The *Tonton Macoutes (*from the creole *Tonton Makout)* were a Haitian paramilitary force set up in 1959 by François Duvalier, the dictator nicknamed "Papa Doc". They were the forces supporting the reign of terror established by the dictator. They committed unremitting acts of violence against the population to keep the dictator Duvalier in power.

periodic food shortages mainly because of flooding, droughts and political instability. Solidarity among communities around the *lakou* social organisation and the mobilisation of resources at the national level worked well until the 1950s to address these issues.

Interestingly, in line with the evolution of the development narrative of the time, the first international food aid operation occurred in the early 1950s in the wake of Hurricane Hazel. Since then, humanitarian organisations have distributed food in Haiti. The NGO Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), an organisation very close to the U.S. government, was the first to organise permanent food aid in the country in the mid-1970s and was soon followed by others.

Meanwhile, foreign influence had not stopped and beginning in the early 1970s a food aid strategy for Haiti was developed by the U.S Congress under president Ronald Reagan and implemented under the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). According to Josh DeWind (1986: 97), it has two components, first to 'facilitate government reforms needed to shift Haiti's agricultural sector to export crop production, but also to provide food for consumption as Haiti produces less and less of its own food'. Also, 'By flooding Haiti with tens of millions of dollars of low-cost foods, the Title III program has the potential of driving down the prices for food crops in local markets. While a decline in domestic food crop prices might make exporting coffee relatively attractive to peasant producers and result in a slight increase in coffee production, it could also reduce peasants 'income and standard of living' (DeWind and Kinley 1986: 97). According to Ian Smillie (2001: 59), USAID

> ...[S]hift[ed] the Haitian economy away from agricultural production for local consumption to an economy primarily based on export agriculture and offshore assembly plants. Food aid was, thus, seen as a tool to encourage rural farmers to accept short-term, labour-intensive jobs in food-for-work programmes, rather than continue to farm small plots of land.

As soon as the early 1970s, 70 % of the Haitian national budget was from foreign assistance, and by 1975, it reached US $35.5 million (Girard 2010: 10). The high level of corruption among the Haitian elites 'meant that this aid never reached the Haitian people and the economic situation was dramatic. A study conducted in 1984 found that less than 25 per cent of the population was living above the poverty line, and the levels of inequality were dramatic (Girard 2010: 210). Also, the rate of population growth was relatively high, and the level of deforestation of the country had reached 97 per cent facilitating a rapid soil erosion (Weiss 2004: 117). Picture below,

Picture - 7: UNEP/Flickr (2011). Border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 2011. Ninety-eight per cent of the Haiti side is deforested.

According to USAID, by 1984, more than 50 % of the food in Haiti was distributed through humanitarian organisations[54], it was the largest programme in the world (1984: ii, 27). USAID reported that the 'programs

[54] According to a report by .... in 1981, twenty-five non-governmental organizations were registered with AID (which today is USAID, to distribute food assistance.

implemented by PVOs[55] have been more effective than those implemented by GOH agencies' (1984: 27). The World Bank stated, that the government owned mill, the Minoterie D' Haiti had the monopoly on the import of wheat, and wholesaled it as flour to bakeries, distributors and retailers, an increase of taxes on flour sales increased the cost, between 1981 and 1983 the profit from these taxes represented 30.3 percent of the price of flour (World World Bank 1985: 42-44). At the time wheat importation represented 20 percent of Haiti's calories' consumption and was introduced as a substitute to traditional crops like maize, sorghum, millet, bananas, breadfruit and various roots. USAID comments that the price of wheat 'determine the entire structure of cereal prices' (1982c: 76). By swelling the sale of imported wheat mostly from the U.S. and Argentina at a lower price through Title III[56] program, the price of traditional food crops would go down and farmers would turn to cultivate cash crops for exportation, coffee in particular. Despite the increase poverty that was the outcome of such strategy, USAID 'has forced the Haitian government to agree to sell larger amounts of wheat flour at a reduced price as one of the preconditions for initiating the Title III program.'[57] (1985: 74-75, Annex C:1)

The Haitian population has perceived food aid distribution as a threat to its independence since its inception. Mainly, food distribution and food for work programmes were established and disliked, as they reminded Haitians of the *corvée,* which was unpaid labour, imposed on the population by various regimes. The U.S. Army reinstated the *corvée* during the American occupation of the country between 1915 and 1934. According to Schuller (2012), the *corvée* was perceived by Haitians as a form of indirect taxation and as a form of domination, bringing back the memories of slavery to the

[55] PVO stands for private voluntary organisations a appellation often used instead of NGO at the time.
[56] Historically, most U.S. food aid has been provided under Title I (government-to-government concessional aid) and Title III (concessional aid tied specifically to development). Under Title III food aid is imported under free market conditions as a substitute for preexisting imports.

rural peasantry. When speaking about food aid, Haitians often use the words *manje sinister,* which can be translated as eating food of poor quality.

The World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) became heavily involved in Haiti after 1986, following the departure of President Duvalier. Before that, the United States Agency for International Development was the primary body involved in Haiti. According to (Gros 2011) in the 1980s the IMF and the WB institutions analysed economic recessions in poor countries as evidence of the endemic mismanagement of funding and poor policies designed by their governments. In all cases the following reasons were identified,

> '"profligate" government spending (including on social programs that benefit the poor), "bloated" bureaucracies, "distorted" pricing, "irrational" trade policies, "overvalued" currencies, and "inefficient" and "financially" burdensome state-owned enterprises that bled the national treasury, produced low-quality but high-priced goods, and were prone to seeking shelter from international competition through state-imposed tariffs and quotas on foreign-made products.' (Gros 2011: 148)

However, the dependence of the Haitian government on foreign funding assistance and its difficulties in reimbursing its debt pushed to call for an intervention by the IMF and WB which were the main institutions giving loans to the country at the time. Currency reforms were adopted with the devaluation of the gourde which value plummeted immediately, causing a jump in inflation rate[58]. Meanwhile, wages did not increase, and the level of poverty deepened. Additional loans were needed to maintain the government afloat but with conditionalities spelt out in the structural adjustment loans (SALs) and structural adjustment programs (SAPs). While the devaluation of the gourde was supposed to stimulate Haitian agricultural exports, by 1987, 'the country had ceased to become a major exporter of any

[58] Inflation increase from 6% in 1986 to 13% in 1987.

agricultural commodity, with the possible exception of Mango.' (Barnett and Weiss 2008)

The SAPs included the elimination of protective tariffs imposed by the Haitian state which in addition to the devaluation of the gourde made Haitian agriculturalists unable to compete with imported wheat, corn, meat and subsidised rice (Fig.2) from the USA.



Figure 3: Food and Agriculture Organization (2016) - Evolution of Rice Importation in Haiti (1961-2016)

The U.S. Public Law 480 suppressed the possibility of Haitian domestic agriculture from being used as humanitarian assistance, according to a report from the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice (2010). One of the tragic effects of such a policy has been a massive, forced exodus of agriculturalists to urban areas, seeking alternative ways of subsistence and living in slums around the capital. This economic burden gives a sense of helplessness to the population. One man summarised this feeling during a conversation: 'For us to be independent adults, we must be able to feed ourselves; so if they really want to help us, they need to invest in agriculture'[59] [LL. Int 7].

[59] Exerpt of an interview with a local leader in Haiti, November 2013

Historically in Haiti, customs duties were primary source of state revenue. In the late nineteenth century, coffee alone generated 60 per cent of the taxes; well into the 1970s, it supplied 40 per cent of state revenue (Lundahl 1979) Additional revenues were raised through taxes imposed on consumer goods, some of which were also manufactured by state-owned enterprises. The Haitian state earned little revenue from the influx of foreign firms that set up operation from the mid-1970s to 1991 since tax exonerations were often the incentive that brought them to Haiti, to begin with (the others being low wages and the absence of labour unions)(Gros 2010: 984). When Haiti was compelled to drastically reduce customs duties on a variety of goods, including rice, and closed some of the state-owned enterprises (e.g., HASCO, the sugar mill), the bottom essentially fell out of the agency responsible for tax collection: Direction Générale des Impôts (DGI).' (Gros 2011).

However, a group of humanitarian organisations including Christian Aid (McGuigan 2006: 38) and Oxfam, have acknowledged the problem of food import in the country,

> In the **rice sector,** a huge amount could be done to support rice farmers, who have been abandoned to a serious decline in the last two decades. A lot of technical support and investment is needed to increase production and productivity, and many organisations in Haiti feel that a tariff increase would be advisable for this product. This policy was also endorsed by the EU in the 1990s. Even a small tariff increase could help improve the meagre profit margins of tens of thousands of extremely poor rice farmers and tariff revenues could be channeled back into supporting rice producers' development. Ensuring the rice sector was more profitable would also mean the huge loan taken on from the IDB (announced in November 2003) would have more chance of supporting a viable initiative over the medium to long term.

The possession of land and agricultural production has been at the centre of the Haitians livelihoods from the time African slaves landed in Haiti. As discussed in the preceding chapter, the macroeconomic policies adopted by successive governments have severely affected Haitians' livelihoods and deepened poverty of the population. Due to the reduction of tariffs for imports, making the importation of rice cheaper than producing it locally[60]. The country has increasingly become dependent on imports for its essential food supply. The intense cultivation from foreign agribusinesses for high-value cash crop exports took over the land from Haitian farmers and deteriorated the environment by overusing chemicals and the land. At the beginning of the new millennium, NGOs funded by USAID have continued to distribute food decreasing local production and trade (Dubois 2012). Inadvertently, some humanitarian organisations supported export-oriented agriculture policies, undermining the local production, and established dependency upon the dumping of agricultural surpluses from the US through their humanitarian programmes. Haiti used to be a rice exporter; today, the country produces only 18 per cent of the rice consumed in the country (Dubois 2012: 9). Some humanitarian organisations such as Christian aid are trying to reverse the food import process, competing against the power of the agribusiness system.

The number of international non-governmental organisations has increased in the early 1980s and the majority of development assistance has been provided through these organisations due to the reduction or ending of foreign assistance transiting through the government. Between 2000 and 2009, it has been estimated by the Office of the Special Envoy that an

---

60 One of the most destructive projects of the Haitian economy has been what the Haitians named the Miami Rice (*Diri* Miami) introduced by the World Bank and the IMF with the negotiation of a tariff reduction on rice imports going from 35 percent to percent. Simultaneously, American Rice Inc., a corporation based in Texas, was given the monopoly over rice imports. In the first phase of the project, military convoys distributed rice to the areas producing rice in Haiti. Despite strong opposition by local farmers against the imported product, the production of native rice collapsed, and many farmers were forced to migrate to Port au Prince, the capital city that was already overpopulated. All these trade deals, legal or not, were negotiated behind closed doors, and no public announcement was made to the public and farmers. These deals involved both American and Haitian elites.

average of twenty-three organisations were created each year in Haiti, out of the total number of NGOs working in Haiti, 51 % have they headquarters in the United States (Ramachandran 2015: 40). In a study conducted before the earthquake of 2010, Zanotti found that 70 per cent of healthcare and 85 percent of education services were provided by NGOs (2010). Aid projects have been implemented by NGOs, with officials of the Haitian state doing little more than providing their blessing (Gros 2011: 175). Humanitarian organisations primarily operate as parallel bureaucracies rather than in support of the formal state for building functioning institutions led by the Haitian government. In addition, NGOs have deprived the states of talented employees who prefer the salaries, professionalism and benefits offered by NGOs (Gros 2011).

In the 1990s, the end of the Cold War and new conflicts were threatening the new world order. They called for a new agenda, which was designed by the north-western powers and inspired by the Washington consensus[61]. The new agenda prescribed ‘forced’ democratisation as the best medicine to address the violence induced by the change in the world’s balance of power (Dubois 2012). In Haiti, the first ‘free’ elections brought Jean Bertrand Aristide to lead the nation. Aristide embodied the will of Haitian people, who were massively against neoliberalist policies[62] and the candidate backed by the U.S.: Marc Bazin, a former staff member of the World Bank in line with the liberal peace agenda encouraged at the time. After his election, Aristide was not given a chance to make changes; a coup orchestrated by the Haitian elite and the U.S. overthrew him only seven months into his presidency (Ferguson 1987).

---

[61] The term ‘Washington Consensus’ was coined in 1989 by John Williamson (1993) to describe the end on the state ‘initiating industrialization and import substitution’. The three pillars of the Washington Consensus included: market economy, trade openness and macroeconomic stability.

[62] Neoliberal policies were and are still implemented through economic liberalisation programmes relative to the foreign debt crisis and the pressure on indebted countries to move towards global integration. These policies include stabilisation policies implemented by central governments based on the freeze of wages, cuttings in public health programs, education and civil servants hire to balance budgets. They also include subsidies for the support of essential consumption items (Green 2003; Serra 2008) .

Following the coup, the progressive civil society was crushed by the army and paramilitaries. According to Bernard Diederich and Al Burt (1972), an estimated 5,000 supporters of Aristide were murdered, thousands were imprisoned and tortured, and more than 80,000 people fled the country. To stop the influx of immigrants from Haiti, the U.S. administration, then under Bill Clinton, returned Aristide to office under the condition that additional neoliberal policies would be implemented and a coalition government would be put into place that included the same people who had ousted him three years previously (Lennox 1993). After Aristide, the U.S. government, then under Republican lead, supported another authoritarian regime and established a new puppet government under René Preval (Clement 1997). To make things worse, the assassination of Mireille Durocher-Bertin[63] (Avril 2001: 99), a virulent opponent of Aristide's, triggered the passage of the Dole Amendment in 1995, which banned any direct assistance to Haiti by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It induced a domino effect, and the United States and other donors started to channel almost all assistance to Haiti through the International Committee of the Red Cross and other non-governmental organisations such as Oxfam, Save the Children and World Vision (Stotzky 1997: 270).

The re-election of Aristide in 2000 was a popular victory, angering the international community and the Haitian elite class, which benefitted from the U.S. policies, in particular (Mandelbaum 2016). Alex Dupuis (2006) states that one of the main reasons for Aristide's popular re-election was his agenda, which included the prevention of the privatisation of the last state industries, the protection of local agriculture, the construction of state and regional infrastructures (schools and hospitals in particular), the rise of the minimum wage and a request for the cancellation of the country's debt, which amounted to $21 US billion (46-202). The European Union, Canada, the USA and financial institutions tightened the economic embargo in an attempt to diminish Aristide's popularity. In February 2004, a new coup

[63] Mireille Durocher-Bertin was a lawyer who supported the militia against Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Although the identity of her assassin was never confirmed, multiple reports and witnesses have been silenced by the FBI.

overthrew Aristide, who was exiled to the Central African Republic. According to Jean Christopher Kovats-Bernat (2006: 124) and Irwin P. Stotzky (1997) who was a law professor and former attorney for the first Aristide government, recommended an expansion of,

> The involvement of the civil society, especially the poor, in the national dialogue concerning poverty-reduction as a means of more effectively addressing the immediate economic needs of the deeply impoverished representing 70% of Haitians who stand the most to win or lose in policy shifts. Despite his promises to increase dialogue, neither Aristide administration (1990-1995, 2000-2004) showed much effort in actually doing so.

Aristide established the Aristide Foundation for Democracy (Aristid Foundasyon pou Demokrasi, (AFD)), however, according to Kovats-Bernat (2001), AFD was more a location for political rallies to promote Aristide than a platform to support poverty reduction. What Aristide could never achieve was the construction of a state that could provide essential services to the Haitian population which, to this day, remains widely affected by structural violence[64] and episodic spurts of direct violence, occurring mainly as protests against government policies. Following President Aristide's exile on February 29, 2004, unrest and riots erupted in protest by the Haitian population. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was established to restore calm to the country based on Resolution 1529 of the Security Council: '… the situation in Haiti constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and to stability in the Caribbean especially through the potential

[64] Social forces, such as sexism, racism, poverty and social inequalities, are rooted in historical, political and economic processes, these forces have been referred to as structural violence. This form of violence is indirect, 'built into the person, social and world spaces and is unintended' (Galtung, 1996). In the same way that armed violence, structural violence have two effects, either by killing its victims or by harming them physically, socially or psychologically (Galtung 1969; Farmer 2004). Akhil Gupta (2012: 20) provides a comprehensive definition of structural violence, 'the absence of violence is an ideal state that is not likely to be achieved in any given social formation. This interest in outcomes, however, has a broad scope, not limited to questions of food, livelihood, or income. Structural violence is a capacious term that encompasses not only the exclusion from entitlements such as food and water but also the exclusion of certain groups from particular forms of recognition'.

outflow of people to other States in the sub region'[65] and that [66] it was 'determined that the situation in Haiti continued to be a threat to international peace and security in the region'[67]. Mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN mission's role included three broad areas of intervention: 'a secure and stable environment, the political process, and human rights' (p. 9). Brazil has led the mission named MINUTSA since its inception. As Marcel Biato (2011: 191) writes 'Brazil came to Haiti in 2004 with both a mission and a vision.' In short, the MINUSTAH mandate was to support the government in providing security given the upcoming presidential elections. Initially, the fact that a Southern country like Brazil would be leading the mission was welcome, but soon, it became perceived as a new force of domination.

Despite the MINUSTHA vision, even before the earthquake, 'a string of sexual scandals involving U.N. peacekeepers, and perhaps more crucially, following the cholera scandal that rocked the United Nations. (MINUSTAH)'s 'capital of legitimacy' has quickly floundered...local actors stared to openly criticize the united Nations, referring to it as a 'force of occupation,' (Lemay-Hébert 2014: 191). According to Johanna Mendelson-Forman (2006: 15), from a professional interpretation, the various intervention by the UN in Haiti have been rather technocratic, 'outside of development programming'. The mission has also been limited due to its poor understanding of Haiti's history and culture (Donais 2005). These elements affected the perceived legitimacy of the international body by Haitians who initially, were relieved by the arrival of the peacekeepers. According to Erica Caple James (2010: 3) they originally envisioned MINUSTAH as a neutral security force that would be able to end the violence of the early 1990s. However, the peacekeepers quickly lost legitimacy and were 'blamed to a degree by the populace for

---

[65] S/Res/1529 (2004)
[66] The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was established by Security Council Resolution 1542. MINUSTAH succeeded the Multinational Interim Force (MIF), which was authorised in February 2004 by the Security Council following the exile of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Following the devastating earthquake of 2010, the Security Council supported the secretary-general's advice to increase the force level of MINUSTAH to support the recovery and stabilisation efforts under Resolution 1908 of 19 January 2010.
[67] See no. 8 above.

[the] actions' of the Haitian security institutions (Fishel 1998: 171). One of the MINUSTAH roles is to reinforce the Haitian police capacities, and as such, they have to coordinate and work with the Haitian National Police which has opened it to further criticism because of allegations against the police of committing summary execution, the murder of street children, rapes and robberies.

Peacebuilding operations successes are often shadowed by abuses from a small number of individual or some strategic missteps leading to the death of civilians. These negative consequences reinforce the perception by populations like in Haiti that they are under a new form of control. Diverse organisations and academic institutions have documented examples of abuses committed by MINUSTAH. An review by the University of Miami's Center for the Study of Human Rights (*Haiti human rights investigation: Nov.11-24, 2004*) reports that MINUSTAH peacekeepers and soldiers 'resort to heavy-handed incursions into the most impoverished neighborhoods that force intermittent peace at the expense of innocent residents.' Furthermore, on October 27, 2010, there was an outbreak of cholera in Haiti, which spread rapidly across the country. By January 2014, according to the Haitian Ministry of Public Health and Population, 8,534 persons had died of cholera, and 697,256 cases had been recorded (Widmer 2014). It must be noted that, before the outbreak, there was no cholera cases reported in Haiti, and many questioned the origin of this epidemic. By now, it has been proven (Fabini D. O. et al. 2014: 1) that the soldiers of the MINUTSTAH)[68,69] were carrying the cholera strain and transmitted the disease due to poor hygiene conditions and to the release of the UN mission's wastes directly into a river. Before the cholera outbreak, the leading cause of death for children under five was diarrhoea. Today, it is cholera, marking a shift in structural violence that could have been avoided, according to Unni Karunakara (2010).

[68] It must be noted that MINUSTAH never granted me an interview despite many promises and tentative meeting schedules, but there was always a cancellation at the last minute.
[69] After denying responsibility for introducing the cholera epidemic for six years, the United Nations has recently acknowledged its responsibility.



Cumulative toll of cholera cases and deaths in Haiti since 2010, with map showing worst-affected areas - (AFP)

Figure 4: Agence France Press (2016). Evolution of cholera cases between October 2010 and July 2016

The role and aims of U.N. peacekeeping missions are never easy to implement, Rama Mani commented that “despite the action of the U.N., the reality on the ground ranges from scepticism to cynicism to outright rejection of the U.N. mission, with only a few Haitians expressing support.’ (2006: 11). In the eyes of most Haitians, the impacts of its presence are different from the originally stated objectives, which were to increase security and to protect the human rights of all Haitians. MINUSTAH troops have themselves abused human rights with documented allegations of sexual violence committed against girls, boys and women (Kenkel 2013; Thelma 2013; Muller and Steinke 2018). They have also been accused of robbery, murder, and assault. However, MINUSTAH has continuously refused to investigate such allegations. Soon after the earthquake in 2010, the MINUSTAH mission was reinforced, but further lost the trust of Haitians when it responded violently to peaceful requests by Haitians in the wake of the earthquake (Panchang 2011).

Although this introduction to Haiti's history is limited in its scope and based on generalisations without many nuances, it presents a common theme throughout the country's history: foreign domination, colonisation and exploitation by external powers and the resistance of Haitians against occupation, using open rebellion or more covert methods. That being said, we cannot ignore that in large part of Haiti's misery lies in the mismanagement, creed and greed of its Haitian leaders and elite from the beginning. As Mark Danner (2010) wrote:

> The new nation, its fields burned, its plantation manors pillaged, its towns devastated by apocalyptic war, was crushed by the burden of these astronomical reparations, payments that, in one form or another, strangled its economy for more than a century. It was in this dark aftermath of war, in the shadow of isolation and contempt, that Haiti's peculiar political system took shape, mirroring in distorted form, like a wax model placed too close to the fire, the slave society of colonial times.

An analysis of the evolution of the island's governments since its independence and first ruler, Francois-Dominique Toussaint Louverture[70], the head of the Haitian revolution, suggests that subsequent governments adopted the colonisers' economic model and culture, reinstating the plantation economy and the domination of the population by the elite (Lundahl 1992; Fatton 2006: 114). In the Constitution he published in 1801, Louverture proclaimed himself Governor for Life, a model adopted by future leaders of Haiti. When Napoleon Bonaparte deported him to France in 1802, he was replaced by one of his lieutenants, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, who has been described as brutal and cruel; he proclaimed independence in 1804. Dessalines pronounced himself Emperor and responded with brutal violence to revolts erupting in the newly liberated country. He was assassinated in 1806 and replaced by Christophe and Pétion, two former

[70] François-Dominique Toussaint Louverture, was the leader of the growing resistance against the French colonisers and of the Haitian Revolution (Popkin 2012).

leaders in the struggle for independence. They quickly disagreed on the path to take to rule the country and parted the country into the Northern Kingdom and the Southern Republic. They both were also described as tyrants (Schuller 2007b).

Early Acts of Resistance and Resilience

Since the inception of slavery and foreign colonisation, the inhabitants of *Ayiti*[71] have resisted, first openly by attacking settlers led by Queen Anacaona[72] who was murdered as shown in the lithograph below. Another form of resistance which was still in the open was *ra-ra* processions[73], with chants conveying the social and political issues created by the settlers and the discontent of the population[74].

Figure 5 - Joos van Winghe (1598?). Massacre of the Taino queen and her subjects

[71] *Ayiti* can be translated as *the land of high mountains*, so named by the indigenous Amerindians, the Taino, who originally populated the island.
[72] *Anacaona* can be translated into *golden flower* in English.
[73] As a side note, Queen Anacaona was born in *Yaguana,* which is today the town of Léogâne.
[74] It must be remarked that *ra-ra* processions are still part of Haiti's tradition. They are often performed on Sundays and during Lent and Carnival. They have maintained their revolutionary tone and are a way to inform the governing bodies about the disagreement of the people.

Most slaves arrived from Africa, where they had been free people, often subsistence farmers and warriors to defend their lands against other tribes. In Haiti, their main desire, besides returning to Africa, was to own a piece of land and live alongside their communal practices. Like Foucault's 'strategic reversibility' of power relationships, despite the international and national elites' greed and disregard for those without whom there would be no Haiti, the people of Haiti have always resisted unfair domination.

The slaves working conditions 'rapidly generated various forms of revolt, 'quotidian resistance within, escape from, and uprisings against the system.' (Turner 2011: 677). Quotidian or everyday resistance included a wide range of overt and covert activities to contest their enslavement but also for survival. Their strategies were based on individual and collective verbal demands as well as in cooperation among themselves to lower workloads or to obtain goods for trade and consumption. They were combined with the destruction of crops, violence and even murdering of managers or owners in rare cases as well as some spontaneous revolts (Turner 2011).

Early acts of resistance were also planned and took place in the slaves' quarters or the forests or mountains of Haiti, hidden from the masters. This secrecy resulted in the necessity of performing submissively in front of the master. This performance or acting might have sounded,

> [A]s totally determined from above and to miss the agency of the actor in appropriating the performance for his own ends. What may look from above like the extraction of a required performance can easily look from below like the artful manipulation of deference and flattery to achieve its own end. (Scott 1990: 34)

These rituals of manipulation, which were often the subject of conversations in secret areas or the slaves' quarters, fulfilled two primary purposes. First, they allowed the repressed population to survive their frustration from domination, and second, they represented a mode of resistance to which the master was not totally oblivious. On the contrary, the behaviours dispensed by slaves in front of the master were often the production of correct or expected conducts. The space between what was expected and the frustration of domination represent the terrain in which resistance could be strategised and make life bearable (Fick 2000; Sheller 2004; Alexi 2015).

Suicide was another form of resistance; it was performed individually and collectively. In this case, death was envisioned not only as a liberation from the extreme conditions of life imposed by slavery but also according to popular African beliefs, as a way to escape, allowing the dead to return to their native land (Salvine 1911: 94). However, in the early eighteen century, some observers commented that despair, loss of dignity and pride were not the only reasons for committing suicide, according to Père Labat, ‘They destroy themselves, they off-handedly slit their throats for trivial reasons, but most often, they do this to cause damage to their masters.’ (cited by de Vassière 1909: 230). Suicide was also a calculated strategy, a mean of resistance going beyond personal pain but also to affect the planters’ benefits. Although the thesis does not focus on gender, according to Fick (2000) , woman also developed forms of resistance by poisoning or killing their children to prevent them from the sufferings of slavery and as an act of vengeance against their master, especially when the child was his own.

Once the slavery system was established, a common practice of resistance developed by the slaves was the *marronage.* In this strategy, they deserted plantations and hid in the mountains, then covered by forests. Some of them would disappear for extended periods and be already cultivating small individual plots of land (Nicholls 1974). The response to this open form of rebellion was an increase in colonialists’ brutality. The slaves were also practising other more covert forms of resistance, such as working as slowly as possible, they would break pieces of equipment or act stupid in front of the masters or destroy the crops (Scott 2008). Another more pernicious form of resistance was the extensive use of poison on livestock, planters and their families. A famous *maroon* named François Mackandal conceived the project of exterminating all the ‘Whites’ and creating an independent country.

After his plan was uncovered and denounced, he was ambushed and burnt alive in 1758 (James 1938: 21). At the time, planters were entirely dependent on their slaves and became terrified and helpless when they started to be poisoned on a large scale (Pluchon 1987). Later, in 1791, another *maroon* leader named Dutty Boukman was heading a religious ceremony in Bois-Caiman (*Alligator Woods*). He preached for a total revolution that ignited a great revolt. The revolt completely destabilised the colony. A group of slaves broke away from the initial group, heading for a struggle that would lead them to independence from the French (Debien 1973).

Nevertheless, the suffering of the mass did not end with independence. Haitians rulers profited from and maltreated the masses, and a serious conflict between the new rulers and the population revolved around the reinstatement of the plantation model. Most of the farmers were defying the laws to reinstate the plantation model by cultivating only the small plots of land they were granted, they refused to work on the collective land, which was another act of resistance. David Nicholls (1974) who researched the resistance in the early years of Haiti's independence, explains that the goals of protest were mainly to 'maintain property rights'. Meanwhile, the indigenous Haitian government was under constant pressure to repay the debt owed to France (Gaillard 1990). Only the large-scale cultivation of sugar cane and coffee could produce sufficient revenues. In 1826, then-President Jean-Pierre Boyer instituted a set of laws called the *Code Rural,* which gave the right to government authorities to force Haitians to work on projects such as road building without compensation. These laws also met solid resistance since farmers owned enough land to survive. Once again, they went into hiding from the government in the hills of Haiti (Debien 1973).

A Social Construction Inspired by Cultural Resistance and Resilience

The relationships of power between the Haitian people and its governing bodies has been so steady and asymmetrical, along with the nation's history, that violent resistance has often not even been a consideration. Only subversive practices were left to the slaves henceforth to resist submissive treatment, abuses and lack of freedom. The social construction of the Haitian society has been framed around the Haitian resistance which articulated around three main pillars that have been developed refined and institutionalised to thwart the subsequent systems and practices degrading, humiliating and impoverishing their lives. These pillars are the *Kreyol* language, Vodou practices and the *Lakou* system. Together, they comprise a bulwark of territorial, cultural and national resistance. These three pillars are discussed in detail in the forthcoming sections.

The *Kreyol* Language

The first pillar of the Haitian resistance is the *Kreyol* language. The origins of this language have been located in the colonial plantation system. The language began as a primary mode of speech communication to allow slaves coming from various regions of Africa to understand each other. It was also the result of the forced contact between African slaves and French colonisers. Some researchers view it as a form of struggle against the colonisers. Edouard Glissant (1981) and Price-Mars (1953), for example, remarked that creole utterances often convey two or more messages, one aimed at the master and a second to other slaves, the only ones understanding the true meaning of the words. The slaves named this strategy *Détour*, which can be translated as *bypassing*, like a secret code to circumvent banned communication.

Interestingly, for a long time, creolists have categorised the language as a restricted form of French, English or other European languages. These researchers argue the slaves were avidly trying to reproduce the language of the master in a poor, reductive way. However, in his essay *Discours antillais,* Edouard Glissant (1981) stated that the slaves consciously created a language compared to baby talk to be incomprehensible to the master. He believes that creole is not the product of limited and poor input, but rather, the result of strategies of resistance to reach a limited and determined audience Glissant (1981: 32-35). Even after the revolution, it became a language of resistance against the oligarchy and dictatorship, which maintained French as the lingua franca and, most probably, against humanitarian organisations today. Eckkrammer (2003: 98) goes even further in that direction, stating that the use of *kreyol* language 'constitutes the most manifest symbol of the phenomenon [of creolisation] and suggests a unique opportunity for freeing cultures from colonial or postcolonial oppression by linguistic means'. Today, *kreole* is still a form of liberation. Both researchers are echoed by Maryse Condé, a Haitian scholar who reasserts that the Creole languages constitute not only linguistic subversion but also a mode of resistance to colonial oppression (1998). Amy Wilentz (2013: 82) explains that, for example, the pronoun *li* is used for *he*, *she*, *him*, *her* and *it* for the purpose of hiding the identity or the agency of a particular individual to prevent the uninitiated from grasping a context or a particular narrative.

A Complex Religion

The second pillar or space of resistance, developed by slaves, was the Vodou religion. There is a common expression in Haiti that 85 per cent of Haitians are illiterate, 80 per cent are Catholic, and 110 per cent are Vodou (Murray 1977: 131). Although Roman Catholicism is the official religion of Haiti, Vodou may be regarded as the national religion since most Haitians believe in and practise at least some form of Vodou. To the neophyte, Vodou evokes fear, spirits and unknown as well as a lack of seriousness. As scholar Michael Laguerre (1989: 1) remarks, 'The Vodoo church has been an underground political institution in Haiti and the Vodoo priest a political middleman' from the time of the French colonisation until the present time. Vodou leadership has played a crucial role in the Haitian revolution and after that. According to Father Labat (2012: 38) who wrote about the missionaries convincing Louis XIII the king of France that Africans on the island had to be converted to Christianism,

> It was a very old law that the lands submitted to the King of France made free all who lived in them. That is why King Louis XIII had so much trouble in accepting the fact that the first inhabitants of the Island had slaves and agreed only because he was persuaded that it

> was the only certain means to inspire faith in the true God in the Africans, to take away their idolatry, and to make them persevering until death in the Christian religion.

According to Michael Laguerre (1973), missionaries were convinced that the cruel treatment of slaves was justified by the opportunity given to them to become Christians. An interesting comment was made by Moreau de Saint-Mery (1958: 55) ‘the Negro Creole believe, because of the baptism that they have received, they have a great superiority over all Negroes coming from Africa, who are called **Bossals**...Unbaptized Africans were called **Chevaux** (Horses)’. However, at the time, the slaves were often only baptised and did not receive any further Christian teachings. In addition, a constant tension was reigning between missionaries and colonists as the missionaries had minima power to project a sympathetic image of the Church. The slaves associated the Christian religion to the Whites’ magic.

The colonists were oblivious that the slaves bought in Africa had a history. The fragmentation of the fabric of the African family structures, economic and political organisation has played a role in the influence of Catholicism on their religious worldview. However, the slaves did not cease to be in contact with their Gods but were restricted by the colonist’s power/authority on their religious practices and could not practice their traditional religious rituals (Dubois 2001; Felix 2009). All traditional practices had to be performed secretly, among the slaves were some traditional priests arrived from Africa who maintained some traditional African rituals. However, since slaves were coming from various regions of Africa and Vodou developed from these various substrates (Laguerre 1989: 39-41).

The *maroons* have represented one of the main pillars in the successful revolution for the liberation of the slaves; they started to settle in the hills of Haiti as soon as the late 17th century practised Vodou openly, the religion became the unifying factor in the fight for independence (Desmangles 1989; Fick 1990). After independence, to protect their land and freedom, the *maroon* and former slaves strategised through the secret Vodou societies led by influential priests (Debien 1973; Gonzales 2019). During the US occupation, they participated actively in the *kako* resistance and organised guerrilla attacks that severely affected the U.S. Marines but could not defeat their military supremacy. After the end of the U.S. occupation of Haiti, Vodou societies gained even more power. In the 1950s, a few of these societies had more control than the official government over the lives of Haitians (Laguerre 1989: 125). They issued their members with a passport and acted as an underground judicial body and police force.

However, during the Duvalier regime, they committed abuses when some priests joined and led the *Tonton Macoute* (Mosse 2011: 22). Joining the *Tonton Macoutes* forces was the only way for Vodou society to survive since they could continue to operate their temples freely, without harassment (Laguerre 1989: 3 and 117). Conversely, by integrating Vodou priests into the military forces, they allowed the government to monitor their activities and to exploit them politically. President Duvalier entourage circulated Vodou-related gossip in communities to increase the regime’s power (Wilentz 2013).

There is no doubt that Vodou has always been closely intertwined with politics (Laguerre 1989). Vodou has remained a form of resistance to address inequalities and interactions between peasants and public institutions and operates in multiple layers and levels not easily affected by official policies. The Vodou religion finally received official recognition in 2003 under the presidency of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, which signalled to his people that they could be proud of their African heritage, that they were not inferior to other civilisations. The Catholic clergy was alarmed at this move. Some missionaries and pastors organised a rally designed to incite violence during a key Vodou holiday. Even the influential Catholic Church could not eliminate Vodou[75] through violence and anti-Vodou discursive practices. Thus, Vodou's legitimacy has long been discussed. In defence of its authenticity, Jean Price-Mars (1953: 39) wrote:

> Vodou is a religion because, amid the confusion of legends and the corruption of fables we can discern a theology, a system of representation thanks to which our African ancestors have, primitively, accounted for natural phenomena and which lies dormant at the base of the anarchical beliefs upon which the hybrid Catholicism of our popular masses rests.

The scholar defends the authenticity of Vodou as a religion. It is neither a superstition nor based on black magic, as traditionally pictured. It satisfies all the constructed notions, demands and requirements of a religion with its own theology, orders and places of worship. According to Claudine Michel (2006: 28),

> A serious analysis of the Vodou religion as practiced in Haitian society and abroad reveals that Vodou is a broadly encompassing worldview, a comprehensive system that shapes the human experience of its adepts in their search for higher grounds and purpose in life... the Vodou religion is omnipresent, pervasive, strong, and performs key functions in all aspects of Haiti's social and political life. As such, the ancestral religion represents a key element of Haitian consciousness and provides moral coherence through common cosmological understandings.

Instead of rejecting the Catholic religion imposed upon them, Haitians integrated Catholic practices into Vodou, which is interpreted by Price-Mars (1953: 35-54) as a sign of openness and as a critic of absolute truth asserted by some religions. Secrecy and artifice became a natural and necessary way

---

[75] Emmanuel Felix Jr. (p.35) traces the origins of the word Vodou to a word in Dahomean, meaning *God* and *protective spirit.* See also, Claudine Michel (2006) argues that Vodou comes from the term *Fondge* in Benin.

of survival for the slaves who disseminated Vodou practices under the pretence of Catholic worship (Métraux 1989). Even today, every Vodou god who is a *loa* has a corresponding saint. In most cases, the *loa*'s role mirrors the corresponding saint's. For example, Saint Peter holds the keys to the kingdom of Heaven and corresponds to the *loa Papa Legba*, who is the spirit world's gatekeeper. Most of the holidays from the Catholic religion have become integrated into the Vodou calendar for the corresponding *loa* (Felix 2009: 21,131). For instance, the celebration for a family of spirits called the *Gedes*, personifications of dead ancestors take place on All Saints' Day and All Souls' Day (Métraux 1989). The symbol of the cross has also been adopted, representing life choices. Finally, some Catholic prayers and hymns are performed during Vodou services.

Amy Wilentz (2013: 79) remarks:

> History itself comes alive through the gods' appearance in ceremony and during a service. Certain characteristic behaviours of historical figures are sometimes imitated,...and even the physicality of revolutionary leaders like Boukman, Toussaint, and especially Dessalines...have been incorporated over the years into Vodou which helps make these figures from two hundred years ago familiar and seemingly contemporary to all.

Picture - 8: Author (2013). Inside one of the rooms of a Vodou temple, we can see how pictures of Christian saints represent *loas*.

Picture - 9: Author (2013) - Goddess Erzulie Dantor [76] with her son Reptilian, who exhibits a strong resemblance to the Virgin Mary and her son Jesus.

Vodou has not earned much respect due to the popular culture which has contributed to portraying it into a farce for most outsiders. However, Davis Wades (1985), during his doctoral studies at Harvard University, investigated the religion at length. Among the interesting subjects that have been highly ridiculed, he has attempted to demystify the process of zombification and its power, scientifically. Anthropologists who are, in general, not familiar with the complexity of the nervous system have tended to consider Vodou-related deaths as a psychological process based on suggestive power. Other explanations have been advanced, for example, Littlewood and Douyons (1997: 1096) in a clinical study of zombification conclude that people with a

[76] Erzulie Dantor is the goddess of love, art, romance, sex, jealousy, and passion in the Vodou tradition, an example of the assimilation of the Black Madonna of Czestochowa within the Vodou religion. This Madonna is thought to have been brought by Polish soldiers sent by Napoleon. Instead, they established themselves in the town of Cazale in particular and stayed in Haiti.

chronic schizophrenic illness, brain damage, or learning disability are not uncommonly met with wandering in Haiti. They would be particularly likely to be identified as lacking volition and memory, which are characteristics of a zombi. Interpretations of mental illness as alienation of some vital faculty of agency are common in Central America and the Caribbean.

However, they do not exclude the use of a neuromuscular toxin[77] that would induce catalepsy and be followed by secret retrieval of the poisoned individual as described by Wades (1985: 50-100). His research attributes the process of zombification to a chemical interaction of the Datura plant, a powerful hallucinogen, combined with other ingredients such as poison extricated from puffer fish, three frogs and other, more secret ingredients added by each Haitian *bokos.* Wades warns readers that beliefs and cultural forces are also part of the success of the process. Benedek and Rivier[78] (1989) have shown evidence of the presence of tetrodotoxin in the powders used by *bokos* in the process of zombifiscation. Other researcher such as Hurston (1981: 206) had already given credence to this hypothesis in the early 1980s and Leyburn (1941: 163) had referred to 'those who believe that certain *bocors* know how to administer a subtle poison to indented victims which will cause suspended animation and give the appearance of death'.

What is relevant for this study is that zombification is not applied randomly; rather, it represents a governing strategy. In general, it is used when a member of the community is causing extreme trouble and risks altering the balance of power or peace in the *lakou.* Zombification, in most cases, is organised by the member closed entourage and can be related to questions of selling heritable land or actions harming his/her close kin. Once the victim receives the potion, his/her metabolic rate is reduced, and although he/she is still alive, his/her pulse is so low that he or she has the face of death

[78] According to Benedek and Rivier's study, 'Samples of the powder, which consists of various ground elements including puffer fish(Diodon hystrix L., Diodon holacanthus L., Sphoeroidestestudineus L.), the tree frog (Osteopilus dominicensis Tschudi), the new world toad (Bufomarinas L.), several psychoactive plants (Albizzia lebbeck L., Datara spp. L.)...were obtained from vodou sorcerers.'(1989: 473)

(Leyburn 1941). Deceased, the now-zombie is buried with funeral ritual, but once the effects of the drugs wane, he/she regains consciousness, but never recovers all his/her physical and mental functions. The scientific process is simplified here, but the entire affair takes months, even years, and it is accompanied by many rituals (Wade 1985: 135-150). Hence, Vodou is not only about worship, but it also serves the purpose of regulating society (Bastien 1966). In the extreme case of zombification described here, it acts as a judicial system with severe measures regarding political life inside the communities. It has traditionally functioned as an interface between local and central power (Murray 1977).

Besides its cultural force, Vodou also plays a crucial role in the top-down relationship between leaders and their communities. For example, Wade (1985: 233) comments about the role of a prefect[79] who was also the president of a Vodou society. 'As an official he didn't condemn or even judge what the societies did. They were his friends, and he moved freely among them, "drinking his drink", as he put it, "without problems"'. In turn, they had the responsibility of keeping him informed. No ceremony, for example, could be held without the prefect being informed. This accumulation of official position and spiritual power is not only a way of controlling society, but it also is a way of maintaining open and flowing relationships which transcend the social order during ceremonies. This way of communicating between the representative of urban-based authorities and traditional leaders of Vodou society is no accident and is still relevant (Comhaire 1955; Métraux 1989; Lundahl 1992: 51). It remain essential due to the very nature of the contemporary government in Haiti. The administrative organisation of the country is designed along with its previous coloniser's models, composed of 27 *arrondissements* which are subdivided into *communes* which, in turn, are divided into *sections rurales.* The military also has subdivisions that are different, up to the level of the *rural section,* where they rejoin the administrative divisions. Eighty per cent of the Haitian population lives in

[79] A *préfet* is a prominent government official appointed directly by the president of the country. Haiti is divided into five *départements* which, in turn, are divided into 27 *arrondissements.* Each *département* is headed by a prefect.

these *sections rurales,* and it is a paradox that is essential to understand for any involvement with land issues (Wade 1985).

The Land

This paradox is well-explained by Gerald Murray (1977: 131), an anthropologist who lived and conducted his doctoral research in Haiti. The *sections rurales'* boundaries do not coincide with traditional villages and communities' borders which have been artificially constructed[80]. They are an 'an arbitrary administrative lumping of many communities for the purposes of governance' (Murray 1977) (131). The local population does not identify with the *sections rurales* but rather with their families and neighbours living on the same *lakou,* a model of land management which is the third pillar of the Haitian social system*.* The *lakou* is a cluster of houses inhabited by multi-generational families, arranged around a yard, 'The [L]akou represents a compound in which the (elderly) father lived surrounded by his sons, single or married. All these homes gave to the [L]akou the appearance of a little village' (Laguerre 1973: 50). Sager describes it as 'the symbolic center of family life' (Sager, 2012, p. 36). The *lakou* is more than an organisational system, it is a culture that emerged from the division of land among soldiers at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century (Dubois 2012: 322) however it is also going back to the maroon' s settlements in the hills of Haiti which were a hybrid culture including elements of African traditions, the inclusion of elements from the various tribes of African slaves and the indigenous Taino population (Joachim 1999; Guitar 2006; Sager 2012). In the rural *lakous,* the religious system, Vodou, ties together the land, family and African heritage (Laguerre 1989; Dubois 2004). The agrarian land reform undertaken under Jean-Jacques Dessalines made the *lakou* become the major land organisation system in Haiti after independence (Laguerre 1973)(Mintz, 1995). The members of a *lakou* identify themselves as descendants of African tribes from which their ancestors were captured. 'In

[80] The problem of artificially designed borders between countries or communities has been a significant cause of conflicts since the independence of colonies in general.

time what had been the collective memory of an entire disenfranchised people became the ethos of new generation, and the foundation of a distinct and persistent culture.' (Wade 1985: 72)

After independence, this land socioeconomic system developed as a form of resistance against the return of the plantations and the forms of labour based on the previous colonial system that the new leaders of Haiti imposed. In time, it became the grassroots way of opposing the state's attempts to develop its institutions on the colonial model (Murray 1977). To counter this imposition, the peasants managed the land around cooperative labour and ownership and establihed trade practices circumventing the attempt of the ruling elite to reinstitute large-scale plantation systems. 'In order to preserve that control, the *lakou* system established its own set of customs to regulate land ownership and land transfers. The state has no part in these transactions, which were overseen entirely by community and family institutions' (Lundahl 1992: 55,390; Dubois 2012: 109). In other words, no part of the civil or military government are recognised as legal authorities by the communities. To fill this vacuum, the government has appointed a *chef de section* from the *section rurale* with the main role of establishing contacts and networks with the population. Unless *this chef de section* is recognised and legitimised by the community, he is powerless. To reach the local population, the government at the national level must use traditional networks. Most *chefs de section* are prominent Vodou priests or *houngans* who abide by traditional values. They behave more like traditional leaders than bureaucrats.

This organisation around the *Lakou* is also a way to avoid a system exploiting the surplus of labour, the integration into a commercial circuit and dependency on remunerated labour (Murray 1977). The model is organised to avoid work specialisations or functions that would lead to a growing monopolisation of the land and means of production (Barthélemy 1989). While from the outside, the Haitian society appears regressive and incapable of developing according to the capitalist model, its structures are personalised, emphasising individualism and reciprocity between individuals rather than through formal institutions. The system is based on an education limiting the development of autonomous individuality and the cultivation of behaviours centred on suspicion, jealousy, envy and apprehension of the Other (Barthélemy 1989; Dubois 2004: 110-11).

Gérard Barthelemy (1989: 39) explained that Haiti is 'an egalitarian system *without* a state'[81]. The development of a large-scale, stateless community differentiates the Haitian rural society from the democratic form of society advocated by the liberal peace model or by other models such as the socialist state. The model is sophisticated and innovative and based on the auto-regulation of communities that developed a social organisation articulated around land ownership, the regulation of inheritance and familial relationships. In the land ownership arrangements, each nuclear family owns its land, on which it survives by farming activities, including growing food and raising livestock. Surpluses are sold on local markets. The model is articulated around the *lakou* which includes forms of local assistance. For example, relatives and neighbours could work together to build a house or to harvest, but only if it is absolutely necessary. Generally, the system works around close family networks established to promote self-sufficiency. Labour that assists other families is not remunerated, and there is always something one owes to one's neighbours and vice versa, in the way of Marcel Mauss' gift. Of course, disparities exist. Some, for example, have more productive land or better networks, enabling them to accumulate wealth, but they remain rooted in the *lakou* system and its codes (Barthélemy 1989: 30-68).

For most Haitians, salaried work represents a form of slavery since the salaried has surrendered to the Other[82]. Anthropologist Gérard (Barthélemy 1989) {Barthélemy, 1990 #275@28@author-year} explained that Haitians living in rural areas, in particular, are not willing to trade the freedom of individual entrepreneurship for the attraction of the increased monetisation of their life mode. 'When he [the Haitian peasant] had to choose between a

[81] Author's translation
[82] The same phenomenon has been described by Francis Deng in his writings about the Dinka of Sudan (Deng 1984).

higher income and direct control of the labor process, he chose control[83]' Trouillot (1990: 75). To maintain control over the system, a set of customs has been established to regulate land ownership and transfer in which the state is not involved. For example, if several members of an extended family own plots of land that are contiguous, only one family member would hold the formal title of all the fields and would serve as the interface between the community and the state administration. The division of land would take place inside the family. The only external restriction is the prohibition of selling the land outside the *lakou* (Barthélemy 1989).

The superimposition of a weak central state on a robust parallel indigenous system operating at the margins leaves humanitarian organisations and donors operating in unchartered territory, due to limited relationships and inputs from the state but also by a partial cultural understanding of the social constructs of the population that create they resilience. For example, the *lakou* system might be interpreted as a manifestation of local knowledge of resilience through autonomy for families who cannot rely on and do not want to depend on a government perceived as illegitimate and corrupted

Haiti's current context remains impacted by the tragedy of the earthquake that rocked the country in 2010, killing an estimated 300,000 people, rendering 1.3 million citizens homeless and levelling 80 per cent of the capital Port au Prince. The earthquake also quasi-annihilated the already weak administrative structures of the state. Out of seventeen ministry buildings, fifteen were destroyed. While for Haitians, the earthquake meant trying to survive and continue their lives, for the rest of the world, the earthquake was supposed to be a turning point in which the country could be reset and restarted from scratch with a completely new history. While for the Haitians, there was continuity with the past, for the international community, it was time to build Haiti. The collective imagery of both sides was and still is, at odds. Obviously, history could not be altered, and as Jonathan M. Katz's (2013: 2) wrote, 'But today, Haiti is not better off. It ended its year of

[83] Translated by the author.

earthquakes with three new crises: nearly a million people still homeless; political riots fuelled by frustration over the stalled reconstruction; and the worst cholera epidemic in recent history, likely caused by the very UN soldiers sent to Haiti to protect its people'.

Chapter 6: Data Analysis

> *All got destroyed. No. Ah, I have like, ah, three left out of the seven [buildings]. Five – I lost five and all of my business in Léogâne was destroyed. But a minute and a half saved me. I was inside of, ah, a six-story building, and as I – after I left – after I left the building, it collapsed. Ah, it was unbelievable. It was – and I got to see and, like, all these people writing in front of you, two minutes later, they're all dead. It was unbelievable.*
> *(Participant's recollection of the 2010 earthquake)*

This chapter presents the analysis of the data collected through the unstructured interviews conducted in Haiti between October and November 2013. Four themes emerged from the interviews' analysis. In turn, each theme generated some emotional experiences from humanitarians and local leaders.

The Coloniality of Power[84] or the Myth of Decolonisation

The first general theme emerging from the narratives of local leaders and expatriates is the *coloniality of power* or *the myth of decolonisation*. This theme penetrated all the relationships between local leaders and humanitarians, mostly unconsciously. However, it influenced the emotions there are experiencing towards each other. The expression *coloniality of power* was coined by Anibal Quijano (2007) and referred to structures of power, hegemony and control stretching from the first colonies to the present day. This expression is related to the practices and legacies of colonial practices as developed by Western Europe and the U.S., which define race as the key element of social labelling. Coloniality of power, explains Quijano is 'Unlike in any other previous experience of colonialism, the old ideas of superiority of the dominant, and the inferiority of dominated under European colonialism were mutated in a relationship of biologically and structurally superior and inferior.' (2007: 171) Coloniality, in the form of social

[84] Anibal Quijano coined the expression *coloniality of power* to express the structure of control, power and hegemony that has prevailed since the invasion of the Americas.

constructions based on discrimination, and subjectification has outlived colonialism.

Quinjano (2007) articulates the concept of the coloniality of power around four interrelated spheres: control of the economy, authority, gender and sexuality, and finally, knowledge and subjectivity. The coloniality of powers contains the risk of the colonisation of the mind, which is a form of decentralising pre-existing systems of knowledge. Quijano (2007: 169) comments, 'this colonisation of the imagination of the dominated remains the worst form of subjectification since its shaping people's identity.' The concern of this study is the expression of coloniality rather than colonialism. Colonialism denotes a political, economic and social relation of domination in which the sovereignty of a nation and its people rests on the power of another nation. According to Margaret Kohn (2017), the term express a reorganisation of space and the settling of foreigners, whose political loyalties remain external to the colonised space. Coloniality, instead, relates to patterns of power that have developed during the occupation of the colonial power. Coloniality has been defined by Maldonato-Torres (2007: 243) as,

> [C]ulture, labour, intersubjective relationships, and knowledge production going well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations. Thus, coloniality survives colonialism. It is maintained alive in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of people, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience. In a way, as modern subjects we breathe coloniality all the time and every day.

The following excerpt is from an interview with a representative of a humanitarian organisation. His narrative expresses some of the aspects of the coloniality of power,

1. And the [Haitian] state is the least of our worries. Sometimes,

> you arrive, and then you work with your partner. I give you an example. The MSPP (Ministry of Health) for the construction of health centres, and according to the procurement legislation, the state, beyond certain amounts, you must go through bidding. But if I decide I want to not engage the workers and then I'll do it myself, it will happen like that. They lack the means to prevent me from doing so (Exp. Int.12).

In this statement, the expatriate humanitarian acknowledges his power to bypass not only the local authorities but also the rule of law. The Haitian state is the 'least of his worries', this statement expresses some ambiguities and highlights the frequent issues encountered by humanitarians to move on swiftly in project implementation. When humanitarian organisations follow the bureaucratic procedures in countries such as Haiti, the time to obtain the necessary authorisations to proceed might prove to be too long to wait for. In this case, due to time restriction and increased requirement for timely results from donors or headquarters, expatriates might decide to act without the required authorisations.

From a power analysis perspective, this humanitarian have the 'power to' undertake work without the consent of local authorities, he also has a relational power over these local leaders. 'Power to' and 'power over' (Lukes 2005) are clearly expressed by the expatriate: 'They lack the means to prevent me from doing so' and 'But if I decide I want to not engage the workers and then I'll do it myself, it will happen like that' [Line 7]. '*And the state is the least of our worries'*[Line 1], this statement has two interesting components, due to the quasi absence of state or local states capacities because of financial limitation and motivation, humanitarians sometimes have to bypass the 'ghost' official authorities. However, there are three potential impacts in the construction of relationships between expatriates and local leaders from this action. First, it might create some negative emotions on both sides; second, it might be undermining the commitment to increase partnership with local entities, in this case, the local official administrators, and third, it can create some forms of resistance from local authorities in facilitating program implementations.

This humanitarian leader shared that he and his colleagues are worried. Borkovec (1983: 10) defined worry as ‘a chain of thoughts and images, negatively affect-laden and relatively uncontrollable.’ Worry has been associated with motivating people to be more productive and preparing people for better accepting bad news or outcomes, according to Sweeny (2016). However, worry is also considered to be a disruptive emotion as it makes some of life’s aspects unpleasant and has been associated with increased anxiety and depression (Behar 2005; McLaughlin 2007). The ‘other worries’ experienced by this leader expatriate show the intense pressure and stress he is under, and several studies have conceptualized worry as an avoidance strategy that is employed to regulate emotions and anxiety in particular (Newman et al. 2013). As this leader of a humanitarian organisation narrative shows, he cares about carrying out the project he has been entrusted with, and this creates anxiety and stress.

While humanitarians might assume and believe that they are operating in a post-colonial framework and do not abidebythe colonial mentality[85], most Haitians have a buried suspicion or believe that they are still living under colonial subjugation that has been transformed and rearranged under the various forces dominating international politics and economics, including humanitarians. Moore (2001: 182) remarks that the concept of ‘post(-) colonial’ is ‘naïve, inadequate and utopian.’ While the Western literature frequently refers to a ‘post-colonial’ period after the granting of independence to former colonies, it is clear now that this term fits the narrative of colonialising forces’ internal and external dialogue, in which ‘old relationships disappear forever, and entirely new ones come to replace them’ (Nesbitt 2013). The prefix *post*- represents a critical part of the definition of

[85] Some notes in my field journal recount of informal conversation with expatriates related to this topic, some of them would criticise the inequality of the international system and the policies adopted by their various governments towards poorer countries such as Haiti. Others, more often highly technically skilled practitioners, would be less interested in this type of debate.

postcolonial. *Post*- denotes two distinctive meanings in one word. Stephen Slemon (1996: 179) deplores that, within the field of postcolonial theories, the most ‘vexed areas of debate...has to do with the term “postcolonial itself”’. According to Slemon (1996: 183), the term:

> Has to be seen as problematised at the outset by lack of consensus on what it is that makes the term ‘colonial’ meaningful—that is, by the lack of consensus...over what it might mean to be ‘post’ the ‘colonial’ moment. If neo-colonial relationships still prevail between and within modern nations, if the ‘practices, theories and attitudes of domination metropolitan centres’ (to re-employ Said’s words) remain in place after European colonialism has formally ended, then at some level contemporary ‘post-colonialisms,’ however they are conceived, must take place within a structure of contemporary and continuing imperial relationships.

The abundant literature about the effect of globalisation following the end of the first Cold War has tackled the issue of the production of knowledge from a global perspective. The adoption of a ‘post’ terminology in this kind of literatures attempts to draw a clear line between the past when colonisation was a political, economic and social plan to conquer and change other civilisations and the present. However, it does not mean that the recognition of these civilisations as individual nation-states has ended all forms of control. In other words, the *post*- ‘collapses different histories, temporalities and racial formations into the same universalising category’ (Hall 1997: 243). This narrative also encloses colonialism in time and space, attempting to end a discourse that is just starting to emerge. In other words, who decides when postcolonialism begins? (Nesbitt 2013: 3)

Some humanitarian workers abide by the Western cultural construction of universality. By doing so, they probably unwillingly, accept the coloniality of power based on its ‘Western particularism and the universal functions that it was supposed to incarnate, given that European universalism had constructed its identity precisely through the cancellation of the logic of incarnation and, as a result, through the universalisation of its own particularism' (Laclau 1996: 24). Edward Said's (1995) insightful book Orientalism positioned this knowledge production as a binary Oriental/Occidental opposition, demonstrating that the ideal of universality was based, on the one hand, on the analytic division of these worlds and, on the other hand, on the omission of that analytical division. The effect of this ideal of universality has been the removal of the Other in the Western production of history, justifying the Western material domination of this non-existent Other. Thus, it is not surprising that, as suggested by Said (1995), the movement and wars for decolonisation during the second part of the twentieth century triggered a fundamental crisis regarding the knowledge produced by Western powers, reducing the narrative of the Other to his/her weakness and incapacity to reach the Western ideal.

The following exert from an interview with an influential local leader illustrates the reaction to the humanitarian intervention in Haiti following the earthquake,

1. But they thought[86] that they could have just come and take over,
2. some of them. It was they deed. And therefore, they overlooked the
3. local electors, the local responsible…the mayor…Because to them,
4. they do not exist. (LL. Int. 6)

Not only does he expresses his sense of being excluded as the Other in a not so postcolonial discourse but also offers a strong opinion about his perception regarding humanitarian workers. The outsiders who *come and take over* [Line 1]. The expression *taking over* refers to *power to* and *power over* (Lukes 2005), through the action of appropriating authority and control. The respondent also uses robust language such as a *deed*, which is a legal instrument affirming, passing or confirming the legal transfer of property, more frequently used for real estate or land. It seems that, for this participant, humanitarians were coming to occupy the land of Haiti. As

[86] Speaking about humanitarians in general

explained in Chapter 5, the problem of land in Haiti is acute for various reasons, including the overpopulation of the island, the parallel system of the state registry and borders. However, it is also dominant a dominant narrative in the collective memory of Haitians who have refused to be used as objects of production from the beginning.

Although the tone of this respondent remained calm, and he stayed composed[87], he was angry and displayed some resentment regarding the power but also some powerlessness concerning the behaviour of humanitarians. In this case, the respondent turned is anger towards the fact that the major had been left without a tent. According to Landmann (2017: 1099) ‘people often get angry when they perceive an injustice that affects others but not themselves.’ This participant expresses anger on behalf of the major; his narrative displays some moral outrage. Montada (1989: 321) contend that moral outrage is provoked by the interpretation that some behaviours are being unfair or incorrect. She asserts that the focus of moral outrage is on the agent responsible, in this case, humanitarian workers ‘or incorrect behaviour or for having neglected a duty’ (Montada 1989: 321). Specifically, she argues that moral outrage ‘presupposes appraisals of injustice’ (Montada 1989: 316) in contrast with compassion, which focuses on the distressed person. From this perspective, people are outraged when they evaluate some comportments as incorrect or unjust.

[They do not exist] is specifically referring to the local official authorities, and in this case to the major who is occupying the highest official rank for a section. In the declaration of this participant, ‘Because to them, they do not exist’ [LL. Int. 6 -Line 3], we understand that, behind the smile[88], Haitians’ local leaders perceive humanitarians as being an expression of the coloniality of power. Post-colonialism is a reality in the social construction of expatriates, but not for this leader. The principle of neutrality accepted in the humanitarian’s narrative of post-colonialism is a form of de-politicisation of

[87] Retrieved from field journal.
[88] I made a note in my journal after the interview that the respondent was smiling when he said that, but it was more of a small, derisive laugh than a smile.

the power held by humanitarians but is inscribed in the continuity of colonialism.

After the independence of Haiti, although there was limited legitimate freedom of movement, it was nevertheless representing a significant improvement from the state of slavery. The plantation workers ‘resented the many continuities between the old regime and the new’, according to Lundahl (1992). Toussaint’s regime did not survive mainly due to his violent temperament, but above all, because of his politics of maintaining the plantation system. General Moyse (Cited in Lundahl 1992: 168), a charismatic opponent of Toussaint’s gained recognition by the masses as he insisted on the necessity of breaking up the plantations’ large estates and distributing the land to lower-level officers, soldiers and individuals.

The political, economic and social hierarchies and legacies left by European colonialists have not disappeared but have been reconfigured based on Western ways and ideas of development. They are still affecting Haitian society and a great many other former colonies (Dubois 2012: 62). They are strongly present in the collective memory.

This official local leader remarks,

1. Yeah. That’s the status quo. There is no – yeah. And how do you
2. think the, you know, like the government is kind of trapped in this
3. system now, in this way of working, not because, you know, they want
4. to have access to some international funding, they have to say yes to
5. all this additional, you know, ah, demands – I mean, fact. (LL. Int. 4]

This respondent thinks that the potential for Haiti’s emancipation from external power is almost unachievable. His hope for change is extremely limited: The ‘government is kind of trapped’ [Line 2] in a system that it does not control but is controlled by the coloniality of power.

The coloniality of power is also expressed by financial power and this traditional local leader expressed it directly,

1. But meanwhile, this mayor is living outside, or he’s living on the floor.
1. He doesn’t have a tent to live under, and you want to come to the
2. mayor who had hundreds or thousands of people that voted for him?
3. And he had over hundreds of people that was campaigning for him.
4. All of those people are in a tent or under a roof or under nothing,
5. under the stars. And you, an NGO, you come in town because you
6. have money in your hand, because you have the power, and then you
7. want to tell the mayor that, ‘Look, I come to your town to donate. But I
   have nothing for you’. [LL. Int. 10)

The message is straightforward in lines 6 and 7. *Money* and *power* are in the *hand* of expatriates, and the decision to ignore, in this case, the highest-ranking local authority. The asymmetrical relationship of power is perceived to be based on financial power. As explained earlier, most of the international funding and assistance is channelled through international NGOs due to the corrupted character of the government. In general, humanitarian organisations are supposed to help the ‘vulnerable’ among the population according to well-established criteria. Most donors require elaborate reporting, including the reference to the various vulnerable groups, and the major would not fit in any vulnerable category.

This participant expressed resentment. As Patrick Materson (1979: 157) observes, resentment develops when people feel dominated and powerless and have no possibilities of expressing these emotions. As an emotion developing from a sense of subjugation, resentment often manifests through the avoidance of confrontation with the perceived repressing figures. Thus, resentment[89] is a silent emotion. Avoidance also differentiates resentment from anger or hate. It was evident through the interviews and readings that Haitians, in general, do not hate and are not angry towards humanitarian workers, but the humanitarian action is inscribing itself in the coloniality of power. Resentment ‘implies the renewals of the original suffering, which is caused by the traumatic event. It even modifies our perception of time as it chains us to a permanent past; a past full of dark memories that prevent us from living in the present and looking with hope towards the future’ (Martin 2013: 5).

In *A Theory of Justice,* John Rawls (1971) contemplates resentment as different from anger but also as more significant than anger, because of its association to a moral and political emotion. In his view, while anger can develop independently of situations thought to be unjust, resentment implies a notion of right and wrong as well as the presence of a moral grievance. According to John Rawl, ‘A person without a sense of justice may be enraged at someone who fails to act fairly. But anger and annoyance are distinct from indignation and resentment; they are not, as the latter are, moral emotions’ (1971: 488). As in the case of the respondent, morale emotions are what differentiates them from natural attitudes, the narrative of the respondent’s experience raises a moral concern and its associated principles. His account refers to an acknowledged right or wrong (Rawls 1971: 481) and to a sense of injustice.

Resentment is a complex emotion, acting in silence, as its expression is blocked by forces such as fear and anxiety, all having the potential to repress its manifestation. Resentment is not merely a sentiment or feeling linked to an individual’s sense of self; rather, it encompasses elements of social structure and hierarchies. Max Scheler (1994) focused on resentment as a repression of the feelings of the slave expressing itself in a desire for revenge. Svend Ranulf (1938) has associated resentment with disinterested moral indignation in the quest for the punishment of those who commit crimes. In the case of this respondent, resentment can partly be attributed to a sense of a lack of justice.The study of resentment allows one to appreciate how structural conditions include but are not limited to forms of inequality such as race, class and discrimination, which fuels social and political action.

Another traditional local leader voices his resentment more generally, taking the example of the French education model still prevailing in Haiti. As mentioned earlier, Max Scheler (1994) associates resentment with an emotion ‘accumulated by the very structure of society’, implying that it is almost entirely independent of the individual temperament; instead, it results from the social environment.

> We are still using the same archaic structure of education that the French left. We are still using the same archaic ability to teach the youth. [LL – Int. 1]

According to Dejean (2006), Dubois (2012) and Hebblethwaite (2015), the Haitian educational language policy is benefiting a minority of Haitians who are bilingual, representing between 5 to 10 per cent of the population, while the majority who is monolingual (speaking only Creole) cannot access the state schools which are teaching in French. According to Murray (2004) and Schuller (2012), the current language policy is preventing economic development and restricts access to communication to an elite minority. Hebblethwaite (2012) highlights the fact that the Haitian government should consider promoting Creole for the following reasons. First, the Haitian government does not have the budget to train a sufficient number of French teachers. Second, most Haitians do not have the resources and time to learn French due to poor infrastructures and economy. Third, none of Haiti’s neighbouring states use French as a language, and this isolates Haiti from the region. Expending literacy in the creole language in Haiti would increase communication and development (Coulmas 1992). The resentment expressed by this participant is not only pointed towards international organisations but also the overall system of governance.

Humanitarians also perceived a coloniality of power, expressing it particularly in relation to the financial system they are depending on to be operational,

1. You depend so much on donations[90]….You must be able to
2. demonstrate that 30 percent of this amount will be spent in […][91]. If
3. you do not have the approval that allows you to offer a tax deduction
4. or go look for government funds…We are not asked to prove at the
5. outset how we will really use in the field; in order to receive the
6. funding, we must first show that 30 percent of the funding will go back to [country X]. [Exp. Int. 12]

Senior humanitarians expatriates were conscious about some 'forms of exploitation' and were quite embarrassed about it; this respondent is honest about the pressure he is under to collect and allocate funds. Part of them must be reinvested in the country of origin. There was a sense of shame and regret in his tone, but also of powerlessness and resentment, too. '[Y]ou must be able to demonstrate that 30 percent of this amount will be reinvested in [country X]'.

Helen Lewis (1971) states that shame is contingent on some particular aspects of social relationships and is inherently a social emotion. She also describes shame as a function that signal threat to social bonds. Interestingly, she found that verbal transcript she analysed displayed markers of shame more than any other emotions. The author also identified that often people were not aware that they were experiencing shame. Finally, she found that people who were experiencing anger were often displaying some elements of shame before and that a way of dissimulating shame was to express anger (1971).

Thomas J. Scheff (2003: 254) attracts our attention to the fact that shame 'has more functions than other emotions. First, shame is a key component of conscience, the moral sense: it signals moral transgression even without thoughts or words. Shame is our moral gyroscope.' Understanding shame is central to the appreciation of human reactions, shame occurs when one

---

[90] Here, the participant was speaking about the NGO for which he was working.
[91] The name of the country is left anonymous, but it is the donor country from which the expatriate came.

realises that he or she acted in a manner that contradicts his/her social status and the expectations associated with it. Humanitarians feel bound to the expectation spelt out in the humanitarian principles. According to Kristjansson (2010), shame involves a feeling of failure of living up to some ideas and ideals, and according to Michael Lewis (2008), negative self-evaluation. Shame has also been associated with depression and regrets by Buss (1980), and leading to feeling of regrets and sadness by Babcock (1988) and Prinz (2004).

Hellen M. Lynd (2013: 66) argues that shame is ignored or hidden but can be pervasive in social relations, ‘the very fact that shame is an isolating experience also means that if one can find ways of sharing and communicating it this communication can bring about particular closeness with other persons’, she goes further in linking the communication of shame with others as a potential experience of ‘entering into the mind and feelings of another person’ (Lynd 2013: 249). Lewis suggests that shame arises when the social bond is under threat, but also as a result of micro-dialogue[92] or dialogue with the self which question the morality of our actions.

The coloniality of power in this thesis is concerned with the transition from traditional to modern society through global capitalism. Grosfoguel (2007: 16) states that coloniality endure as an ‘entanglement... or intersectionality of multiple and heterogenous global hierarchies’, Lao-Montes (2008) and Mignolo (2001) have associated the coloniality of power to the rise of modernity. Both coloniality and modernity were the ‘constitutive axes’ of the ‘specific model of power’ that underpinned globalised capitalism, Quijano (2000: 1) describes coloniality as,

[92] According to Burkitt (Burkitt 2010) ... ‘In recent years social constructionists writing have attempted to shift the focus of psychology away from individual selves and towards self-other relations, relational processes, dialogue and discourse. This underlines one of the key elements of social constructionism: that psychological processes are not something going on “in the head” so to speak, but are located in the ‘in-between” arising from people in dialogue and joint action. Micro-dialogue express the ‘“internal conversation between the “I” and the “me”.

> One of the specific and constitutive elements of the global model of capitalist power. It is based on the imposition of a racial/ethnic classification of the global population as the cornerstone of that model of power, and it operates on every level, in every arena and dimension of everyday social existence, and does so on a societal scale.

In other words, coloniality is not constituted solely by the global and political display of colonialism but also by the 'subtle forms that permeate language and cultural practices, the construction of identities, and ways of knowing.'

Mirna E. Carranza has studied how coloniality is affecting 'the process of community consultations as well as partnership development between the Global South and the Global North, particularly in the context of international social work (ISW). Morana et al. (2008) described coloniality as a 'trans historical expansion of colonial domination and its effect in contemporary times'. Colonialism and coloniality have been distinguished by Mignolo (2008) who argues that colonialism was constructed through several waves while coloniality is embodied in the global system. Castro-Klaren (2008) provides a more thorough description of the 'coloniality of power' which he asserts is implemented in three stages: the classification of people who were not colonisers, the creation of institutions that include international organisations and national institutions to manage colonised populations, and the use of an underlying philosophical perspective legitimising this form of power.

Humanitarianism has been affected by the discourses of coloniality. The wave of globalisation that has taken place after the end of the Cold War created opportunities for expanding humanitarian assistance to those in needs, yet it has also created some challenges. One of the main challenges is the ethics of engagement (Parada 2010) and North-South relations. The discourse of scholar from the Global South shows that they experience globalisation as the reconfiguration of power by the capitalist system of the Global North. De Souza et al. (2004: 53-54) have named it 'an imperialism without colonies' in which the countries with the most power have institutionalised unequal relations between states resulting in the social construction of 'legitimate symmetry with the intent to dominate the other'.

The coloniality of power is pervasive, as Franz Fanon (396) succinctly analysed the psychological transformation of the colonised:

> As long as the black man is among his own, he will have no occasion, except in minor internal conflicts, to experience his being through others. There is of course the moment of 'being for others,' of which Hegel speaks, but every ontology is made unattainable in a colonized and civilized society…In the *Weltanschauung* of the colonized people there is an impurity, a flaw that outlaws any ontological explanation. For not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man…The black man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man. Overnight the Negro has been given two frames of reference within which he has had to place himself. His metaphysics, or, less pretentiously, his customs and the sources on which they were based, were wiped out because they conflicted with a civilisation that he did not know and that imposed itself on him.

In this passage, Fanon provides an interesting reflection of the involuntary internalisation of the coloniser's culture within the black man. He writes of the 'two frames of reference within which he has had to place himself'. The transformation has partly been forced on the native population through the manipulation of identity. By placing the black man as the dialectical opposite to the civilisation of the white coloniser, the imperial power attempts to convince the black man to change.

This humanitarian leader from a secular humanitarian organisation expresses some frustration at not being able to improve the Haitian society,

1. We are leading the project. That is to say, what we do not realise is
2. that to implement these projects according to the image of what we

3. want to bring to Haiti, often the setting is very limited. We are in an
4. area in which the economy is at 90 percent informal, so imagine the
5. functioning of state-level institutions. It is clear that the state functions
6. a little bit in an informal way, too. [Exp. Int. 15][93]

The humanitarian leaders used the terminology ‘the image of what we want to bring to Haiti’, he is frustrated by the limitation of the Haitian to support or lead the improvements’ efforts. According to Anderson and Bushman (2002)[94], frustration is an emotion experienced when obstacles, such as here the limited setting, the lack of functioning governmental structures and control lead to the impediment of potential progress toward established goals, in this case, the image of a better Haiti. Pekrun (2006) remarks that obstacles to attain one’s goal are not sufficient alone to create frustration, the person must also perceive that s/he lacks of control to remove these obstacle. The respondent in this case express the size of the obstacles that will prevent the realization of is ‘image’ of Haiti.

Another expatriate was experiencing some frustration as the representative of the Ministry of Health is not responding or attending the meetings they have convened.

1. I try to contact the new head of the Ministry of Health, but he did not
2. come, so I decided to go on my own with the vaccination programme.
3. The new person is different and he…since he euh... come to this
4. position…we never had a coordination meeting…yah…and…it’s
5. difficult to exchange information…especially we already have our
6. target area, and we are already have our target activity….At the
7. beginning, we divided... we did not want to duplicate to other
8. NGOs…now I don’t know what they are doing....I think they should
9. coordinate us, not expecting our support for them….but he is
10. expecting our support, to input to the MSPP. That was very strange,

[93] Translation by the author.
[94] On frustration, see also (Stein and Levine 1991)

11. how he was thinking...For instance, he asked for some
12. office material, some office material, or…stationary…or transportation
13. when they have vaccination campaign….This is OK if it is in our target
14. area; otherwise, we cannot help them. [Exp. Int. 14]

She is frustrated and also disappointed[95] First, her narrative displays her *power to* decide that she can proceed with the vaccination programme without the representative of the Ministry of Health. This form of power relates to Max Weber (1947) argument about the place of bureaucracy in modern government (in our case, the NGO organisational structure). The increased bureaucracy imposed on humanitarian organisations has been useful to improve efficiency and timeliness of aid delivery. However, at the same time, it deprives humanitarians of the space and independence to address some contextual issues that would improve their relationships with local leaders.

According to Carver and Scheier (1990), disappointment occurs when progress towards a goal is compromised or not achieved. In social psychology, disappointment has been associated to dissatisfaction from the perspective of work or job satisfaction (Jenkins 1994; Spector 1997). Disappointment Soanes and Stevenson (2006: 407) comment also indicates ‘sadness or displeasure caused by the non-fulfilment of one’s hopes or expectations.’ The humanitarian leader cares about the children she is supposed to vaccinate through this program. The difficulties of establishing a working relationship with the representative of the MoH are not only affecting the programme implementation but also children’s resilience to communicable diseases. There is a sense of regret and loss. Regret, a synonym of disappointment is also used to express this emotion. Regret expresses ‘a feeling of sorrow about something that could have been different’, in this case, the lack of vaccination for some children is a reason to experience regrets.

[95] I retrieved in my note that her gestural and tone were also reflecting some anger

The theme of Coloniality of Power displays a wide array of emotions experience by humanitarians and local leaders, table 2 below recapitulates them.

Coloniality of power: Emotion distribution	
Local leaders	**Humanitarians**
• anger • resentment • compassion • powerlessness • frustration • regret • disappointment	• sadness • embarrassment • regret • shame • failure • frustration • disappointment

Table 2: Author (2020) Recapitulation of emotions experienced by expatriates and local leaders in the theme Coloniality of Power

Corruption and Distrust

The second general theme emerging from the interviews were the perceptions of corruption and distrust. The notion of corruption seemed ubiquitous in the minds and communications of humanitarian workers and Haitian local leaders. It is not surprising, given that Haiti is perceived as one of the countries most affected by corruption. The classical definition of corruption is the ‘misuse of public office for private gain’ (Brooks 1909: 6). Jens Ivo Engels, suggests that this definition of corruption ‘only makes sense within modern societies’ (Cited in Elke and Weibler 2014: 68) since traditional societies do not differentiate between private or public spheres. An ethnographic study of corruption presented at the European Commission by Haller and Shore (2005: 4) provides a cultural perspective in which personal networks in traditional societies are not automatically in conflict with state institutional structures, and they can be necessary and complementary arrangements to maintain social contracts. Beyme (1996) comments that, until the end of the nineteenth century in Germany, a common practice by electoral delegates was to take bribes during the King's election. Not only was it a customary practice, but it was also accepted morally. In the same vein, and at the same time, buying votes in England was also a common practice. In modern societies, being corrupted is associated with acting in opposition to what is considered morally acceptable or right. In other words, it is equal to violating what is considered to be in line with relevant moral values and norms, equal to the violation of integrity. The boundary between gift and bribe in transitional societies is not always clear and does not necessarily correspond to the modern notion of corruption and might oscillate between both.

Haitians interviewees were particularly sensitive to the issue of corruption, in this excerpt, this respondent shared,

1. They[96] said, 'Mayor, I would like to do this'. And the mayor said,
2. 'What is in it for me'? And they were shocked. They said, 'This is
3. corruption that, ah, the international community is talking about. This
4. guy is, ah, corrupted'. [LL. Int. 1].[97]

This traditional leader were displayed a modern understanding of corruption,

1. I think that the structure of Haiti, you see that they'll come – they'll
2. give a million US dollars. What is a million US dollars? And they want
3. the government to go on TV. They want to bring their own press. Oh,
4. yes. The government is signing a $1 million… ah, to strengthen the
5. infrastructure. What is that? To strengthen the government
6. infrastructure, a million dollars? Ah, you just gave him $1 million for
7. his pocket. So those are the – those – this is a corrupter. Because the
8. – when they do that, they need other perks from the Haitian
9. government or from the – from the government, like voting for them

[96] Here, *they* refers to the outsiders, in this case, the representatives of HNGOs.
[97] This respondent was present during this particular meeting and heard participants commenting afterwards.

10. for the UN. Oh, yeah. If you – if you hear that it is going to be like, ah,
11. a UN meeting, see a lot of countries coming. Shhh, donating money to
12. the Haitian government so they could get favours. [LL. Int. 4]

Corruption, as interpreted in modern societies. is laden with negative emotions such as guilt, shame and embarrassment. De Sousa (1987) notes that emotions are ways for humans to appreciate values, whether moral or immoral and Barrett et al. (2007) adds that they also provide assumptions of who is responsible for them. Research conducted by Moll et al. (2005) and Salvador and Folger (2009) found that our emotional and moral lives overlap.

The emotions of guilt and shame are often associated (Tangney and Fischer 1995) but according to Lewis (Lewis 1971), empirical studies, shame and guilt are two distinct emotions and are self-conscious emotions arising from transgressions. While shame 'involves a painful focus on the self, guilt involves a focus on a specific behaviour' (Tangney et al. 2014: 799), such as corruption in our example. Other researchers such as Erikson (1963) and Friedman (1985) are in agreement that guilt is a social and self-conscious emotion arising from the experience that one is flawing social norms. According to Parrott (2004: 136) 'self-conscious emotions are highly social in nature. They social nature stems from the social nature of the self and from the social nature of the situations that elicit them....an individual's sense of self is strongly grounded in social relationships and social processes.' Sheikh and Janoff (2010) and Ketelaar et Au (2003) argue that, when people experience guilt about specific behaviour they experience tension, suffer remorse and regrets. The regret and tension motivate reparation such as confessions and apologies, in this case guilt can be a constructive emotion. In comparison, when people experience shame, they might feel worthless, powerlessness and exposed. Schalkwijk et al. (2016) describe shame as a painful emotional experience issued from a '...comparison of the self's action with the self's standards... but may equally stem from comparison of the self's state of being with the ideal social context's standard.'

The excerpt below displays the consciousness and awareness by local leader about the modern concept of corruption but he also brings some doubts about who is corrupted, about responsibility, that the interpretation of corruption ‘of a given country cannot be regarded independently of its overall social and political system, and, in particular, of the culturally rooted, often implicit values and practices that shape the actual functioning of social and political institutions.’ (Elke 2017: 280).

1. Whatever there’s a – ah, now, if the government said, ‘Look, it’s never
2. going to be done like that’. Our 80 percent Haitians, 20 percent –
3. you're all – I’m like in the administration. The Haitian government or
4. the local electors, instead of seeing an organisation come with $5
5. million, $10 million and live with it. The other – if 10 percent is spent
6. in the – in the country, that 10 percent was not bad. So...they are
7. happy and satisfied. Eighty percent is going back. But at least 10
8. percent is here. So...if there were like a hundred organisations that
9. will come and stay and stayed 10 percent, hey, that’s 10 percent
10. [inaudible]. So that’s the view of the Haitian local government right
11. now. It is the policy in the interest of international interests. And today,
12. the bulk of the international interest is the assistance. There is no oil,
13. there is no gold, no diamonds, there is no fighting in Haiti. It’s that
14. disaster. Not a chronic tendency to emergency needs. That's where
15. the economy is. This is where it moves[98]. [LL. Int. 5]

Another leader expressed clearly that Haitians are perceived as corrupted,

1. Now, when the government come in between and said, ‘Look, I don’t
2. want it to be done like that, I want it to be done like this’. They said[99],
3. ‘Well, this guy, he just wants the money for his pocket’. [LL. Int. 9]

[98] Translation by the author.
[99] Speaking of the HNGOs.

From the perspective of another respondent, not only was the international system involved in corrupt schemes, but they also spawned a trickle-down effect, in which humanitarian organisations were included, but not local governments.

1. And that money goes into the government. The government does
2. whatever they want with it. They don't come and do any audit or any
3. research; they don't care. And now they tell you, 'Look. We gave the
4. Haitian government 2 million dollars, and though we never heard what
5. they do with it, so they are corrupted. So, if we're going to give money
6. to Haiti, we have to give it to the NGOs'. [LL. Int. 3]

The perception of corruption plays a significant role in contributing to distrust between humanitarian and local leaders; distrust[100] emerges from professional and social perceptions. Trust can be described as a moral value based on 'some sort of belief in the goodwill of the other' (Seligman 1997: 43). Emile Durkheim (1933/1964) remarked that the 'glue' which is holding human societies together cannot be acknowledged as trust *per se*. Rather, trust is part of the social construct of societies through normative relationships, hierarchies, roles and values. However, based on status and power, societies draw subjective lines dividing those they will and those they will not trust.'

In the following excerpt, an official local leader is focusing his distrust towards a lack of trust in young humanitarians expatriates, regarding their professional knowledge and their lack of life experience.

1. But if the NGOs could've put their selves together, because all
2. NGOs want to do the same thing. If you go into a cluster meeting,
3. which was like, you know. They had to narrow down the same
4. people that you see in the education meeting. That's the

[100] In the literature, distrust, lack of trust and mistrust are used interchangeably. In this section 'distrust' will be used.

5. same that with the house meeting, and then that person is like 25,
6. 30 years old, don't know anything about life. And they are the one
7. who are deciding for the Haitian people? [LL. Int. 5]

One of the common patterns in the definitions of trust resides in a positive expectation from the trustor of the trustee (Rousseau et al. 1998). A definition proposed by Mayer et al. (1995: 712) describe trust as the readiness of a party to accept the activities of another party based on the expectation that the trustee will perform these activities which are important to the trustor, regardless of the capacity to oversee or monitor that other party. Trust has also been described as a positive attitude that includes availability, promise fulfilment, fairness, and receptivity (Butler 1991); competence, loyalty, consistency, and integrity (Butler and Cantrell 1984); behavioural integrity, power-sharing, benevolence and communication (Robinson 1996). Scholars such as Shockley-Zalaback et al. (1999) have defined that trust is based on relationships and are communication-based.

Distrust has mostly been associated with the violation of trust (Lewicki and Bunker 1995; Bies and Tripp 1996) or to the absence of trust (Gilbert and Tang 1998). I means that according to the first assumption for distrust to occur, there must be trust to start with. Gilbert and Tang's have a different approach which is based on the idea that initially, neither trust nor distrust is present in a relationship. Lewicki et al. (1998: 439) define distrust as the 'confident negative expectations regarding another's conduct'. They considered trust and distrust as distinct but connected. Sitkin and Roth (1993: 373) describe distrust as 'a belief that a person's values or motives will lead them to approach all situations in an unacceptable manner'. Distrust is a psychological construct that emerges when a party in the relationship act or say something that the other party judge as negative in light of her/his expectations. According to Worchel (1979), once distrust has taken root in a relationship, it will diminish meaningful communications and information sharing.

Some scholars have focused on the impact of trust on emotion, and that affective responses to the trustee’s perceived motives and intentions do influence how the trustor evaluates her/his level of trust (Jones and George 1998). According to Lewicki et al. (1998: 445-447), trust reduces uncertainty, increases ‘faith’ and ‘confidence’ while distrust is increasing uncertainty with anticipation of poor outcomes. Distrust is characterized by ‘fear’, ‘cynicism’ and ‘scepticism’; it also increass ‘vigilance’ and ‘weariness’ (1998: 445-447). These emotions engendered by distrust may shape and taint the interpretation of events by those experiencing distrust. In the narrative above, the reason given by the respondent to express his distrust of expatriates is based on external appearance based on the fact that they are mostly young and professionally, they are multitasking, being involved in various sectors that would require extensive technical knowledge. Once distrust is taking roots, as Karen Jones remarks (2019: 959),

> An action or remark that might otherwise have seemed innocent will be taken to reveal an ulterior motive, or a lack of competence. We will be focused on the risks of being dependent on those we distrust and will thus be disposed to take protective action against them or to withdraw from contact.

Jones (2019: 959) further explains that the intersection of trust and emotions will lead in our views of others being caught through ‘the mechanism of affective looping which leads us to believe that our interpretation of the causes for distrust are based on an evaluation that is reason based.’

In the words of this humanitarian, his organisations has satisfactory results but without much assistance and help from the local official authorities which mostly agree to whatever plans or programmes they are presented with.

As for myself, I have an excellent relationship with the town hall. If I am the initiator, even the communal authorities get involved because of our relationship. He[101] would even be able to tell me, ‘go ahead and then if you want, you inform us’[102]. Yes, I tell you, if you want, you inform us. Go and ask them. And [the humanitarian organisation][103] began its collaboration with them, and whatever I have this concern to involve them or not, they will tell you, ‘oh, that's wonderful’. Even though there would be a judgment to take on this attitude, we should be more involved in..., in terms of institutional strengthening. Indirectly, we have good results. Unfortunately, the programme tends not to include the fact that the town is going to be our partner but does the *commune*[104] have the human resources, that is to say, intellectually to be a partner. Who is living up to what I am doing? [Exp. Int. 11]

According to Gambetta, distrust feeds contempt and fear, which in turn tend to increase distrust. In our example, the dependence of the leader on the expatriates indicates that his distrust increases his fear and contempt in the prospect of Haiti’s reconstruction, affecting his judgments or beliefs. TenHouten (2007) defines contempt as a pattern of attitudes and behaviours characterised by disgust and anger that are directed toward a group or an individual, and sometimes also towards an ideology. Bell (2013) differentiates contempt as active or passive. While active contempt focuses on the object of contempt as a potential threat, passive contempt dismisses the object. Contempt focuses, Bell (2013) argues, on the entire person rather than on some specific aspect, she asserts that when we feel contempt towards others, we regard them as less than ourselves. One of the effects of contempt she remarks is that it stimulates psychological or physical withdrawing.

The table below summaries the emotions related to the theme of corruption and distrust:

---

[101] Speaking about the mayor.
[102] This remark speaks for itself. In a real relationship, there would be a discussion, maybe a negotiation about the actions to be undertaken by the HNGO.
[103] Name changed by the author.
[104] The *Commune* is the circumscription managed by a mayor.

Corruption and Distrust: Emotions' Distribution	
Local leaders	**Humanitarians**
• disappointment • humiliation • contempt • worry • fear • anger • guilt • shame • embarrassment	• contempt • disappointment • worry • anger

Table 3: Author (2020) - Recapitulation of emotions experienced by expatriates and local leaders on the theme of Corruption and Distrust.

Conspiracy Theories

Another theme emerging from the interviews was related to conspiracy theories from traditional local leaders. According to Bale (2007), conspiracy theories are often defined as explanatory beliefs about a group of people who connive in secret to reach malicious goals. In the early stage of the study of conspiracy theories, those were usually rejected as pathological (Hofstadter 1966), however, with the increase in research on the subject, Sunstein (2009) and Oliver (2014) for example, have documented that conspiracy theories are more frequent than initially thought and a large number of people are creating them or believe in them. Some conspiracy theories, such as the example below, are highly implausible,

1. But I think that – but I think that there are plans that are being
2. executed under very, very high levels of government throughout
3. the world, and their plans are very strategic and it's a long period of

4. time. They want to control this country[105]. So, therefore, they want
5. the NGOs here[106]. They don't want the government to have
6. control of the organisation. Because if they have control of the
7. organisation, every person that is from here has to be
8. researched. They have to know what you doing, where you going
9. to go, why you doing this? [LL – int. 4]

In the field of social science, there is an increased recognition of the importance to understand more about these beliefs (Douglas 2011; van Prooijen and Douglas 2018). Although the content of conspiracy theories varies widely, research has shown the subjective beliefs their include can be rooted in a common psychological model. The beliefs in conspiracy theories are sensitive to social contexts (Wright 1974; Uscinski and Parent 2014), people tend to be more involved in conspiracy theories in situations of crisis such as natural disaster or social changes, and conflicts (McCauley and Jacques 1979; van Prooijen and Douglas 2018). Furthermore, according to Abalakina et al. (1999) and Imhoff and Bruder (1999; 2014) the social structures contributing in shaping people sense of vulnerability and powerlessness constitute critical factors in increasing beliefs in conspiracy theories. Research conducted by Thomas (1928) indicates that even in cases in which conspiracy theories are very unlikely to be real, they still have an impact on the life of those experiencing them. This impact has been traced in the subjective reality of beliefs, and beliefs affect behaviours (van Prooijen and Douglas 2018). Conspiracy theories help make sense of the reality; the coloniality of power is present but impossible to 'fight' or eliminate. It is imposed upon Haiti by a mysterious 'organisation' attempting to control not only the country's political economy but also its mind, in another expression of the persistence of colonial domination [Line 1–3], its memory, continued influence and inescapability.

1. So that – they try – they want to control this country. So

[105] *They*, according to this participant, refers to high-level government officials from various countries. Note in field-journal.
[106] Speaking of HNGOs or NGOs.

2. therefore, they want the organisation[107] here. They don't want the
3. government to have control of the organisation....So every person
4. that from here has to be researched[108]. They have to know what
5. you doing, where you going to go, why you doing this? Because I
6. – if the Haitian government have control of what they are doing,
7. some of the Haitians will understand the plan that they have. [LL. Int. 6]

By creating an abstract enemy through the transitional object of the anonymous organisation, this participant can share and give voice to his sense of powerlessness. Powerlessness is induced by the sense of not having control over one's contextual environment; it leads to feelings of being helpless. Tajfel and Turner (1986) assert that powerlessness is experienced in situations in which group boundaries are perceived to be impermeable; and the hierarchic status is illegitimate and unstable. resentment.

Humanitarian organisations also are also the object of conspiracy theories,

1. Now the NGO is structured in a way that all the people that is in that
2. country that no – have no jobs, ah, is hurting. They bring 20, 30, 50
3. people on a rotating basis Every six month, they are changed for a
4. period of three years. Thirty people transformed [ph]. That's 120
5. people that went through the system. And the money that came in
6. through the NGO, those people that came get $4 or $5,000 a month.
7. And that money went back through that country.... It's a structure that
8. is there to create jobs in certain countries. [LL. Int. 8]

[107] During this interview, the respondent used the term *organisation* to refer to a conspiracy theory.
[108] This participant elaborated about seeing satellites in the sky at night that were spying on the island. Later, I found that some organisations had used drones to make some evaluations, without informing the population.

This participant was well-informed about the average salary of personnel working for humanitarian organisations[109][110]. He refers to the humanitarian system as a well-oiled machine, using the misery of Haiti and other countries to provide well-paid employment, a conspiracy theory that has gained popularity in Haiti, but also in other countries. When he states, 'thirty people transformed', the word *transformed* might be interpreted in various ways. Are they transformed professionally? Emotionally? Socially? It seems, rather, that he refers to an economic transformation as they 'go through the system' and come out with several thousands of dollars. The tone of this leader was neutral[111], but this declaration reflected some resentment.

Another conspiracy theory expressed by a traditional leader concerned the attempt at destruction on of the pillar of the traditional social organisation in Haiti,

1. There are some organisations that are here. And through that
2. organisation, the people that come, who knows who they are?
3. There's a plan to get rid of Vodouism. [LL. Int. 8]

According to Grzesiak-Feldman (2013) and Federico (2018), conspiracy beliefs are associated with anxiety and can be issued by the perception that society is under threat (Jolley 2018). Also, it conveys a change imposed on society's fundamental values. In this example, the conspiracy theory is not only based on concrete allegations but also on matters that are at the essence of the Haitian culture and identity. As mentioned earlier, the Haitian Vodou has long been rather negatively perceived by outsiders. The religion is often 'represented as the ultimate antithesis of "civilization," as a case of African superstition reborn in the Americas' (Dubois 2001: 92). It was not until the late 1990s that a change in the perception about Vodou arose as the field of ethnography, in particular, became interested and started to explore its cultural aspects. According to Laurent Dubois (2001: 95), 'the

[109] The salary of Haitian administrative personnel was equivalent to $20/month.
[110] (Richardson 1997)
[111] Note from personal journal entry.

history of Vodou is part of a history through which the objectified slaves of Saint Domingue became citizens of Haiti. It is a piece of a story of a triumph of representation, and for this very reason, it frustrates the methodologies of traditional history.' The perception of threat to the Haitian worldviews shaping their identity creates uncertainty, anxiety and powerlessness.

Directly and indirectly, humanitarians are part of the threat and might be the target of some resistance towards this perception. Michel Foucault wrote, '[R]esistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power' (1978: 95). In the words of this respondent, Haitians wish to resist this imposition,

1. So, therefore, there're going to be some blockage. So it's not – the
2. Haitians cannot control what is happening right now due to the fact
3. that they create certain poverty, starting with school, moving
4. forward to – I'm like – I'm a – ah, to farming, move forward to
5. factories [LL – Int. 7]

Resistance as expressed by the word 'blockage' by this respondent was not precisely described but it refers to a long tradition of resistance. What activities might the population and their leaders undertake to maintain their way of doing things.

Picture - 10: Author (2013) - Vodou temples are at the heart of Haitian social construction

Conspiracy Theories: Emotions distribution
Local leaders
• vulnerability • hopelessness • powerlessness • anxiety • fair

Table 4: Recapitulation of emotions experienced by expatriates and local leaders on the theme of Conspiracy Theories.

The Relief Development Continuum

When I arrived in Haiti at the end of 1993, it became quickly apparent that the acute emergency assistance period following the earthquake was over. Linking relief and development is a conceptual process that has been at the centre of debates for humanitarians and development organisations since the 1980s. The increase in funding necessary to address emerging and existing humanitarian emergencies required development and humanitarian workers to include some coordination between their activities. As Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell (1994: 2) wrote,

> The basic idea is simple and sensible. Emergencies are costly in terms of human life and resources. They are disruptive of development. They demand a long period of rehabilitation. And they have spawned bureaucratic structures, lines of communication and organisational cultures, which duplicate development institutions and sometimes cut across them. By the same token, development policy and administration are often insensitive to the risk of drought and to the importance of protecting vulnerable households against risk. If relief and development can be 'linked', so the theory goes, these

> deficiencies can be overcome. Better ‘development’ can reduce the need for emergency relief, better ‘relief’ can contribute to development; and better ‘rehabilitation’ can ease any remaining transition between the two.

The relief development continuum is often referred to as ‘linking relief, rehabilitation and development’ (LRRD). The relationship between these three elements seemed straightforward with a model of linking relief and development presenting relief, rehabilitation and development as steps of a continuum. This representation distinguishes between an acute emergency phase during or immediately after a disaster, in which rescue and relief aid take place, a phase of rehabilitation and reconstruction, and finally a phase in which ‘normal’ development returns. The model contemplates man-made or natural disasters as, a temporary disruption of an ongoing normal, linear development process taking place in the affected societies. The different phases are approached as interrelated and following one another in time. They are often presented as cyclical, similar to the conventional project or policy cycle in development assistance. Coordination between the phases is envisioned in cooperation between the sectors of relief and development to facilitate a rapid return to development. Besides, this approach should help to provide development aid in such a way as to prevent disaster from reoccurring, while relief aid could be given in such a way as to contribute to long-term development (Audet 2015: 110).

However, according to Richard Longhurst (1994), thinking about a continuum between relief and development activities ‘takes the form of competing intellectual frameworks, often using similar words in different meaning.’ Margie Buchanan-Smith also comments that the increase in the length of conflicts is not conducive to traditional development initiatives and some countries and communities require humanitarian assistance for extended periods as shown in figure 4 below which describes the average length of crisis between 2008 and 2018, with an average length of 9.3 years in 2018.



Figure 6: Global Humanitarian Assistance Report (2019)

Another remark by Maxwell (1994) is that a linear approach to LRRD might not take into consideration that development assistance was probably underway before a disaster occurred or conflict arose and that the relationship between development initiatives and conflict or disasters is often not a consideration in the development of policies or response. Janssens (2011), comments that the organisation Médecins Sans Frontières acknowledges the difficulties in differentiating between emergencies and development. The department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Development in Canada (Brown 2005) also struggle to keep political support for programs and policies for reconstruction funding which is the transitional or articulation between relief and development.

The difficulties in transitioning from relief to development is expressed by this local leader,

I think that it was one of the biggest helps that Haiti has had through the international communities for having all the NGOs coming altogether. It was unbelievable to see that, how it touched the people’s heart and they went through their pockets to give money to the NGOs, whether it was Red Cross, whether it was All Hands, whether it was some American press, any NGO that was here, they – ah, I think that they have done a marvellous job, overall. Yes, there

8. are a lot of critics. Yes, there are a lot of, uhm, things that they did
9. wrong afterwards [LL. Int. 9]

The first part of the narrative displays some positive emotional energy, the humanity of outsiders that ‘touched the people’s heart…’ [Line 3]. *Touching people’s heart* is emotionally laden; the heart is not only a symbol of life but also a symbol of love, of humanity. Touching someone’s heart can be interpreted as having touched the deepest part of his/her being. It also implies that there is a potential to create positive emotional energy. During this initial period, Haitians felt loved and close to humanitarian workers. There was hope, eagerness and enthusiasm about the tremendous amount of help after the earthquake.

Nevertheless, this positive emotional recollection was overshadowed by the acknowledgement that they[112] did many things wrong. Here, the respondent tone of voice dropped, and he lowered his head[113]. The ‘uhm’ [Line 7] brings back another reality to his mind. This last part of the sentence is loaded with unshared thoughts, sorrows and disappointment. This respondent expressed the difficulties of transitioning from relief/emergency assistance towards development activities.

A study conducted by Wood et al. (2017) seven years after reinforces this perception ‘…many NGOs came but did not address the needs. In fact, they just came to do whatever they want and not what the community needs.’ A key informant in the study stated, ‘NGO’s come with their own agenda instead of listening to the needs of the community and doing what the community needs’ (Wood et al. 2017: 5). According to the authors, ‘These examples demonstrate a level of dissatisfaction among key informants and focus group participants with government and organizations in charge, repeating a narrative within which community members are excluded from solutions and the distribution of goods and services.’ (Wood et al. 2017: 5)

[112] *They* refer to the humanitarians who worked in Léogâne and the surrounding villages
[113] Note from personal journal, October 2013.

François Audet (2015: 117) remarks,

> Humanitarian actors continue to drive the linkage debate. However, the concept has yet to become a central preoccupation of the larger development community. This disconnect has reinforced the perceived linearity of the linkage idea, as debate has focused on the relationship between relief and development rather than on how to achieve better development outcomes in contexts where tremendous needs appear to be entrenched.

Mosel and Levine (2014) observe that the concept of linkage between humanitarian assistance and development assistance is more a component of exit strategies than the result of well-developed policies and programs' adaptations. According to Nell Grabiam (2012), efforts undertaken by relief agencies to go beyond their role as providers of basic services has been hampered by their particular institutional settings, their principles and bureaucracies that are not compatible with those of development assistance organisations. Although the concept of LRRD has been endorsed at the policy level (European Commission 2007; European Parliament 2012) and empirically LRRD is a laudable initiative, in practice, it has proven challenging to implement.

Since the early twentieth century, the attention in this area has shifted towards 'resilience' renewing interest in the LRRD concept. According to Mosel (2014), the current focus on resilience represents 'the best opportunity yet to operationalise the links between relief and development'. The concept of resilience is broader than the original LRRD framework, encompassing not only people affected by crisis but also those who are vulnerable to crises. According to Otto and Weingartner (2013), the concept offers an opening for the dialogue and integrate programming across the humanitarian and development sectors. Oxfam (2013: 5) comments that 'building resilience will mean breaking down the barriers between humanitarian and development approaches more fundamentally than ever before. Response to humanitarian and economic crises need to be brought together with responses to foster long-term development'.

Christoplos (2006) and Slim (2000) are advocates for basing the LRRD on a rights-based approach focusing on the responsibilities of duty-bearers, and the ability of people to claim their rights rather than be assisted on a need-based approach. A right-based approach provides a framework to link relief and development by focusing on the underlying problems that are identified as participating in the creation and persistence of poverty and vulnerability. The limitation of this model resides in the fact that it focuses on governance, presupposing a functioning national and local state institutions willing to assume their responsibilities. As described in our case study, it is unfortunately not occurring in Haiti, and some other countries or regions relying on humanitarian and development assistance.

Another strain of thought to implement LRRD is Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). DRR focuses on risk reduction strategies and 'can be seen as a practical application of the resilience concept. This approach supports community-based education and risk reduction measures regarding hazards s and disasters but also attempts to re-focus development activities towards greater risk-sensitivity and proactive response.' (Mosel and Levine 2014: 3). Wisner et al. (2003), comment that DRR has mostly been implemented from a technical point of view with limited attention to the prevalent social, economic and political causes of crisis. However it has achieved significant results at the community level according to Christoplos et al. (2006),Twigg (2025). John et al. (2014) observe that LRRD represents a framework that has the potential to integrate DRR within development assistance, called DRR 'mainstreaming'.

An aspect of the discourse about 'resilience' is about adopting a different way of thinking about development during protracted crisis. Rather than a new paradigm, resilience addresses the need to bring development and humanitarian actors together to achieve these outcomes (Mosel and Levine

2014: 3). However, the operationalisation of resilience remains a challenge despite the fact that it seems a promising approach.

In Haiti, the LRRD was difficult to achieve, a joint report published by Tulane University, acknowledges (2012: 35).

> Qualitative inquiry suggested that though initial assistance met survival needs, the continued efforts were not as effective at meeting needs for resilient recovery. The nature of assistance and equity in distribution were identified as the source of significant constraints to the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance. Focus groups indicated that aid, through initially useful and appreciated, did not improve their situation because it did not reflect their mid-term and long-term needs.

Some humanitarian organisations or humanitarian individuals were nevertheless cooperating with local authorities to increase their independence,

1. Here again recently, to give an example, about ten days ago in terms
2. of the cholera response, it was the town hall which informed us of
3. pockets and outbreaks of cholera in the commune of Léogâne,
4. particularly in the city center. Generally, in the past it was
5. [organisation X][114] who gave us this information and it was
6. [organisation X] that we supported. But here we are already at a stage
7. Where..... the town hall gives us information. [Organisation X] role is
8. to validate because it is they who receive the patients in relation to
9. evolution. And from there, the answer, which we will give elsewhere
10. today will be made through the town hall. So yes institutions, we are
11. trying more and more..... not only to strengthen them but to pass
12. through local institutions as partners [ ][115]

---

[114] [Organisation X] is an international humanitarian organisation.
[115] Authors’ translation from French to English

This humanitarian leader was very keen to work with local institutions and had established some channel of communication, he was satisfied with the cooperation and expressed some optimism and hope in the future.

LRRD is one of the fifty-one commitment agreed upon by the negotiators of the Grand Bargain[116] and is included in Work Stream Ten. Five of commitments relate to Work Stream Ten: 'Enhance engagement between humanitarian and development actors.' The yearly independent report performed by the Overseas Development Institute states that this Work Stream as showing 'some progress.' The assessment of progress is based on a system of stars and Work Stream Ten received two out of four star in the criteria considered which include, donors activity; activity on joint commitment, links to other work streams; and links to other existing processes (Metcalfe-Hough 2018a: 60). The furtherment of Work Stream Ten has presented some challenges in advancing coordination and engagement between the humanitarian and development sectors. Donors regards this area as a 'crosscutting issue' and the Work Stream Ten was ended in March 2018. However, some members signatories expressed their interest in pursuing their effort to bridge the gap between the relief and development sector. According to Metcalfe-Hough (2018a: 60), a large unnamed donor 'raised serious concerns' about the loss of focus on this issue.

LRRD in the Water-Sanitation Response

According to a joint assessment run by the World Health Organisation and UNICEF (World Health Organization and UNICEF 2012), Haiti is the most underserved country in the western hemisphere in terms of water and sanitation infrastructures, only 69 % of the population has access to an improved water source and, 17 % had access to improved sanitation facilities in 2010. According to Nichols (1987), in the 1980s, the government of Haiti under president Duvalier sought bilateral assistance to improve water

[116] These commitments have been divided in ten work streams.

and sanitation conditions in the country. Léogâne was part of a water and sanitation programme supported by the U.S. government in the early 1980s. In 1986, Haiti was among the recipients of loans from the International Development Bank (IDB) to improve water supply and sewerage systems. Leogane and the surrounding region benefited from these initiatives with the installation of a centralized distribution system supplying drinking water to the residents of the town and its immediate surroundings (Galaga 2014: 3). This gravity-driven system of distribution was fed by a line catching an artesian spring located in the bed of the Momance River (Aquastat 2000). The water then reached the urban centre through a gridded distribution system, with three additional lines feeding parts of town. In 2008, Hurricane Gustav first damaged the infrastructure for water distribution, resulting in the removal of many water pipes and they were switching off, thereby depriving the people living in and around Léogâne of potable water (Quintiliani 2013)[117].

After the earthquake, the 'Provision of potable water and sanitary facilities proved to be an enormous challenge' (Gelting 2013: 69), and water sanitation has been an predominant sector in the humanitarian response after the earthquake. According to Center for Disease Control (2011), the efforts undertaken by various organisations were relief oriented and addressed the immediate needs created by the earthquake and the cholera epidemic, they did not focus they efforts on addressing the long term issues in water and sanitation indicating difficulties in linking relief rehabilitation and development programs. These short term projects ended or were winding down by 2012, and many organizations have scaled back their water and sanitation programmes in Haiti (Haiti 2013). According to the Haitian government (2013), the programmes and projects implemented by the various organisations in the water and sanitation sector lacked coordination with the Haitian government such as the Ministry of Public Health (MSPP), DINEPA and the local authorities.

[117] Meeting with DINEPA, October 29, 2013.

Since 2012, the national drinking water and sanitation directorate (DINEPA) has managed the water supply for the community of Léogâne and the peri-urban region around (Galaga 2014). DINEPA agreed to cooperate with humanitarian organisations after the earthquake to distribute water from water trucks and water bags. However, after that, the relationship between DINEPA and humanitarian organisations did not develop in a comprehensive collaboration aiming at transitioning emergency measure for the provision of water towards a more sustainable way that would link relief and rehabilitation activities toward development. DINEPA received some funding from the Spanish government, the Inter-American Bank of Development and the United Nations programme to rehabilitate the system, but by 2012, most of the financing had ceased (Galaga 2014). At the time of the visit in November 2013, only one central pump had been repaired, and a few parts of the city only received water a few hours a week for three main reasons. First, the pump was not strong enough to be used for long periods; second, the piping system had not been repaired in most parts of the city. Third, there were only three employees to run the entire system, including plumbing services, distribution and administration[118]. Pictures 5 and 6 are displaying examples of the limitations in transitioning from emergency to development in the city of Leogane. DINEPA's offices have been rebuilt but are not functional due to an absence of cash flow and the unfinished reparations of the central system of water distribution. Humanitarian organisations have invested most of their budget and funding in building new construction. There are also, as mentioned above, technical issues, including unfinished repairs to the central system and not enough personnel to run the system properly.

[118] Meeting with DINEPA, October 29, 2013.

Picture - 11: Author (2013). Inside DINEPA' s headquarters in Leogane.

Picture - 12: Author (2013). Inside DINEPA' s headquarters in Leogane.

After the provision of emergency bagged water and water trucking, between 2010 and 2012, humanitarian organisations constructed water points in Leogane and the surrounding region. Unfortunately, according to Widmer et al. (2014), the installation of water points has been poorly documented, and the geographic mapping of such activities was still underway during my visits in October and November 2010. In collaboration with Haitian NGOs, the

DINEPA has undertaken the mapping of these point to document and organise their location and needs for improvement or reparation. A first inventory has identified 545 water points; and further inventories refined the number of water points, which dropped to 377, of which 16 per cent were not functional. International humanitarian organisations constructed 56 percent of these water points of which ‘only 25 percent of them had evidence of a management strategy. Of those water points with evidence of a management strategy’ (Widmer 2014: 4). (See Table 4 below.)

Summary of water point construction and management data

	Count	Percentage
Construction information		
Number constructed pre-earthquake	3	0.8
Number constructed post-earthquake	374	99.2
Total constructed	377	100.0
Constructed and marked by IO/NGO	213	56.5
Constructed with no sign of sponsor	132	35.0
Constructed by community	13	3.4
Privately constructed	16	4.2
Management strategy		
All water sources ($N = 377$)		
No evidence of management strategy	284	75.3
Evidence of management strategy	93	24.7
Managed by IO/NGO	44	47.3
Managed by community	21	22.6
Managed by elected committee	12	12.9
Managed by individuals	12	12.9
Managed by alternative	6	6.5
Managed by DINEPA	1	1.1
IO/NGO constructed water sources ($N = 213$)		
No evidence of management strategy	145	68.1
Evidence of management strategy	68	24.9
Managed by same IO/NGO	41	28.3
Managed by other Organization	27	18.6

Table 5 – (Widmer 2014): Summary of Water Point Construction and Management Data

Another study conducted by Galaga et al. (2014), was aimed at determining the most appropriate water system for the town and its surroundings and at investigating the local perspectives regarding the use of reconstruction funds. The findings of the study first argument in favour of a centralised piping system for hygiene and practicality. Technically, it provides the safest system compared to all other possibilities. Concerning the viewpoint of the town citizens, the results of the study show that 83 per cent of the sample (N=165) preferred a centralised piping system for water delivery, while 17 percent preferred a decentralised system. As the study claims, Haitians perceive the provision of potable water through a centralised system of piping as a significant contribution to the improvement of their quality of life (Galaga 2014). Although the preference of stakeholders has been widely acknowledged as essential to the resilience and success of projects' implementations aimed at improving population's well-being, the study indicates that, in reality, its stakeholders' views have not been considered . (Galaga 2014). Each humanitarian organisation has used its funding to build a few water points. Included in the quality of life is also the protection against water-borne diseases. Often, in politically and economically unstable regions or countries, water-borne diseases are a significant cause of structural violence, causing more illness and death than direct violence.

Finally, another objective of the study was to guide the reconstruction effort in providing foreign agencies with a better understanding of the preferences of the population in term of the most water system and the most favourable options in terms of hygiene and the improvement of services for the population. The overwhelming response in term of water system was the reparation of the central water system. This begs the question of why, instead of digging hundreds of wells whose contamination is difficult to control and lack proper management plans, humanitarian organisations did not support the rehabilitation of the city's central piping system, as Galaga et al. (2014) recommended. Multiple questions can be advanced for not following these recommendations. First, humanitarian organisations would have had to pull their funding together to work on a centralised system. Second, they would have needed to hire qualified engineers and other specialists. A third reason would have been the difficulties of convincing major donors to work together on a large project rather than a myriad of small projects.

In March 2013, a microbiologic study was performed for 345 of the functioning wells. Faecal Coliform bacteria was present in 37.3 percent of the wells. The study also showed that there was no planning for population concentrations, no coordination among the organisations involved in the construction to avoid either duplicating or missing areas, and management strategies and technical monitoring were almost non-existent in both humanitarian organisations and government areas where the wells were dug (Widmer 2014: 6). Widmer et al. (2014: 5-6) comment,

> The average cost to have a Haitian contractor dig a well and install a pump is in the range of $7,000–$11,000 depending on depth, wellhead construction, and type of pump (E.R., personal communication). For IOs and NGOs, large numbers of wells can be dug quickly and cheaply, providing an immediate positive outcome that can be reported to funding sources. However, longitudinal maintenance costs are many times the initial cost of installation and often not accounted for in WASH budgetary allocations of IOs and NGOs.

Although contamination is higher during floods, it must also be noted that ‘inadequate or improper construction of wellheads, as well as the inappropriate depth of wells are not closely related to non-toxigenic, non-01/non-0139 V. *cholera* in association with faecal contamination, thereby indicating that contamination of wells by epidemic strains of the microorganism is plausible’ Widmer (2014: 794). Cholera is one of the most apparent new causes of the shift in structural violence in Haiti. Spread by MINUTSAH, cholera was brought by the United Nations and humanitarian organisations, who then left the country when they ran out of funds or changed their programmes’ priorities. Today, cholera is there to stay and kill.

Widmer et al.’s (2014: 793) study shows that humanitarian organisations built more than 50 percent of the wells, but with…

> …minimal evidence of planning (including geospatial planning in terms of geography/topography/hydrology and population concentrations), little to no coordination among organisations responsible for the construction to assure that services were not being duplicated or missed, and almost non-existent technical monitoring and management strategies (from either the public or private sectors) after the wells were dug and IOs and NGOs had either departed or altered their programmatic objectives in the area.

Nobody knows for sure how many cases of waterborne diseases are transmitted through well water. In early 2016, Reuters reported ‘cholera is resurfacing at an alarming rate.…An open cistern of greyish water serves as a spot for bathing, washing clothes and bottling drinking water’ (Makini 2016). At the end of 2016, the Haitian Ministry of Health reported 1,159 cases of cholera in the country, an increase of 112 percent compared to 2015 (WHO, 2017). Slowly, with the high turnover of humanitarian personnel who will be called and receive funding after each new spike in cholera cases, the origins of the disease will fall into oblivion. The problem might be explained in ways that put Haitians at fault.

A study conducted in 2017 by Wood et al. (2017: 3) addresses water concerning ‘access, contamination, health effects, infrastructure, mosquito reservoirs, treatment strategies, and co-infections’ in Leogane and the surrounding region. The research aimed at identifying population health concerns regarding water. Concerns included ‘improper hand/bathing hygiene, improperly cleaned water storage containers or water pump nozzles, toileting in water sources or on the land, and a lack of soap use.’ (2017: 4). One of the recommendations by the respondents in the study was an increase in education regarding water treatment, water purification, and hygiene to decrease ‘water contamination and vector borne diseases stemming from stagnant water.’ (Wood et al. 2017: 4)

According to the analysis by the authors, the respondents were concerned by,

> [R]eductions in infrastructure, personnel, or resources to communities and was frequently discussed in the context of questioning the long-term sustainability of the influx of foreign aid following the 2010 earthquake. Specifically, destabilization included the closure of temporary aid clinics, the loss of international aid funding, reduced number of physicians to the area, and the inability to use or maintain equipment—such as water pumps installed by the Red Cross and donated medical equipment. (Widmer 2014: 4)

A humanitarian leader was also convinced about the importance to continue to support the communities if long term solutions were not found,

> I think, me from experience, I can say the result often depends on the incentive. We may say to people, like the famous slogan of the Red Cross, "wash your hands is a need" but if they are not given soap, it does not remain their priority not to have soap. You have to give them the soap and not just give them in the moment to say "here you are using a soap to wash your hands". But give them the soap to develop the habit and after that it really becomes a necessity for them. [Int.][119]

He was positive and had hopes for the situation to improve and about his experience and the possibilities to change poor hygiene habits. He displayed some eagerness for and enjoyment in his work.

According to Oxfam International (2010), the earthquake, became an opportunity to rebuild the country ‘a once-in-a-century chance for change’. Merlin (2010), stated that it was necessary to ‘ensure that all humanitarian responses contribute and build towards the longer term development of the

---

[119] Author’s translation from French to English

health work force and health system' (Merlin, 2011). According to the Center for Economic and Policy Research (Center for Economic and Policy Research 2012), 'The emergency response based on current needs is seen as having a negative impact on the objectives of future development.' Dara, an independent organisation that has evaluated donors' response to the earthquake, drew the sad conclusion that 'Build Back Better' was nothing more than a slogan (Dara, 2011). Three years after the earthquake, reconstruction projects announced by the Haitian government and large donors have not started, mostly because of lack of funding and the Haitian 'population has heard public announcements of international aid and witnessed its mass deployment, while results in terms of assistance have become less and less visible as time went by' (Biquet 2013: 131).

> This has created a lot of tension between international aid actors, the authorities and the population. Perhaps too easily, distrust towards humanitarian organisations is palpable in both rhetoric and in the field. Cynically, the inhabitants of Port-au-Prince speak of the 'Republic of NGOs'. Identifiable by the colours of their flags and stickers, it is not uncommon for the cars of humanitarian organisations to be stoned.

In an interview in January 2011, Pierre-Salignon[120] (2011), stated 'Firemen cannot be blamed for extinguishing a fire, but nor can they be asked to reconstruct the building'. The respondent comments below mirror the difficulties between all the means deployed and the perceived result of the tremendous effort made by humanitarian organisations. By giving high hope to Haitians, the governments and major donors have promised a speedy recovery and a better future, fostering frustration among the population and local leaders (Biquet 2013).

Cultural Misunderstanding in Transitioning from Emergency Shelters to Reconstruction and Development of Permanent Housing

[120] Pierre Salignon was the Director General of Doctors of the World in 2011.

Years after the disaster in Haiti, many temporary settlements remain, and the nature of post-disaster resettlement continues to threaten the health and safety of survivors. The issues related to post-disaster temporary and transitional settlements have persisted over decades, bringing to question current policies in the transition from disaster to reconstruction and development.

Several studies have described that the failure in cultural sensitivity and planning lead to unsuccessful resettlement of population and potentially increase their vulnerability. In 1976, Mitchell (1976) exposed the potential of the creation of 'ghost towns' or settlement when reconstruction is not planned according to the needs of communities or populations. These settlements are often deserted as population move back to old settlements, with family members or to urban areas in search of better economic opportunities. Audefroy (2010) and Mulligan and Nadarajah (2011) who did some case studies in South East Asia covering 40 years of transition from relief to development showed that the use of local knowledge and culturally relevant solutions should be at the forefront. The relevance of traditional knowledge in resilience and disaster risk reduction. Audefroy (2011), in a study conducted in Haiti in 2011 in housing reconstruction, insists on the importance of considering 'vernacular architecture' during the reconstruction process after man-made/natural disaster. The knowledge developed locally in Haiti has shown a level of technological abilities and skills, which are the result of long practice rooted in culture. As Audefroy (2011) remarks, 'the tangible manifestation of this local knowledge can be seen in the housing construction process, while the skills and cultural practices constitute the intangible element. An inseparable bond exists between the cultural and social practices and local knowledge' (2011: 454). According to Lewis and Kelman (2010) people are aware of the various hazards that can affect their communities and this knowledge is integrated in the way their organize and manage their livelihoods. From this perspective, resilience is endogenous to communities and is supported by cultural continuity. Mercer et al. (2012) remark that local knowledge, views and ideas are often not included in the LRRD dialogue with communities.

During the fieldwork in Haiti, several areas and organisations involved in housing programs were visited. As picture 4 below shows, first, the construction of this housing is not appealing, but this cannot explain why nobody was using it when 230,000 people were still living under tents in the area. During the interview with the humanitarian leader, I learned that 34 of the 84 families who had received this temporary housing had never occupied the new buildings and 11 of the families had received two houses from another organisation. According to the organisation, the cost of each house was $3,000 US. Thirty-four empty houses represented a total of U.S. $102,000 US that has been spent without any benefit to the chosen beneficiaries.

Picture - 13: Author (2013). Unoccupied T-Shelter

Meanwhile, some families, who were not included in the project and did not benefit from the housing project, were still living in shacks made of cloth, plastic and wood without windows and running water. This begs the question of why some of the houses are left empty while a significant part of the population on this hill is still living in shacks.

Organisation X was working in more than 50 countries and arrived in the region of Léogâne after the earthquake to build 249 transitional shelters, also called *T-Shelters*. These houses are 18 square metres, have two rooms and are made of plywood attached to a cement base with a tin roof (see pictures 4). Notably, in case of hurricanes, tin must be securely attached to the structure of the house, since flying tin roofs are deadly. The targeting for becoming beneficiaries of this program required that the families could prove that they were leasing or owned the land.[121] More than 60 per cent of families affected by the earthquake living in the area were renters and ineligible to be part of the programmes. As described in chapter 5, land property is central to the culture and economy of Haiti. One of the local leaders interviewed commented,

> People who don't need shelters got shelters, while others who were more vulnerable and more in need didn't get anything. A lot of people who lost their homes thought the Communal Section Administrative Council could help them get a shelter. (LL. Int.10)

In his view, official local authorities have been powerless in the process of the housing reconstruction; they were only mandated by the humanitarian organisation to address issues concerning land titles and ownership upon which they have little or no control. The humanitarian organisation formed some local committees, but the humanitarian organisation made the final decisions regarding the recipients. The participation of the committee members was limited to informing the families chosen to be included in the programme. Another local administrative leader reported,

> The initial field study was done by people who didn't know anything about the local context.…There were people who got a shelter by shady methods or by lying [LL. Int. 10].

[121] From notes and interview of October 30th 2013.

The respondent was frustrated for three reasons: first, by the lack of cultural knowledge of humanitarian workers, second by the corrupted system, and third also by recipients of assistance who were lying in order to benefit from the assistance brought by humanitarian organisations at the expense of others. As Sager remarks (2012: 36), in Haiti, the traditional knowledge system is discernible in the *lakou,* which represents*,* 'the symbolic centre of family life'. During the colonial period, slaves succeeded in stealing small plots of land and made them highly productive. After independence, over a decade, President Pétion[122] allocated 170,000 hectares to an estimated 10,000 farmers. Plantations were divided between freed slaves, who started or continued small-scale farming. After that, as Gerard Latortue (1993) explained, modern legal and customary arrangements have interacted, and legal land transactions depend on notaries and surveys, which the rural population does not accept as a way to keep the land in their families.

The system has developed borrowing to the 'French tradition of bilateral inheritance and neolocal residence and has become the typical settlement pattern of Haiti' (Vannier 2009) cited in . The *lakou* model evolved in the absence or as an opposition to the government; it sustained the families through a subsistence practice ensuring autonomy, land ownership and individual freedom (Dubois 2012). According to Laguerre (1989) and a World Health Organisation (World Health Organization 2010) review, even though there is an increase in urbanisation due to population growth and decrease in agricultural employment, those who are migrating recreate the *lakou* model in cities. A recommendation by the International Organization of Migration insists on the need to revitalise the system to increase resilience: the model should be reproduced in the design or reconstruction of settlements for the selection of recipients of housing reconstruction as well as in term of the spatial organisation (Schininà 2010).

[122] Alexandre Sabès Pétion (April 2, 1770 – March 29, 1818) became the first President of the new republic of Haiti which he governed from 1807 until he died in 1818. He has been considered one of Haiti's founding father.

Understanding the evolution of land tenure in Haiti and who controls the land tenure system is essential in transitioning for relief to development and the relief continuum model. It might explain why a significant number of houses constructed by humanitarian organisations remain inhabited. The general secretary of Actalliance, a humanitarian organisation, remarked, ‘Land is a precious commodity in Haiti, and tracking down land titles can be a legal maze. But that shouldn’t stop us from pushing for a solution to this chronic problem’ (2011). What he perceives as a chronic problem is part of a long tradition of land management based on resilience and resistance. Despite several attempts at reforming the system of land ownership, the central government has never succeeded in implementing it. The legal framework of the Haitian land ownership as established by the Constitution of 1987, was primarily drawn on the French laws related to land administration and most of its provisions have not yet been implemented (Bloch et al. 1988; Victor 1993). This ‘legal and administrative system coexists with the practice of occupying land with little consideration for formal legal constraints.’ (Levine 2012: 7) This superimposition of underground traditional land ownership and a legal system inapplicable has resulted in a confusing situation for those who are not aware. A study conducted by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations and the Institut National de la Réforme Agraire (Food and Agriclture Organization 1997) estimated that ninety-five per cent of the land sold in the rural areas of Haiti, in particular, were avoiding the processes and formalities imposed by the Haitian legal system

The houses that humanitarian organisations have built or rebuilt are on land given by the government or private owners, which means that chances are, they have been taken from the ‘real’ owners in the parallel system. James Leyburn (1941) wrote:

> Legally it might be argued that only a small fraction of the population has an indisputable right to the land on which it lives. By strict interpretation most of the peasants are still squatters whom the government might dispossess. The American Occupation...met with

> the stubborn refusal of the peasants to state their claims or take any interest in legalising their rights.

Since the country's independence, each new dictator has confiscated land to distribute to the regime's supporters. As soon as a dictatorship ended, the land was taken back, piece by piece, by the local peasants. Frequently, those who owned the land during the dictatorships were often not living on the land and were not tending to it. Recovering the confiscated land represents an essential aspect of the need for land for survival. However, it is also a symbolic ritual of redistribution, symbolic because of the impossibility of regaining all the land lost. The recouping of the land is undertaken in a systematic and organised way, often approved by official and local traditional authorities. Some of the techniques utilised to regain lost land include violence, the use of land titles going back to the colonial time, if they exist, and the occupation of the land (Barthélemy 1989). According to Glenn R. Smucker et al. (2000), 'Haiti's informal land tenure system provides a modicum of social security via flexible and affordable land transfer and tenancy. The system prioritizes concerns for the stability of access over particular modes of ownership of land. Due to impoverishment, most peasants are preoccupied with food security and risk management in a context with little margin for failure... Peasants promote food security by strategic management of their social capital resources, including access to land.'

Humanitarian organisations have recognised the importance of land rights and land issues during and after humanitarian crises. UN-Habitat which led the protection cluster after the earthquake in Haiti acknowledged the complexity of land rights and called for increased research and analysis, though, according to Simon Levine et al. (2012: 5) 'the capacity available was nowhere near enough.', 'the mutual difficulty that researchers and informants had in understanding each other on this issue suggests a twin lesson: first, that local people know how to come to an understanding in their own society and second, in the context of a humanitarian response agencies have little chance of understanding how they do it.' (Levine 2012: 8)

Five of the eight Haitian participants shared that the external intervention conducted by humanitarian organisation did not take into consideration the uniqueness of the Haitian context. In the following excerpt of an interview

1. Yes, there are a lot of things that they could have done better. But
2. Haiti is unique. Like you could be – you could have gone anywhere in
3. the world. When you come to Haiti, you're like, 'Wait a minute, what's
4. going on'? You walk about like five, ten miles; there is not a cop in
5. sight. And then you said, 'Okay. There are no bombs. There are no
6. riots. Like people are just walking about their business'. And the – and
7. a password to a Haitian person is just *bonswa*. *Bonjou*[123]. That's the
8. password. And those people, they are so humble, they are so
9. beautiful, they are so – they – there is no way that anyone could do
10. any harm or anything to their international community. But themselves
11. when they came, they were surprised. They – when they said that
12. Haiti is very poor, they were amazed. They were like, 'Wait a minute.
13. They said that Haiti is poor They were ready for the worst'. And what
14. they have found is not the worst. [LL int. 5]

On this subject, Paul Farmer (2004: 305), who has deep knowledge of the Haitian society, wrote, 'To foreign eyes, the Haitian story has become a confused skein of tragedies, most of them seen as local. Poverty, crime, accidents, disease, death – and more often than not their causes – are also seen as problems locally derived. The transnational tale of slavery and debt and turmoil is lost in the vivid poverty, the understanding of which seems to defeat the analyses of journalists and even many anthropologists, focused as we are on the ethnographically visible – what is in front of us.'

Although there is a wealth of literature on designing emergency/ development strategies and projects according to contextual particularities

[123] *Bonswa* (creole): Good evening. *Bonjou* (creole): Hello or good morning.

and needs, in reality, organisations continue to use most of the same blueprints in various contexts.

1. …when the individuals that worked in the NGOs, they have used –
2. They are used to work in different countries. So they come here, and
3. they applied the same system that they have used, whether it’s
4. Somalia, whether it’s somewhere in Africa. They tried to use the same
5. thing, but it does not work. Haiti is unique. It won’t fit. So they fail in
6. that point by trying. [LL. Int. 4]

In the words of this participant, we can feel that Haiti’s uniqueness was not considered in the design and implementation of programmes, and on that point, *they are failing*. The use of the pronoun *they,* states the gap between us and them, us versus them. Although *we* know the needs of the Haitians’ society, *they* decide what is right for us, and consequently, they are failing. The respondent is categorical when he states, ‘but it does not work’.

There was some land available for sale when we surveyed the area with an informant, but I did not succeed in getting an answer to the question of why there was land available for sale despite population pressure, and people still living in camps for internally displaced people (IDPs) and tents makeshifts. Why a significant number of houses were empty when there was still such a shortage of housing after the earthquake? During a meeting with a group of Haitian leaders,

Picture - 14: Unknown photograph (2013). Meeting with a group of Vodou leaders

they warned me that the land transfer was an extremely complicated system in Haiti, especially with the traditional heritance of land from parents to sons. In the traditional system, men old enough to cultivate their own land were often sharecropping, which partly resolved the problem concerning the traditional familial inheritance custom. However, this answer begged the question of why there was still land available for sale or houses left unoccupied when Haitians were still living under makeshifts made of plastic sheeting and rags? Who was selling this land[124]? Unfortunately, I could not stay long enough to find the answer to this important question during my field visit and undertook additional research to uncover the mystery of the land available for sale.

It happens that anthropologist Gerald F. Murray (1980) conducted extensive research in this area and found that Haitian Vodou plays a central role in the traditional land tenure system. Although Vodou rituals are numerous and touch all aspects of life, I will describe the cult of the dead, which is the most relevant to our understanding of the land tenure issue. Most of the literature has focused on the cult of the dead as a mode of interaction with deceased grandparents and parents through ceremonies performed by a *houngan*[125] who is paid to *rélé mo* (make the dead come back). What Murray (1980: 126) noticed was the impressive ‘quality of the burial monuments in Haiti. The tombs where many peasants are buried cost more to construct than the wattle-daub cottages in which they spent their lives’.

Most young Haitian males in rural areas are traditionally educated at home in a vocational sense. Education starts early with learning how to tend the garden or small plot of land on which the family ensures its food security until they reach their teenage years. At this point, they receive a pre-inheritance plot of land, which they cultivate as if it were their own but share the fruit of their labour with the entire family (1980: 301-302). This custom is still widely used to remove the obligation of waiting until the parents’ death to acquire land, thereby allowing young men to gain economic independence at an early age. The plot does not belong to the sons until both parents die, after which time, they consider it their property. However, with the issue of a growing population, the system had met its limits, and although it is still practised, not all families have enough land to continue the tradition. Although an increase of seasonal migration to the Dominican Republic has increased the amount of land available, this seasonal work is only undertaken with the goal to buy a plot of land[126].

Surprisingly, at the time of Murray’s research, his surveys showed an extremely low percentage of landless farmers, with eight out of ten agriculturalists owning land. After examining the question from many angles, Murray interviewed 589 landowners about land transactions. The table below shows the causes for selling land plots.

Reason	N	Percentage
Burying a parent	187	31.7
Healing a sickness	138	23.4

[125] A *houngan* is a Vodou male priest, the female being a *mambo.*
[126] Although I treat only land inheritance for men in this section, the subject of land inheritance is exceptionally complicated. Overall, the system has its own reasoning.

Poverty: General cash needs	74	12.6
Burying a child	41	7.0
Paying debts	38	6.5
Burying a sibling	23	3.9
Burying a spouse	19	3.2
Building a tomb	15	2.6
Anniversary services for dead	11	1.9
Wedding of son or daughter	10	1.7
Buying food	6	1.0
Raising capital for trade	6	1.0
Paying for child's schooling	5	0.8
Other	16	2.7
Total	589	100.0

Table 6 - Murray, G. (1980: 132). Ethnographic Analysis of the Reasons for selling a plot of land

Murray's (1980: 304-306) surprising findings are, first, that 'virtually all of the land was being transacted among villagers themselves', and, second, the 'dramatic importance of financing rituals as the major contest for the sale of the land'. Following the death of a family member, the expenditures are often beyond the deceased's family's financial capacities. Nonetheless, a majority of families, with the inclusion of the extended family, has a plot of land that can be sold. Although there is no obligation to raise the money through the sale of land, there is a mechanism in place that renders it cheaper to finance a ritual via land sale than via animal or crop sales. In practice, priests approach the families of the deceased or sick to offer to buy land should the family need financial support; no mention is made of the reason behind this offer (Murray 1980: 304-306) (1980: 304-306). To adapt the land ownership system to the growing population, the price of rituals was increased, forcing agriculturalists to sell land to withstand the social pressure to meet the demands of funeral rituals. It is through this land release system that there is continuously land available for young men.

From the villagers' perspective, these changes have come from God's punishment because of the decline of old virtues and the rise of selfishness. While openly, no villager would explicitly describe the land system, one of Murray's (1980: 319) informants gave him advice on the process to purchase land.

> You wait 'till a relative or neighbour of yours has a sickness or death in his family. You approach him; you tell him how sorry you are that he has this problem. You reach in your pocket, pull out a wad of bills, and say, 'Look, brother, here's a couple of gourdes I can lend you to help see you through'. You tell him, 'I pray to God that you don't have to sell off any of your land. But listen, brother, if God forbid you should have to sell off a tiny piece, you'll keep me in mind, won't you'?

As Murray writes, these are 'hidden systems', or 'subterranean linkages', that go beyond the expressive and emotional ceremonies experienced by most outsiders. It is, in short, '*the folk religion of its members that keeps the community's land circulating*. A heretofore hidden face of peasant Vodou' (1980: 319)[127]. Vodou is not just the visual drama that is exposed to outsiders and has been mocked; it is also a social structure playing the role of a government in the local political and economic life. Another critical idea emerging from Murray's (1977) ethnographic research is the capacity of the cult to adapt to economic and political changes and initiate social changes. The adaptation of Vodou is not happening by accident but, instead, is linked to adaptive mechanisms developed to address crises that threaten the economic and social balance of life in communities.

The impact of using lands without understanding the complexity of the system or without having the right interlocutors in their negotiations can

---

[127] For another account of the importance of rituals in the sale of land, see also Frederic George Bailey, who studied this type of phenomenon in Highland Orissa (Journalist 2013).

affect neighbours' coexistence if land, for example, is wrongly appropriated or given to the wrong person. For example, the International Crisis Group stated in 2009 that 'Haiti's land tenure records are poorly organised and mostly unreliable' (International Crisis Group 2009: 6). USAID claimed, 'Haiti does not have an effective national cadastre and lacks a comprehensive, functional system for recording land ownership'. After the land was distributed or redistributed by the government, often through humanitarian organisations, some conflicts were reported. For example, Erik Vittrup (2010) reports, 'Less than 5 percent of Haiti's land is officially accounted for in public land records'. The government is then accused of not managing the country properly. However, small landowners' resistance has been fierce regarding the government's attempts to legalise the land according to recommendations from international organisations.

Brian Concannon (2017: 7) in an expert affidavit comments, '[P]olice are particularly reluctant to intervene in land conflicts, because of the history of violence in them, and the amount of participants that are potentially involved. Although it is just a supposition that I cannot prove at this stage, it is very possible that the police are connected with the land squatters and owners and belong to the parallel system.' This excerpt reveals that outsiders' interpretation of the land problem is based on their Western concept of land ownership. Again, their conclusions are creating resentment and frustration toward the authorities.

Understanding such a complex cultural setup and the barriers erected to protect some of its subterranean modes of operation. The limitations of official leaders in implementing current modern policies shed some light in the complicated relationship between traditional and official local leaders. The following excerpt displays the attitude and analysis of a mature humanitarian leader as he speaks about the town administration.

1. One of the things I see as a partner of the municipality is that,
2. yes, they have some project ideas. But they lack support; it lacks
3. people with the necessary skills. Yes, a competent presence, I

4. would say people familiar with municipal management to
5. accompany them, because it is not the will that is lacking. They
6. just do not have the capacities, because the director
7. general of the town hall is a lawyer. It's true that he followed
8. some seminars, training paid by the [Country Y] corporation, but
9. apart from that… [E – Int. 15]

The humanitarian leader is saddened by the limitation of the local authorities in term of skills. He is positive because he perceives a real will from the authorities to improve the situation.

Before the earthquake, the Haitian administration, as it is clear by now, was already suffering from severe structural, financial and functional problems, including the lack of trained administrators and financial resources. Like other national institutions, it did not enjoy the confidence of the population, who saw it as unable to provide essential services and as marked by endemic corruption. The lack of continuity or bridge between relief, rehabilitation and development were not only affecting the water sanitation and shelter sectors but also the health sector.

At the time of the visit in Haiti, many humanitarian organisations were leaving or downsizing their operations. They had rebuilt, or built, many components of infrastructure, including shelters, health posts, latrines and schools. Most of the local people who had built and run them were now unemployed, as the Haitian state was not capable of taking over their salaries.

During this transitional period, while visiting the markets, I met many former employees of humanitarian organisations who were desperate to find a job. Most of them had been laid off by these organisations, and they felt abandoned and abused.

1. So I think that, in the [inaudible], the NGOs have learned a lot going
2. for Haiti. They have also helped a lot. They have also made a lot of
3. mistakes, but right now, these is a little bit of suffering. Because they

4. came... and they were paying the Haitian workers top dollar because
5. they do, ah – okay. Ah, the Haitian wage is $5 a day. [Inaudible]
6. They'r trying to pay them $20 a day. But for how long? You have to
7. understand that, if I used to eat one plate of food a day, now you
8. come and put on my table three plate of food a day for six months...
9. After six, what am I going to do? Now I become nice and big, looked
10. food. But after six months, I need to maintain that three plates of
11. food. So they pulled out so quick [speaking of the humanitarian
12. organizations]. It's like they wheel up so high, and they got under you
13. and you fall down, flat on your but [LL. Int. 6].

This respondent expressed some mixed feelings, the gratitude from the unprecedented support by the international community and particularly international humanitarian organisations but also some deception, resentment, fear and powerlessness because they left too fast without leaving a continuity. 'They have also helped a lot,' but not in the right ways; 'they have also made a lot of mistakes'. The participant expressed what could be heard in many public places. 'But right now, there is 'a little bit of suffering' [Line 3]. This participant reflects that, soon, he and a significant number of Haitians who have been eating relatively well during the presence of international organisations will lose this possibility (or have already lost it), which will have a great many side effects.

Although some local leaders felt resentment, anger was also expressed by the employees laid off when the humanitarian organisations that were employing them left. 'Now I become nice and big, looked good. But after six months, I need these three plates of food. So, they pulled out so quick' [lines 9 and 10]. The use of the word *so* is a little confusing; it allows many interpretations. It is not clear if the respondent, who was quite desperate about his future, was accusing the international organisations of leaving on purpose. Unfortunately, it was not possible of investigating further, but the rest of the interviewee's remark is also very disturbing. 'It's like they wheel up so high, and they got under you, and you fall down flat on your butt' [LL. Int. 6, lines 10 and 11].

LRRD: Emotions distribution	
Local leaders	**Humanitarians**
Emergency period	
• Hope • Cheerfulness • Contentment • Optimism	
Transition towards development	
• Sadness • Disappointment • Regret • Fair	• Hope • Eagerness • Pride • Compassion • Enthusiasm

Table 7 - Author (2020) - Summarization of Emotions Associated with LRRD

Summary

Nine local leaders in Haiti and five humanitarians participated in interviews to explore the emotional impact asymmetrical relationships of power were having on them. Four themes emerged from the general coding of the interviews: Coloniality of Power, Corruption and Distrust, Conspiracy Theories, and The Relief Development Continuum. The emerging model provides a portrayal first, of the effects or impacts of these relationships of power and second of the emotions coming out for each theme. Below is table summarizing the emotions associated with each theme.

Theme	Coloniality of Power	Corruption And Distrust	Conspiracy Theories	Relief Development Continuum
Humanitarians	Sadness Embarrassment Regret Shame Failure Frustration Disappointment Anger	Contempt Disappointment Worry		**Emergency period** **Relief continuum** Hope Eagerness Pride Compassion Enthusiasm Frustration
Local leaders	Anger Resentment Compassion Powerlessness Frustration Regret Disappointment	Guilt Shame Embarrassment Disappointment Humiliation Contempt Worry Fear Anger	Vulnerability Hopelessness Powerlessness Anxiety	**Emergency period** Hope Cheerfulness Contentment Optimism Relief continuum Sadness Disappointment Regret Fair

Table 8 - Author (2020) - Summarization of Emotions Associated with each Theme

Chapter 7 - Conclusion and Implications

> *Whatever people believe to be real will be real in its consequences. When I see something, I must interpret it, give it meaning. If one believes in witches, they behave as though witches exist: They take protective measures, explain events in terms of witchcraft, and might even execute witches. Nonbelievers, on the other hand, may choose to execute witches because of their presumed heresy or to institutionalise them because they are crazy. (Michele Wilson)*

The four themes emerging from the data analysed were distinct but interconnected. The relief development continuum theme is related to the specific period at which the field-work was conducted. Although efforts at the local level and institutional level from the humanitarian community are attempting to link relief and development (LRDD), they are both still operating separately, and obstacles to operationalising logical transitions are complicated to address. Some humanitarian organisations have tried to integrate some developmental or rehabilitation activities in their programmes, but it is often not enough to reinforce the communities' resilience. According to Audet (2015: 117),

> If emergency relief and development assistance still exist in two different operational realms today, it is because there are ever-growing obstacles to constructing a smooth and logical transition between their specific phases....efforts....are impeded by donor rules that mandate a rigid, bureaucratic distinction between them... the different political and operational cultures of relief and development organizations have erected practical barriers to success.

The emotions expressed by the participants were approached from the perspective that their occur in and are shaped by social and cultural contexts and are constructed through dynamic and interactive processes. The Relief Continuum theme generated inversed emotions for humanitarians and local leaders. To capture this occurrence, the Relief Continuum theme was divided in two periods. The first one was the Emergency period which occurs after a shock and lasts between one and two years, sometimes longer depending on the context. The second one was Relief Continuum which refers to the period when relief operations are transitioning to rehabilitation and development.

In the table, while local leaders were displaying emotions including hopefulness, cheerfulness, contentment and optimist when evocating the response to the aftermath of the earthquake (emergency period), they expressed sadness, disappointment, regret and even fair about the future, in the period of transition toward development. According to some of the respondent there was not foreseeable improvement in the living conditions in Haiti despite all the assistance and support the country and its inhabitants have received. For humanitarians still working in Haiti, none of them where present during the emergency response and most of them arrived during the rehabilitation process. They could not express particular emotions related to the emergency period but overall, their experience with the rehabilitation and transition towards development activities were positive, including emotions indicating hope, eagerness, enthusiasm, compassion but also some frustration, regret, disappointment and sadness due to the various difficulties linked to the implementation of their programs

Despite the fact that during the preparation of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit it was acknowledged that ‘actors outside the traditional power structures of the humanitarian system have little real influence over humanitarian financing and programming.’ (ALNAP 2015) Cooperation between local leaders and humanitarian organisations are still impeded by funding structures being short-term and programme driven, which give humanitarian agencies little incentive to give more responsibilities or engage in long term cooperation with local leaders. In addition, the asymmetricality of power remain an underlying and enduring problem, financial, a sense of coloniality, distrust and corruption represent facts and perceptions that are to be addressed.

In Haiti, humanitarian organisations operate in a dysfunctional state and might be perceived as 'parallel states', reinforcing the opinions of that they are associated with post-colonial entities leading to the emergence of conspiracy theories from the part of local leaders. Conspiracy theories which are the extension of disempowerment indicate a lack of transparency that could be ameliorated by more open communication and inclusion, ideally from both sides. However, due to the asymmetrical relationship of power between local leaders and humanitarians, it might come to the later to initiate the process. Some humanitarian leaders have shown that they could work well with local officials, studying their approach could prove to be helpful to develop such cooperation more broadly. As Swami and Furnham (2014: 232) point out 'only real democratic change would set in place the foundations for a society in which harmful and unjustified conspiracy theories are weakened and ultimately extinguished.'

In a study conducted in Haiti, Miller (2019: 3) states 'endogenous inhabitants re-create the *lakou* system in post-disaster settlements in Haiti. His study validates the resilience of the *lakou*, the inclusive nature of the *lakou* system, and the important role it places in the production of social capital within post-disasters communities'. The *lakou* is the central system of economic, social and political resilience in the Haitian society. Even though the Haitian society is transitioning at different paces from traditionality to modernity, the *lakou,* is adaptable to modernity,

> Whereas the actual physical settings where large families lived and worked for generations in the countryside might have new geographies, new boundaries and more complex locations that are visible or not, the *lakou* as social milieu remains ever so present in modern Haiti, in both rural and urban settings. Real or imagined,

> today’s *lakou(s),* are relational spaces that serve our communities, ensure participation and ownership in communal affairs, and provide pillars to build and develop projects and possibilities of all types that benefit the group. (Michel 2009)

This theoretical and social framework represents the fabric of the Haitian society and a point of entry to connect emergency, rehabilitation and development. To further the possibilities of fulfilling this policy through practical implementation an adaptation of the theory of Cultural Competence is proposed.

Cultural competence has first been articulated in the field of psychology in the early 1980s. Cultural competence is inclusive of culture, in the context of this study, Green’s (1982: 6-7) definition frame culture as ‘those elements of a people’s history, tradition, values and social organization that become implicitly or explicitly meaningful to the participants... in cross-cultural encounters.’ His definition includes the relationship between humanitarian and local leaders across culture and social boundaries, it refers to the social events and organisation requiring some knowledge which can be apparent or less observable. In the case of Haiti, the *lakou,* is a complex construct not readily observable and which understanding require cultural competence. Green’s definition offers an overview of the concept as ‘an ability to provide services that members of a distinctive culture recognizes as appropriate among themselves.’ Cross et al. (1989: 13) expand on the definition of cultural competence, describing it as ‘a set of congruent behaviors, attitudes, and policies that... enable a system, agency, or group of professionals to work effectively in cross-cultural situations’.

Taylor (1994: 154) elaborates on the concept and describes it as an ‘‘integrative’ and ‘transformative’ process, ‘an adaptive capacity based on an inclusive and integrative world view which allows participants to effectively accommodate the demands of living in a host culture’. McPhatter (1997) points out that cultural competency is overcoming the limited success of early efforts in this area referred to mostly as ‘cultural sensitivity’ which have provided information about ethnic or conflict histories, techniques for improving cross-cultural communication. However, they have not succeeded in addressing the diversity of cultural needs. According to McPhatter (1997: 262-266), cultural competence is integrative and should include three components: an enlightened consciousness, a grounded knowledge base, and cumulative skill proficiency developed.

Enlightened consciousness refers to the process of examining our primary worldview, meaning an evaluation of our belief systems, including our values and behavioural patterns. The aim of this enlightening of our consciousness is to accept ‘others on the basis of equality solely because of a sense of shared humanity.’ (McPhatter 1997: 259) The process requires sustained efforts until there is acceptance and comfortable exchanges in cross-cultural relations. Grounded knowledge base, requires additional perspective by taking some distance from our socially constructed reality which includes but is not limited to, our education system, our values, historical background and scientific beliefs. Grounded knowledge requires the collection of information from other disciplines and the acceptance of the existence of others’ social constructions. Cumulative skill proficiency implies the acknowledgement that cultural competency ‘is a dynamic, ongoing developmental process that requires a long-term commitment and is achieved over time’ (United States Department of Health and Human Services 2003: 12). Cumulative skill proficiency might not be possible to develop in the immediate relief assistance period following a disaster or in addressing the direct effects of conflicts on populations. However, there is the potential of developing these cumulative skills in the period of rehabilitation or reconstruction that follows and in the case of Haiti it might have helped bridging the gaps between the relief-development continuum. The three components are interrelated and should ‘be embraced as an essential part of a mutually influencing whole.’ (McPhatter 1997: 262) Based on the premises developed by McPhatter (1997), and as suggested by Davis (1997) cultural competence is a transformative process of knowledge about how other cultures represent the world and about their policies, practices and attitudes.

Cultural Competence



Figure 7: Model of Cultural Competence adapted from Anna R. McPhatter (1997)

Limitations and Future Research

The study presented has limitations. First, the group studied was quite small and it would be beneficial to conduct this type of research in other contexts to improve, refine and contradict the findings. Longer periods of time should be spent in these countries, regions or communities to allow deeper observation. It would also benefit the development of more profound relationships and immergence in the daily life and culture of the contexts explored. A specific focus on gender would enrich the analysis but was not possible in this context.

The fact that the study was performed posteriori probably had an impact on the themes and emotions identified. Participating in real time meetings between humanitarians and local leaders would certainly bring different perspectives, insights and emotions. It would also allow the observation of body language which would also contribute in reinforcing the robustness of findings.

Finally, the data analysis could be simplified and deepenedd by using automated text analysis programs such as the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (Pennebaker 2007). The use of statistical programs such as CLASSI would also help to refine the identification of emotions. Researching the emotions is challenging but recent advances in technology would strengthen such undertakings.

Emotions have always been a fundamental element of humanitarian's narrative and humanitarianism is based on the translation of compassion into action. Humanitarianism does produce and provoke emotions. How can the concept of humanitarianism not be emotional?

Appendix 1 - Léogâne

Like many areas in less industrialised countries, Léogâne is mainly a peri-urban area with a small centre rather than a town. It is located 30 km west of the capital, Port-au-Prince, across a mountainous region and a coastal plain. The total population of the region is estimated at about 300,000 people, one-third of who lives in the urban centre of the town.

The town of Léogâne is built on the ancient site of Yaguana, the birthplace of the Taino Queen Anacaona (c. 1474–c. 1503), who has remained a mythical figure in the Vodou tradition. The Taino spoke the Arawakan language popular for the majority of the South American Indians who populated the area before they were massacred by the Spanish invaders. Léogâne was built by the French and operated as the administrative centre of the colony. It was destroyed the first time by an earthquake in 1770, rebuilt and later burned by Jean-Jacques Dessalines to prevent the town from falling into the hands of the French. Dessalines is another mythical figure of the Haitian revolution.

On the coast, fishing is an important part of the local economy. The growth of sugarcane remains one of the main export crops. Fruit and other cereals are produced as well, but the country's environmental deterioration has been catastrophic. While the United Nations Environmental Program attributes the deforestation of Haiti to the 2010 earthquake, the roots of the problem are much older. In 1954, Hurricane Hazel downed many trees throughout the country. Later, intensive logging to provide the capital's growing demand for charcoal exacerbated the problem. Charcoal still powers 85 percent of all energy needs. In addition, the agricultural system developed by colonialists and later international financial institutions such as the World Bank in collaboration with corrupt governments has compounded the problem.
The water sanitation in the Léogâne region remains disastrous, even after years of development programmes. A shallow productive aquifer is located at a depth of five to ten metres in the coastal plain region. Deeper, an insulating layer protects an unconfined aquifer from a confined one that was

used when central piping was installed throughout the town. However, it was destroyed in 2008 by hurricanes Hanna and Gustave.

Labels	Area	Total	Male	Female	18y/+
II- ARRONDISSEMENT DE LEOGANE		486 007	239 526	246 481	267 402
1- Commune de Léogane		**190 682**	**94 621**	**96 061**	**105 128**
Ville de Léogane	Urbain	100 349	48 339	52 010	49 950
Quartier de Trouin	Urbain	8 408	4 529	3 879	3 619
Sections Rurales	Rural	81 925	41 753	40 172	51 559
Section Communale		**190 682**	**94 621**	**96 061**	**105 128**
1re Section Dessources	Urbain	76 143	36 615	39 528	38 198
1re Section Dessources	Rural	18 120	9 073	9 047	11 612
2e Section Petite Rivière	Urbain	24 206	11 724	12 482	11 752
2e Section Petite Rivière	Rural	17 197	8 586	8 611	10 894
3e Section Grande Rivière	Rural	18 217	9 126	9 091	11 607
4e Section Fond de Boudin	Urbain	8 408	4 529	3 879	3 619
4e Section Fond de Boudin	Rural	3 087	1 631	1 456	1 890
5e Section Palmiste à Vin	Rural	5 519	2 919	2 600	3 392
6e Section Orangers	Rural	1 806	962	844	1 143
7e Section Parques	Rural	2 009	1 037	972	1 151
8e Section Beauséjour	Rural	1 979	1 014	965	1 192
9e Section Citronniers	Rural	1 538	828	710	972
10e Section Fond d'Oie	Rural	3 872	2 047	1 825	2 431
11e Section Gros Morne	Rural	3 169	1 615	1 554	2 047
12e Section Cormiers	Rural	2 629	1 406	1 223	1 672
13e Section Petit Harpon	Rural	2 783	1 509	1 274	1 556

Table 9 - Population of the circonscription of Léogâne (Source : Institut Haitien de Statistiques et d'Informatique, January 2012).

References

Abalakina-Paap et al. (1999) Beliefs in conspiracies. *Political psychology* 20, 637-647.

Acemogly et al. (2014) Chiefs: economic development and elite control of civil society in Sierra Leone. *Journal of political economy* 122, 319-368.

Actalliance (2011) Haiti: give us our land. [Report]. *https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-give-us-our-land* Accessed 5/7/2012

Adinolfi C. et al. (2005) *Humanitarian response review.* United Nations.

al., L. e. (1998) Trust and distrust: new relationships and realities. *Academy of management review* 23, 438-458.

Alexi, Y. (2015) Mwn pas connait as resistance: Haitians' silence against a violent state. *Journal of Haitian studies* 21 (2), 269-288.

Allport, G. W. and Postman, L. G. (1947) *The psychology of rumor.* 1st edition*.* Henry Holt.

ALNAP (2012) *The state of the humanitarian system report.* London: ALNAP.

ALNAP (2015) *The state of the humanitarian system report* London: ALNAP.

Altman, D. (2010) *Are aid donors now running Haiti.* AIDWATCH. *http://aidwatchers.com/2010/04/are-aid-donors-now-running-haiti/* Accessed March 2012.

Anderson, C. A. B., B. J. (2002) Human agression. *Annual review of psychology* 53, 27-51.

Anderson, C. B., Sebastien (2014) Perspectives on power in organizations. *Annual review of organizational psychology and organizational behavior* 1, 67-97.

Anderson, M. B. (1999) *Do no harm: how aid can support peace--or war.* Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Anderson, M. B. and Woodrow, P. J. (1998) *Rising from the ashes : development strategies in times of disaster.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Aquastat (2000) *Haiti fact sheet.* http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data/cf/readPdf.html?f=CF_HTI_en.pdf Accessed November 26, 2019.

Artz, S. and Riecken, T. (1994) A study of adolescent female violence in a suburban school district. Britich Columbia Ministry of Education.

Attfield, S., Knight, P. (2003) *Interviewing for social scientists: an introductory resource with examples.* Sage.

Audefroy, J. F. (2010) Post-disaster emergency and reconstruction experiences in Asia and Latin America: an assessment. *Development in practice* 20 (6), 664-677.

Audefroy, J. F. (2011) Haiti: post-earthake lessons learned from traditional construction. *Environment and urbanization* 23 (2), 447-462.

Audet, F. (2015) From disaster relief to development assistance: why simple solutions don't work. *International journal* 70 (1), 110-118.

Augusta, V. H.-P. A. (1927) *The social philosophy of William Morris.* Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

Avril, P. (2001) *Haïti, 1995-2000 : le livre noir de l'insécurité.* Haïti: P. Avril.

Babcock, M. K. (1988) Embarrassment: a window on the self. *Journal for the theory of social behavior* 18, 459-483.

Bakhtin, M. M. (1973) *Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics.* Ann Arbor, Mich.: Ardis.

Bale, J. M. (2007) Political paranoia v. political realism: on distinguishing between bogus conspiracy theories and genuine conspiratorial politics. *Patterns of prejudice* 41, 45-60.

Barnett, M. (2005) Humanitarianism transformed. *Perspectives on politics* 3 (4), 723-740.

Barnett, M. and Thomas, W. G. (2011) *Humanitarianism contested: where angels fear to thread.* Routledge.

Barnett, M. F., Martha (2004) *Rules for the world: international organizations in global politics.* Cornell University Press.

Barnett, M. N. (2011) *The empire of humanity a history of humanitarianism.* Cornell University Press.

Barnett, M. N. and Weiss, T. G. (2008) *Humanitarianism in question : politics, power, ethics.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Barnett, M. N. and Weiss, T. G. (2011) *Humanitarianism contested : where angels fear to tread.* Routledge global institutions. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, England ; New York: Routledge.

Barrett, L. F. e. a. (2007) The experience of emotion. *Annual review of psychology* 58, 373-403.

Barthélemy, G. r. (1989) *Le pays en dehors : essai sur l'Univers rural haïtien.* 2. edition*.* Port-au-Prince, Haïti: Editions Henri Deschamps : CIDIHCA.

Bastien, R. (1966) *Vodoun and politics in Haiti.* Washnington, D.C: Institute for Cross-Cultural Research.

Beckett, G. (2017) A Dog's life: suffering humanitarianism in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. *American Anthropologist* 119 (1), 35-45.

Beekman et al. (2013) Corruption and economic activity: micro level evidence from rural Liberia. *European journal of political economy* 30, 70-79.

Behar, E. e. a. (2005) Thought and imaginal activity during worry and trauma recall. *Behavior therapy* 36, 157-168.

Bell, M. (2013) *Hard feelings: the Moral psychology of contempt.* Oxford University Press.

Benedek, C. and Rivier, L. (1989) Evidence for the presence of tetrodotoxin in a powder used in Haiti for zombification. *Toxicon* 27 (4), 473-480.

Bennett, C. and Foley, M. (2016) *Time to let go.* Oversees Development Institute.

Berger, P. L. and Luckmann, T. (1967) *The social construction of reality : a treatise in the sociology of knowledge.* 3d edition*.* Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books.

Beyme, K. (1996) *Transition to democracy in Eastern Europe.* Advances in political science. Palgrave Macmillan.

Biato, M. (2011) Brazil's mission in Haiti. In Thompson, H. (editor) *MINUSTAH and beyond.* United Nations University Press.

Bies, R. J. and Tripp, T. (1996) Beyond trust: "Getting even" and the need for revenge. In Kramer, T. and Tyler, B. (editors) Sage. 246-260.

Biquet, J.-M. (2013) Haiti: between emergency and reconstruction: an inadequate response. *Revue international de politique de développement* 4(3). *https://journals.openedition.org/poldev/1600* Accessed August 24, 2019

Bloch et al. (1988) *Land tenures issues in rural Haiti: review of the evidence.* University of Wisonsin-Madison.

Bodenhausen, G. e. a. (2012) Social categorization and the perception of social groups. In Fiske, S. T. and Macrae, C. N. (editors) *The SAGE handbook of social cognition.* Los Angeles, Calif.: SAGE. xvi, 575 p.

Boigier, M. and Batja, M. (2012) The construction of emotion in interactions, relationships, and cultures. *Emotion review* 4 (3), 221-229.

Borkovec, T. D. e. a. (1983) Preliminary exploration of worry: some characteristics and processes. *Behavior research and therapy* 21 (1), 9-11.

Borton, J. (2009) *Future of the humanitarian system: impacts of internal changes.* Feinstein International Center.

Boyatzis, R. (1998) *Transforming qualitative information: thematic analysis and code development.* Thousant Oaks: SAGE.

Boyce, J. K. (2000) Beyond good intentions: external assitance and peace building. In Forman, S. and Patrick, S. (editors) *Good intentions: pledges of aid for postconflict recovery.* Lynne Rienner. 367-382.

Braun, V. and Clarke, V. (2006) Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative research in psychology* 3 (2), 77-101.

Brooks, R. C. (1909) The nature of political corruption. *Political science quarterly* 24 (1).

Brown, S. (2005) Vers la consolidation de la paix. In Conor, Y. and Verna, G. (editors) *Faire la paix: concepts et pratiques de la consolidation de la paix.* Presses de l'Université de Laval. 414-441.

Bruner, J. S. (1973) *Beyond the information given; studies in the psychology of knowing.* 1st edition. New York,: Norton.

Bruner, J. S. (1990) *Acts of meaning.* The Jerusalem-Harvard lectures. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell, S. (1994) Linking relief and development: an introduction and overview. *Linding relief and development.* University of Sussess. Institute of Development Studies.

Buchanan-Smith, M. (2003) *How the Sphere Project came into being: A case study of policy-making in the humanitaian aid sector and the relative influence of research.* Overseas Development Institute.

Bugnion, F. (2000) The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: from the 1949 diplomactic conference to the dawn of the new millennium. *International affairs* 76 (1).

Burckhardt, J. (1979) *Reflections on History.* Liberty Fund.

Burgess, R. G. (1984) *In the field: and introduction to field research.* London: Unwin Hyman.

Burkitt, I. (2010) Dialogues with self and others: communication, miscommunication, and the dialogical unconscious. *Theory & psychology* 20 (3), 305-321.

Buss, A. H. (1980) *Self consciousness and social anxiety.* San Francisco: Freeman.

Butler, J. K. (1991) Toward understanding and measuring condi- tions of trust: Evolution of conditions of trust inventory. *Journal of management* 17, 643-661.

Butler, J. K. and Cantrell, R. S. (1984) A behavioral decision theory approach to modeling dyadic trust in superiors and subordinates. *Psychological reports* 55, 19-28.

Caple-James, E. (2010) *Democratic insecurities, trauma and intervention in Haiti.* Berkerley: University of California Press.

Carstensen, E. (2015) *Funding of local and national humanitarian actors.* http://www.local2global.info/wp-content/uploads/l2gp_local_funding_final_250515.pdf Accessed September 5, 2019.

Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1990) Origins and function of positive and negative affect: a control-process view. *Psychological review* 97, 19-35.

Castro-Klaren, S. (2008) Posting letters: writing in the Andes and the paradox of the colonial debate. In Moraña, M., Dussel, E., Jáuregui, C. A. (editor) *Coloniality at large: Latin America and the postcolonial debate.* Duke University Press.

Catholic Relief Services (2012) *Haiti earthquake: two years later.* Catholic Relief Services. http://crs.org/emergency/haiti/downloads/haiti-stewardship-report-2012.pdf. Accessed April 13, 2020.

Center for Disease Control and Prevention (2011) *Elimination of cholera transmission in Haiti and the Dominican Republic.* Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. http://www.cdc.gov/globalhealth/features/cholera.htm Accessed January 12, 2020.

Center for Economic and Policy Research (2012) *Evaluation of donor response to Haiti earthquake shows "Building Back Better" nothing but a slogan.* Center for Economic and Policy Research. http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/relief-and-reconstruction-watch/evaluation-of-donor-response-to-haiti-earthquake-shows-building-back-better-nothing-but-a-slogan Accessed August 15, 2019.

Center for Human Rights and Global Justice (2010) *Sak Vid Pa Kanpe: The Impact of US Food Aid on Human Rights in Haiti.* New York: Center for human rights and global justice.

Chabal, P. and Daloz, J. P. (1999) *Africa works: disorder as political instrument.* Oxford: James Currey.

Chai, C. and Chai, W. (1967) *Book of rites.* Vol. 1 New Hyde Park, England: University Books.

Chambre de commerce et d'industrie d'Haiti (2011) *La corruption un obstacle au développement et à démocratie.* Chambre de commerce et d'industrie d'Haiti.

Charmaz, K. and Bryant, A. (2007) *Handbook of grounded theory.* London: Sage.

Chatterjee, P. (2008) Haiti's forgotten emergency. *The Lancet* 372 (9639).

Chen, M. (2014) How humanitarian aid weakened post-earthquake Haiti. *The Nation*, Accessed 8/8/2016

Cheng, C. (2001) Assessing coping flexibility in real-life and laboratory settings: a multimethod approach. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 80, 814-833.

Christoplos, I. (2006) *Links between relief, rehabilitation and development in the Tsunami response: a synthesis of initial findings.* London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition.

Clement, C. (1997) Returning Aristide: the contradictions of US foreign policy in Haiti. *Race and class* 39, 21-36.

Clore, G. L. and Ortony, A. (1988) The semantic of the affective lexicon. In Hamilton, V. E. A. (editor) *Cognitive perspectives on emotion and, motivation.* Kluwer Academic.

Cohen, R. (2014) Lessons from Haiti for humanitarian assistance for Syria. *Nonprofit Quarterly*. Accessed April 4, 2014

Collinson, S. E., Samir (2012) *Humanitarian space: a review of trends and issues.* Overseas Development Institute.

Comhaire, J. (1955) The Haitian “Chef de section”. *American anthropologist* 55, 621-624.

Committee;, I.-A. S. (2011) *IASC operational guidance for Cluster lead agencies on working with national authorities.*

Comte, A. (2013) *Systeme de politique positive, ou traite de sociologue, instituang la religion de l'humanite.* Livre-Bnf, H. (editor),

Concannon, B. J. (2017) *Declaration of Brian Concannon Jr., Esq.*

Condé, M. (1998) Créolité without the creole language? In Bulutansky, K. M. and Sourieau, M. A. (editors) *Caribbean Creolization: reflections on the cultural dynamics of language, literature, and identity.* Gainsville: University Press of Florida.

Côte, S. e. a. (2010) The ability to regulate emotion is associated with greater well-being, income, and socioeconomic status. *Emotion review* 10, 923-933.

Cotterrel, R. (2011) Justice, dignity, torture, headscarves: can Durkheim's sociology clarify legal values? *Social an legal studies* 20 (1).

Coulmas, F. (1992) *Language and economy.* Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Coyne, J. C. (2013) *Doing bad by doing good: why humanitarian action fails.* Stanford University Press.

Crane, R. S. (1934) Suggestions toward a geneaology of the "Man of Feeling". *A journal of English literary history* 1 (3), 205-230.

Crocker, L. G. (1969) *The age of enlightenment.* London: Macmillan.

Cross, T. L. (1989) *Towards a culturally competent system of care: a monograph on effective sercies for minority children who are sevelrely emdotianallly disturbed.* Washington, D. C.: Georgetown University Child Development Center.

Danish International Development Agency (1996) *The joint evalutaion of emergency assistance to Rwanda: study III principal findings and recommendations.* Relief and rehabilitation network.

Danner, M. (2010) To heal Haiti look to history, not nature. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/opinion/22danner.html?_r=3&pagewanted=all&.

Davey, E. e. a. (2013) *A history of the humanitarian system: Western origins and foundations.* Overseas Development Institute.

Davis, K. (1997) *Explirng the intersection between cultural cometency and namaged behavioral health care poicy: implications for state and county mental health agencies.* Alexandria, VA: National Technical Assistance Center for State Mental Health Planning.

de Saint-Mery, M. (1958) *Description topographique, physique, civile, politique et historique de la partie française de l'ile de Saint-Domingue.* Paris.

de Sousa, R. (1987) *The rationality of emotions.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

de Souza, S. and Vega, M. C. (2004) La farsa del "desarrollo." Del colonialismo imperial al imperialismo sin colonias. *La cuestión social de la formación profesional del trabajo social en el contexto de las nuevas relaciones de poder y la diversidad Latino americana.* Buenos Aires. XVIII Seminario Latinoamericano de Escuelas de Trabajo Social.

de Vassière, P. (1909) *Saint-Domingue: la société et la vie créoles sous l'Ancien Régime 1629-1789.* Paris:

de Waal, A. (1997) *Famine crimes : politics and the disaster relief industry in Africa.* African issues. Oxford: J. Currey.

de Waal, A. (2010) The humanitarian's tragedy: inescapable and inescapable cruelties. *Disasters* 34 (2), 130-137.

Debien, G. (1973) Marronage in the French Caribbean. In Price, R. (editor) *Maroon societies: rebel slave communities in the Americas.* Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.

DeChaine, D. R. (2005) *Global humanitarianism : NGOs and the crafting of community.* Lexington Books.

Dejean, Y. (2006) *Yon lekòl tèt anba nan yon peyi tèt anba [An upside down school in an upside down country].* Port-au-Prince: FOKAL.

DeMars, W. (1996) Review: mercy without illusion: humanitarian action in conflict. *Mershon international studies review* 40 (1), 81-89.

Deng, F. (1984) *The Dinka of the Sudan.* Waveland Press Inc.

Denzin, N. K. (1989) The sociological interview. *The research act: a theoretical introduction to sociological method.* Prentice hall. 102-120.

Desmangles, L. (1989) *The faces of the Gods: Vodou and roman Catholicism in Haiti.* Chapel Hill: The University of North California Press.

deWaal, A. (2000) *Who fights? Who cares?: war and humanitarian action in Africa.* Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.

DeWind, J. and Kinley, D. (1986) *Aiding migration: the impact of international development assitance in Haiti.* Immigration Research Program. New York: Columbia University.

Diederich, B. and Burt, A. (1972) *Papa Doc : Haiti and its dictators.* Harmondsworth, Penguin.

DiFonzo, N. (2008) *The watercooler effect: a psychologist explores the extraordinary power of rumors.* Penguin.

Dijkzeul, D. (2010) Doing good, but looking bad? Local perceptions of two humanitarian organizations in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. *Disasters* 34 (4), 1139-1170.

Donais, T. (2005) Back to square one: the politics of police reform in Haiti. *Civil Wars* 7 (3), 270-87.

Donini, A. (2011) Between a rock and a hard place: integration or independence of humanitarian action. *International Review of the Red Cross* 93 (881), 141-157.

Douglas, K. M., and Sutton, R. M. (2011) Does it take one to know one? Endorsement of conspiracy theories is influenced by personal willingness to conspire. *British journal of social psychology* 50, 193-364.

Douglass, F. (1893) *Lecture on Haiti*. Washington, D.C.

Dubois, L. (2001) Vodou and history. *Comparative studies in society and history* 43 (1), 92-100.

Dubois, L. (2004) *Avengers of the New World: The story of the Haitian revolution.* Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Dubois, L. (2012) *Haiti: the aftershocks of history.* 1st edition. New York: Henry Holt and Co.

Duffield, M. R. (2014) *Global governance and the new wars : the merging of development and security.* 2nd edition. Zed Books.

Dupuis, A. (2006) *The prophet and Power: Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the international community, and Haiti.* Rowman & Littlefield Pushisers.

Dupuy, A. (2010) Commentary beyond the earthquake: a wake-up call for Haiti. *Latin American perspectives* 37 (3), 195-204.

Durkheim, E. (1898 [1973]) *Individualism and the intelectuals.* Bellah, R. (editor), Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Durkheim, E. (1933/1964) *The division of labor in society.* Free Press.

Eckkrammer, E. M. (2003) On the perception of "Creole" language and identity in the Netherlands Antilles. In Collier, G. and U., F. (editors) *A pepper-pot of cultures. Aspects of Creolization in the Caribbean.* Rodopi. 85-108.

Eisenberg, N. M., Paul H. (1989) *The roots of prosocial behavior in children.* Cambridge: Cambride University Press.

Elie, J. R. (2006) *Participation, décentralisation, collectivités territoriales en Haiti. La problématique.* Vol. PADCA. Port-au-Prince:

Elke, F. (2017) Cognition, cultural practices, and the working of political institutions: and adult developmental perspective on corruption in Russian history. *Behavioral development* 22 (2), 279-287.

Elke, F. and Weibler, J. (2014) Review and shortcoming of literature on corruption in organization in offering multi-faceted and integrative understanding of the phenomenon. *American psyschological association* 19 (3).

Emerson, R. M. (1962) Power-dependence relations. *American Sociological Review* 27, 31-41.

Erikson, E. (1963) *Childhood and society.* New York: W.W. Norton and Company Inc.

Esterson, A. (1972) *The leaves of spring: Schizophrenial, family and sacrifice.* Pelican.

European Commission (2007) *Communication from the commission to the European parliament and the council: towards a European consensus on humanitarian aid.* European Commission.

European Parliament. (2012) *Policy briefing: linking relief, rehabilitation and development.* Department, D.-G. F. E. P. P.

Evangelical Lutheran Church of America (2011) *Haiti earthquake update: one year later.* Evangelical Lutheran Church in America. *http://download.elca.org/ELCA%20Resource%20Repository/Haiti_OneYearUpdate.pdf.*

Fabini D. O. et al. (2014) The 2010 cholera outbreak in Haiti: how science solved a controversy. *PloS Pathog* 10 (4).

Fanon, F. (2012) Black skin, white masks. In Longhofer, J. L. and Winchester, D. (editors) *Social theory re-wired: new connections to classical and contemporary perspectives.* 2nd edition edition. Routledge.

Farmer, P. (2004) An anthropology of structural violence. *Current anthropology* 45 (3).

Farmer, P. (2012) *Haiti after the earthquake.* New York: Public Affairs.

Fatton, R. J. (2006) The saturnalia of emancipation and the vicissitudes of predatory rule. *Third World Quaterly* 27 (1).

Federico, e. a. (2018) The role of system identity threat in conspiracy theory endorsement. *European journal of social psychology*.

Feldman, A. (1995) Ethnographic states of emergency. In Robben, A. and Nordstrom, C. (editors) *Fieldwork under fire.* University of California Press. 224-253.

Felix, E. J. (2009) *Understanding Haitian Voodoo.* Xulon.

Ferguson, J. (1987) *Papa Doc, Baby Doc: Haiti and the Duvaliers.* Oxford: Basis Blackwell.

Fick, C. (2000) Emancipation in Haiti: from plantation labour to peasant proprietorship. *Slavery and abolition* 21 (2), 11-73.

Fick, C. E. (1990) *The making of Haiti: the Saint-Domingue revolution from below.* Tenessee University Press.

Fiering, N. (1976) Irresistible compassion: an aspect of eighteenth century sympathie and humanitarianism. *Journal of the history of ideas* 37 (2), 195-218.

Fife, W. (2005) *Doing fieldwork: ethnographic methods for research in developing countries and beyond.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Fishel, J. (1998) Old principles, new realities: measuring army effectiveness in Operation Uphold Democracy. In Kretchik, W. E. A. (editor) *Invasion, intervention, 'intervasion: a concise history of the US army in Operation Uphold Democracy.* US Army Command and General Staff College Press.

Fishstein, P. (2010) *Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan's Balkh Province.* Medford: Tuft University.

Fiske, S. T. (1993) Controling other people: the impact of power on stereotyping. *American psychologist* 48, 621-628.

Fiske, S. T. and Berdahl, J. L. (2007) Social power. In Kruglanski, A. and Higgins, E. T. (editors) *Social psychology: a handbook of basic principles.* Philadelphia: Philadelphia: Psychology Press.

Fiske, S. T. and Neuberg, S. L. (1990) A continuum of impression formation, from category-based to individuating processes: influences of information and motivation on attention and interpretation In Zanna, M. P. (editor) *Advances in experimental social psychology.* Vol. 23. New York: Random House. 1-73.

Floersh, J. e. a. (2010) Integrating thematic, grounded theory and narrative analysis: a case study of adolescent psychotropic treatment. *Qualitative social work* 9 (3), 407-425.

Food and Agriclture Organization (1997) *Définir une politique agro-foncière pour Haiti: éléments d'orientation.* Food and Agriculture Organization/Intitut National de la Reforme Agraire.

Foucault, M. (1977) *Discipline and punish : the birth of the prison.* Allen Lane.

Foucault, M. (1978) *The history of sexuality.* Translated Hurley, R. Pantheon.

François, P.-L. (2011) Earthquakes, non-govermental organizations, and governance in Haiti. *Journal of black studies* 42 (2), 186-202.

Friedman, M. (1985) Toward a reconceptualization of guilt. *Contemporary psychoanalysis* 21, 501-547.

Gabiam, N. (2012) When "Humanitarianism" becomes "Development": the politics of international aid in Syria's Palestinian refugee camps. *American anthropologist* 114 (1), 95-107.

Gaillard, J. K. (1990) *L' Experience Haitienne de la dette extérieure.* Port-au-Prince: Maison Henri Deschamps.

Galaga, e. a. (2014) Assessing preference regarding centralized and decentralized water infrastructure in post-eartquake Léogane, Haiti. *Earth perspectives* 1 (5), 2-13.

Galinsky, e. a. (2006) Power and perspectives not taken. *Psychological science* 17, 1068-1074.

Galtung, J. (1969) Violence, peace and peace research. *Journal of peace research* 6 (3), 167-191.

Gelting, R. e. a. (2013) *The american journal of tropical medicine and hygiene* 89 (4), 665-670.

Gerstbauer, L. C. (2005) The new conflict managers: peacebuilding NGOs and state agendas. In Krahmann, E. (editor) *New threats and new actors in international security.* New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 23-44.

Giddens, A. (1971) Durdkheim's political sociology. *The sociological review* 19 (4), 477-519.

Gilbert, A. J. and Tang, T. L. (1998) An examination of organizational trust antecedents. *Public personnel management* 27, 321-338.

Girard, P. R. (2010) *Haiti: the tumultuous history: from pearl of the caribbean to broken nation.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Glaser, B. G. (1992) *Basics of grounded theory analysis.* Mill Valley, CA: Sociology Press.

Glaser, B. G. and Strauss, A. L. (1967) *The discovery of grounded theory; strategies for qualitative research.* Aldine.

Glissant, E. (1981) *Le discours antillais.* Paris: Gallimard.

Global Humanitarian Assistance (2007) *Summary report of the global humanitarian platform.* Global humanitarian platform:

Global Humanitarian Assistance (2015) *Global Humantiarian Assistance.* Global humanitarian platform:

Gonzales, J. (2019) *A new history of post 'Revolutionary Haiti, and the society that emerged in the aftermath of the world's most successful slave revolution.* Yale University Press.

Goodhand, J. (2006) *Aiding peace? : the role of NGOs in armed conflict.* A project of the International Peace Academy. Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Goodwin, S. A. e. a. (2000) Power can bias impression processes: stereotyping subordinates by default and by design. *Group processes and intergroup relations* 3 (2000), 227-256.

Gordon, S. (2011) *Winning hearts and minds? Examining the relationship between aid and secruity in Afghtanistan's Helmand province.* Sommerville, MA: Feinstein International Center.

Green, D. (2003) *Silent revolution: the rise and decline of market economics in latin America.* 2 edition*.* Latin American Bureau.

Green, J. W. (1982) *Clutural awarness in the human services.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Gros, J.-G. (2010) Indigestible recipe rice, chicken wings, and international financial institutions: or hunger politics in Haiti. *Journal of black studies* 40 (5), 974-986.

Gros, J.-G. (2011) *State failure, underdevelopment and foreign intervention in Haiti.* Routledge.

Grosfoguel, R. (2007) The epistemic decolonial turn: beyond political-economy paradigms. *Cultural studies* 21 (2-3).

Gross, J. J. (1998) The emerging field of emotion regulation: an integrative review. *Review of general psychology* 2 (271).

Gross, J. J. and John, O. P. (2003) Individual differences in two emotion regulation processes: implication for affect, relationships, and well being. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 85, 248-362.

Groupe d'Appui aux Rapatriés et Réfugiés (2011) Haitian social organizations demand the dissolution of reconstruction commission. http://www.garr-haiti.org/spip.php?article739 Accessed October 10, 2014

Grunewald, F. (2010) *Inter-agency real-time evaluation in Haiti: 3 months after the earthquake.* Groupe Urgence Rehabilitation Development.

Grzesiak-Feldman, M. (2013) The effect of high-anxiety situations on conspiracy thinking. *Current psychology* 32, 100-118.

Guehenno, J.-M. (2013) November 6, 2013.

Gugerty, M. K., and Kremer, M. (2000) *Outside funding of community organizations: benefiting or displacing the poor?* Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research.

Guinote, A. (2008) Power and affordances: when the situation has more power over powerful than powerless individuals. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 95, 237-252.

Guitar, L. (2006) Ocama-Daca taino (hear me, I am taino): taino survival on Hipaniola, focusing on the Dominican Republic. In Lang, P. (editor) *Indigenous resurgence in the contemporary Caribean.* New York.

Gupta, A. (2012) *Red tape bureaucracy, structural violence, and poverty in India.* (John Hope Franklin Center book) Durham, [N.C.] ; London: Duke University Press. https://www.dawsonera.com/guard/protected/dawson.jsp?name=https://lse.ac.uk/idp&dest=http://www.dawsonera.com/depp/reader/protected/external/AbstractView/S9780822394709

Haiti human rights investigation: Nov.11-24, 2004. (2004). University of Miami.

Haiti, R. o. (2013) *National plan for the elimination of cholera in Haiti, 2013–2022.* Ministry of public health and population. http://new.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_download&gid=20326&Itemid=270&lang=eng/ Accessed February 19, 2020.

Hall, S. (1997) When was "the postcolonial"? Thinking at the limit. In Chambers, I. and Curti, L. (editors) *The postcolonial question: common skies, divided horizons.* New York: Routledge.

Haller, D. and Shore, C. (2005) *Corruption: anthropological perspectives.* Anthropology, culture and society. London: Pluto Press.

Hamlin K., B., S. (2006) *Haiti conflict assessment.* USAID.

Hammersley, M. and Atkinson, P. (1983) *Ethnography, principles in practice.* London ; New York: Tavistock.

Harré, R. (1986) The Social Construction Viewpoint. *The Social Construction of Emotions.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.

Harré, R. (1989) *The social construction of emotions.* New York, NY: Blackwell.

Hebblethwaite, B. (2012) French and underdevelopment, Haitian Creole and development: Educational language policy problems and solutions in Haiti. *Journal of Pidgin and Creole languages* 27 (255-302).

Hebblethwaite, B. (2015) The scapegoating of Haitian Vodou religion: David Brooks's (2010) Claim That "Voodoo" Is a "Progress-Resistant" cultural Influence. *Journal of black studies* 46 (1).

Hierbert, P. G. (2008) *Transforming worldviews: an anthropological understanding of how people change.* Baker Academic.

Hilhorst, D. and Matthis, V. L. (2005) Grounding local peace organisations: a case study of southern Sudan. *Journal of modern african studies* 43 (4), 537-563.

Hochschild, A. (2006) *Bury the Chains.* Vol. Reprint Edition. Mariner Books.

Hofstadter, R. (1966) The paranoid style in American politics. In Hofstadter, R. (editor) *The paranoid style in American politics and other essays.* New York: Knopf. 3-40.

Howard, S. L. (1972) *Prisoners of war in international armed conflict.* International law studies. Newport: Naval War College.

Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (2010) *Camp committee in Haiti: un-accountability mechanism?* Humanitarian Accountability Project.

Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (2015) *Humanitarian Accountability Report.*

Hurston, Z. N. (1981) *Tell my Horse.* Trutle Island: Berkeley.

Imhoff, R. and Bruder, M. (2014) Speaking (un)-truth to power: conspiracy mentality as a generalized political attitude. *European journal of personality* 28, 25-43.

Imogen, W. C., Yves Gerald (2011) Ann Kite Yo Pale: let them speak: best practice and lessons learned in communication with disaster affected communities: Haiti 2010. *2011.* http://www.internews.org/research-publications/ann-kite-yo-pale-let-them-speak

Inesi, E. G. e. a. (2012) How power corrupts relationships: cynical attributions for others'generous acts. *Journal of experiemental social psychology* 48 (4), 795-803.

Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (2010) *Interim Haiti recovery commission report.* http://en.cirh.ht/mission-statement.html Accessed February 12, 2012.

International Committee of the Red Cross (1994) *Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and red Cresceent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief.* London: Overseas Development Institute.

International Crisis Group (2009) *Haiti 2009: stability at risk.* International Crisis Group.

Jackson, J. E. (1990) *'I am a fieldnote': fieldnotes as a symbol of professional identity.* Fieldnotes: the makings of anthropology. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Jackson, R. O. (2011) *Geographies of the Haitian diaspora.* Routlege.

Jaggar, A. M. (1989) Love and knowledge: emotion in feminist epistemology. *Inquiry* 32 (2), 151-176.

Jaggar, A. M. (2015) *Just methods: an interdisciplinary feminist reader.* 2 edition*.* Routledge.

Jahre, M. M.-J., Leif (2010) Coordination in humanitarian logistics through cluster. *International journal of physical distribution & logistics management*.

James, C. L. R. (1938) *The black Jacobins.* New York,: The Dial press.

Jamieson, T. (1987) The Demise of Tug Wajele. *Refugees* 40.

Janssens, M. (2011) *MSF and development: the end of a taboo?* http://dl.msf.fr/borderline-en-1 Accessed 3 May 2019.

Jenkins, S. (1994) Need for power and women's careers over 14 years: structural power, job satisfaction and motive change. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 66 (1), 155-65.

Joachim, B. (1999) Colonisations: les racines du sous-developement en Haiti. In Arthur, C. and Dash, J. M. (editors) *A Haiti anthology: Libete.* Markus Wiener Publishers.

Joas, H. (2011) *The sacredness of the person : a new genealogy of human rights.*

Jolley, D. e. a. (2018) Blaming a few bad apples to save a threatened barres: the system-justifying function of conspiracy theories. *Political psychology* 39, 465-478.

Jones, B. S., Abby (2003) *External review of the inter-agency standing committe.* Center for International Cooperation.

Jones et al. (2014) Governance struggles and policy processes in disaster risk reduction: A case study from Nepal. *Geoforum* 57, 78-90.

Jones, G. R. and George, J. M. (1998) The experience and evolution of trust: Implications for cooperation and teamwork. *Academy of management review* 23 (3), 531-546.

Jones, K. (2019) Trust, distrust, and affective looping. *Philosophical studies* 176 (4), 955-968.

Journalist (2013) *Housing reconstruction.* November 12, 2013.

Karim, F. (2006) *Humanitarian action in the new secrutiy envrironment: policy and operational implications in Afghanistan.* Overseas Development Institute.

Karunakara, U. (2010) Haiti: Where aid failed. *The Guardian*. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/dec/28/haiti-cholera-earthquake-aid-agencies-failure Accessed September 8, 2015

Katz, M. J. (2013) *The big truck that went by: how the world came to save Haiti and left behind a disaster.* New York: St-Martin Press.

Kawamichi et al. (2015) Perceiving active listening activates the reward systme and imporves the impression of relevant experiences. *Social neuroscience* 10 (1), 16-26.

Keegan, F. W. and Machachlan, M. D. (1989) The evolution of avunculocal Chiefdoms: a reconstruction of Taino Kinship and politics. *American anthropologist* 91 (3), 613-630.

Keehnen, F. W. M. (2012) *Trinkets (f)or Treasure?* Leiden University.

Keltner, D. and Lerner, S. J. (2010) Emotion: Part II. The social beign. *Handbook of social psychology.* 5 edition. Wiley.

Keltner et al. (2003) Power, approach, and inhibition. *Psychological review* 110, 265-284.

Kemper, T. D. (1978) *A social interactional theory of emotions.* New York: Wiley.

Kenkel, K. M. (2013) *South America and peace operations: coming of age.* Routledge.

Ketelaar, T. and Au, W. T. (2003) The effects of feelings of guilt on the behavior of uncooperative individuals in repeated social bargaining games: an affect-as-information interpretation of the role of emotion in social interaction. *Cognition & emotion* 17, 429-453.

Kibreab, G. (2004) Pulling the wool over the eyes of the strangers: refugee deceit and trickery in institutionalized settings. *Journal of refugee studies* 17 (1), 1-26.

Kivland, C. (2012) Unmaking the State in 'Occupied' Haiti. *Political and legal anthropology review* 35 (2), 248-70.

Klasing, A. M. M., Scott P. (2011) Measuring the way forward in Haiti: grounding disaster relief in the legal framework of human rights. *Health and human rights: and international journal* 13 (1).

Kohn, M. and Reddy, K. (2017) *Colonialism*.

Kovats-Bernat, J. C. (2006) Factional terror, paramilitarism and civil war in Haiti: the fiew from Port-au-Prince, 1994-2004. *Anthropologica* 48 (1), 117-139.

Kristjánsson, K. (2010) *The self and its emotions.* Cambridge University Press.

Krueger et al. (2016) *IASC Transformative agenda — A review of reviews and their follow-up.* Inspire consortium. 'Kuja Kuja. https://www.kujakuja.org/

Kushner, J. (2014) Four years after the haiti earthquake, what have billions in US aid bought? *GlobalPost*,

La corruption: un obstacle au developpement et a la democratie. (2004) D'haiti, C. D. C. E. D. I.

Là-bas (2011).

Labat, J. B. (2012) *Nouveau voyage aux isles de l'Amérique.* La Haye: Nabu Press.

Laclau, E. (1996) *Emancipation(s).* Verso.

Laguerre, M. (1973) The place of voodoo in the soical structure of Haiti. *Caribbean Quarterly* 19 (3), 36-50.

Laguerre, M. S. (1989) *Voodoo and politics in Haiti.* London: Macmillan Press.

Landmann, H. H., Ursula (2017) What elicits third-party anger? The effect of moral violation and others'outcome on anger and compassion. *Cognition & emotion* 31 (6), 1097-1111.

Latortue, G. (1993) Haiti, Nouvel Etat ACP. *Caribbean and the European Community.* Université Antilles.

Lemay-Hébert, N. (2014) Resistance in the time of cholera: the limits of stabilization through securization in Haiti. *International peacekeeping* 21 (2), 198-213.

Lennox, M. (1993) Refugees, racism, and reparations: a critique of the United States' Haitian immigration policy. *Stanford law review* 45 (3), 687-724.

Lester, A. and Dussart, F. (2014) *Colonization and the origins of humanitarian governance: protecting Aborigines across the nineteenth-century British Empire.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Levine, S. B., Sarah; and Boyer, Beatrice (2012) *Avoiding reality: land, institutions and humanitarian action in post-earthquake Haiti.* Overseas Development Institute.

Lewicki, R. J. and Bunker, B. B. (1995) Trust in relationships: A model of development and decline. In Rubin, B. B. B. J. Z. (editor) *Conflict, cooperation, and justice: essays inspired by the work of Morton Deutsch.* Jossey-Bass.

Lewis, H. B. (1971) *Shame and guilt in neurosis.* New York: Internationa Universities Press.

Lewis, J. and Kelman, I. (2010) Places, people and perpetuity: community capacities in ecologies of catastrophe. *ACME: an international E-journal for critical geographies* 9 (2).

Lewis, M. (2008) The emergence of human emotions. In Lewis, M., Haviland-Jones, J. (editor) *Handbook of emotions.* Guilford. 304-319.

Leyburn, J. G. (1941) *The Haitian people.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Leys, R. (2007) *From guilt to shame: Auschwitz and after.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Li, T. M. (2007) *The will to improve: governmentality, development, and the practice of politics.* Duke University Press.

Lieberman et al. (2011) Subjective responses to emotional stimulu during labelling, reappraisal, and distraction. *Emotion* 11, 468-480.

Littlewood, R. D., Chavannes (1997) Clinical findings in three cases of zombification. *The Lancet* 350.

Longhurst, R. (1994) Conceptual frameworks for linding relief and development. *IDS bulletin* 25 (4), 17-23.

Lukes, S. (1974) *Power: a radical view.* Studies in sociology. London: Macmillan.

Lukes, S. (2005) *Power: a radical view.* 2nd ed edition. Palgrave Macmillan.

Lundahl, M. (1979) *Peasants and poverty: a study of Haiti.* New York: St. Martin's Press.

Lundahl, M. (1992) *Politics or markets? Essays on Haitian underdevelopment.* London: Routledge.

Lutz, C. A. (1988) *Unnatural emotions: everyday sentiments on a Micronesian atoll and their challenge to Western theory.* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Lynd, H. M. (2013) *On shame and the search for identity.* Routledge.

Magee, J. C. and Smith, P. K. (2013) The social distance theory of power. *Personality and soical psychology review* 17, 158-186.

Makini, B. (2016) Cholera blamed on U.N. peacekeepers surges in Haiti as funding vanishes. *Reuters*. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-haiti-cholera/cholera-blamed-on-u-n-peacekeepers-surges-in-haiti-as-funding-vanishes-idUSKCN11F2OU Accessed December 16, 2016

Maldonado-Torres (2007) On the coloniality of being. *Cultural studies* 21 (2-3), 240-270.

Malinowski, B. (1961) *Argonauts of the Western Pacific.* New York: Dutton.

Mamdani, M. (1996) *Citizen and subject: contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism.* Princeton: Princeton Unitersity Press.

Mandelbaum, M. (2016) *Mission Failure: America and the world in the post-cold war era.* Oxford University Press.

Manning, J. and Kunkel, A. (2014) *Interpersonal relationships: qualitative methods, studies, and analysis.* Sage.

Martin, M. (2013) Introduction. In Martin Moruno, D. (editor) *On resentment: past and present.* Cambridge: Cambridge scholars publishing.

Mauss, M. (1954) *The gift : the form and reason for exchange in archaic societies.* Routledge.

Maxwell, S. (1994) *Linding relief and development: an Ethiopian case study.* Institute of development studies.

Mayer et al. (1995) An integrative model of organizational trust. *Academy of management review* 20, 709-734.

McCauley, C. and Jacques, S. (1979) The popularity of conspiracy theories of presidential assassination: a Bayesian analysis. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 37, 637-644.

McGuigan, C. (2006) *Agricultural liberalisation in Haiti.* Christian Aid.

McLaughlin, K. A. e. a. (2007) The effects of worry and rumination on affect states and cognitive activity. *Behavior therapy* 38 (1), 23-28.

McPhatter, A. R. (1997) Cultural competence in child welfare: What is it? How do we achieve it? What happens without it? *Child welfare* 156(1).

Mellen, J. (2012) *Our man in Haiti: George de Mohrenschildt and the CIA in the nightmare repuplic.* Trine Day.

Mendelson-Forman, J. (2006) Secruity sector reform in Haiti. *International Peacekeeping* 13 (1).

Mennin et al. (2002) Appling an emotion regulation framework to integrative approaches to generalized anxiety disorder. *Clinical psychology: science and practice* 9, 85-90.

Mercer, J. e. a. (2012) Ecosystem-based adaptation to climate change in Caribbean small island developing states: integrating local and external knowledge. *Sustainability* 4 (8), 1908-1932.

Merlin (2010) *Is Haiti's health system any better?* http://www.who.int/workforcealliance/knowledge/merlinhaiti_2011report.pdf Accessed August 16, 2019.

Metcalfe-Hough, V. P., L. (2018a) *Grand bargain annual independent report 2018.* Humanitarian Policy Group. https://www.agendaforhumanity.org/sites/default/files/resources/2018/Jun/Grand%20Bargain%20annual%20independent%20report%202018_full.pdf Accessed March 18, 2020.

Metcalfe-Hough, V. P. L. (2018b) *Grand Bargain annual independent report 2018.* Overseas Development Institute.

Methodists, U. (2011) *Haiti earthquake recovery: one year after.* United Methodist. *http://* www.umc.org/news'and'media/haiti'earthquake-recovery'one-year'later. Accessed April 13, 2020.

Métraux, A. (1989) *Le Vaudou Haîtien.* Paris: Gallimard.

Michel, C. (2006) Vodou in Haiti: way of life and mode of survival. In Michel, C. B.-S., Patrick (editor) *Vodou in Haitian life and culture.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Michel, C. (2009) Vodou: theory and praxis in conversation; "Sak pase? N'a pe koute. dites donc, nous some à l'ecoute" [Tell us, we're all ears]. In *International Colloquium IX of the Congress of Santa Barbara.* Mirebalais, Haiti.

Mignolo, W. (2008) The geopolitics of knowledge and the colonial difference. In Moraña Et Al. (editor) *Coloniality at large: Latin America and the postcolonial debate.* Duke University Press. 225-258.

Miles, B. M., Huberman, M. A. and Saldana, J. (2013) *Qualitative data analysis.* 3rd edition*.* Sage.

Miller, J. P. (2019) Post-disaster recovery through the evolution of the lakou, a traditional settlement pattern. *International journal of disaster resilience in the built environment* 11 (1), 3-14.

Millet, K. (1978) *Les paysans haitiens et l'occupation américaine d'Haiti, 1915-1930.* La Salle.

Minear, L. (2002) *The humanitarian enterprise : dilemmas and discoveries.* Kumarian Press.

Minear, L. (2012) Humanitarian action and politicization: a review of experience since World War II. In Donini, A. (editor) *The golden fleece: manipulation and independence in humanitarian action.* Kumarian Press.

Minichiello et al. (1990) *In-depth interviewing: researching people.* Longman Cheshire Pty Limited.

Mintz, S. J. (1977) *Was the plantation slave a proletaria?* New York: Fernand Braudel Center for the study of economies, historical systems of civilization.

Mitchell, W. A. (1976) Rebuilding after disaster: the Gediz earthquake of 1970. *Geographical review* 66 (3), 296-313.

Moise, C. (1988) *Constitutions et luttes de pouvoir en Haitie, 1804-1987: de l'occupation étrangère à la dictature macoute (1915-1987).* Editions du

Moll et al. (2005) The neural basis of human moral cognition. *Nature review neurosci* 6, 799-809.

Montada, L. S., A. (1989) Justice and emotional reactions to the disadvantaged. *Social justice research* 3 (4).

Montgomery, P. B., P. H. (2007) Field notes and theoretical memos in grounded theory. *Western journal of nursing research* 29 (1), 65-79.

Moore, D. S. (2001) Postocolonialism. In Adam, M. K. (editor) *Handbook of postmodern Biblical interpretation.* St Louis, MO: Chalice. 182-188.

Moraña et al. (2008) *Coloniality at large: latin America and the postcolonial debate.* Duke University Press.

Mosel, I. and Levine, S. (2014) *Remaking the case for linking relief, rehabilitation and development.* Overseas Development Institute.

Mosse, D. (2011) Introduction: The anthropology of expertise and professionals in international development. In Mosse, D. (editor) *Adventures in aidland: The antrhorpology of professionals in international development.* Oxford: Berghahn.

Muller, F. and Steinke, A. (2018) Criminilising encounters: MINUSTAH as a laboratory for armed humanitarian pacification. *Global crime* 19 (3-4), 228-249.

Mulligan, M. and Nadarajah, Y. (2011) Rebuilding community in the wake of disaster: lessons from the recovery from the 2004 tsunami in Sri Lanka and India. *Community development journal*, 1-16.

Mumby, D. K. L. L. P. (1992) The politics of emotion: a feminist reading of bounded rationality. *The academy of management review* 17 (3), 465-486.

Murray, F. G. (1977) *The evolution of Haitian peasant land tenure: a case study in agrarian adaptation to population growth*. PhD. Columbia University.

Murray, F. G. (1980) Population pressure, land tenure, and Voodoo: The economics of haitian peasant ritual. In Ross, B. E. (editor) *Beyond the myths of culture: essays in cultural materialism.* Academic Press: Academic Press.

Murray, F. G. (1984) *Bon-Dieu and the rites of passage in rural Haiti: structural determinants of postcolonial theology and ritual.* McGill University.

Murray, G., Bannister, M. (2004) Peasants, agroforesters, and anthropologists: A 20-year venture in income-generating trees and hedgerows in Haiti. *Agroforestry systems* 61, 383-397.

Myrtho-Casséus, R. (2016) Decentralisation territoriale et espace public. *The journal of haitian studies* 22 (1), 177-187.

Nasios, A. (2003) Remarks by Andrew S. Natsios, Administrator, USAID. *InterAction forum.* Washington, D.C. USAIS. *http://transition.usaid.gov/press/speeches/2003/spo30521.html*.

Nesbitt, N. (2013) The end of cultural resistance: Haiti, Chibber, and the universalization of capital. In *FFLCH/USP.* Univesidad de Sao Paulo.

Neuberg, S. L. (1996) Social motives and expectancy-Tinged social interaction. In Sorrentino, R. M. and Higgins, E. T. (editors) *Handbook of motivation and cognition: the interpersonal context.* Vol. 3. The Guilford Press.

Newman et al. (2013) Worry and generalized anxiety disorder: a review and theoritical synthesis of evidence on nature, etiology, mechanisms, and treatment. *Annual review of clinical psychology* 9, 275-297.

Nicholls, D. (1974) A work of combat: mulatto historians and the Haitian past, 1847-1867. *Journal of interamerican studies and world affairs* 16 (1), 15-38.

Nichols, A. B. (1987) World's water markets beckon consultants and suppliers. *Journal of water pollution control federation* 59, 842–850.

Nussbaum, M. C. (2004) Emotions as judgements of value and importance. In Solomon, R. C. (editor) *Thinking about feeling: comtemporary philosophers on emotions.* Oxford University Press. 183-199.

Obregon, L. (2018) Empire, racial capitalism and international law: the case of manumitted Haiti and the recognition of the debt. *Leiden journal of international law* 31 (3), 597-615.

Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (2016) *Resolution 46/182, which created the humanitarian system, turns twenty-five.* https://www.unocha.org/fr/story/resolution-46182-which-created-humanitarian-system-turns-twenty-five

Office of the United Nation Special Envoy (2011) *International assistance to haiti: key facts as of December 2011.* Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti.

Oliver, J. E. and Wood, T. (2014) Medical conspiracy theories and health behaviors in the United States. *JAMA internal medicine*.

Operation Review Unit (1994) *Humanitarian aid to Somalia.* The Hague: Inspectie Ontwikkelingsamenwerking te Velde.

Otto, R. a. L. W. (2013) *Linking relief and development: more than old solutions for old problems?*

Oxfam (2010) *A once-in-a-century chance for change.* Oxfam International. http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp136-haiti-oncein-a-century-220310-summary.pdf Accessed September 18, 2019.

Oxfam (2013) *No accident: resilience and the inequality of risk.* Oxfam.

Oxfam (2016) *Righting the wrong: strengthening local humanitarian leadership to save lives and strengthen communities.* Oxfam International.

Panchang, D. (2011) MINUSTAH, keeping the peace, or conspiring against it? Accessed December 12, 2015

Parada, H., Carranza, M.E. (2010) *Research, development and the ethic of engagement* Toronto: Ryerson University.

Parkinson, B. (1996) Emotions are social. *British journal of psychology* 87, 663-683.

Parkinson, B. F., H. Agnieta; Manstead, S.R. Antony (2005) *Emotion in social relations: cultural, group, and interpersonal processes.* Psuchology Press.

Parmelee, M. (1915) The rise of modern humanitarianism. *American journal of sociology* 21 (3), 345-59.

Parrott, G. (2004) Emotion wrods, and the social nature of self-conscious emotions. *Psychological enquiry* 15 (2), 136-138.

Patton, M. (2002) *Qualitative research & evaluation methods.* SAGE.

Peacekeeping, U. N. (2020) *Our history.* [*https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-history*](https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-history) Accessed April 11, 2020.

Pekrun, R. (2006) The control-value theory of achievement emotions: assumptions, corollaries, and implications for educational research and practice. *Educational psychology review* 18, 315-341.

Pennebaker, J. W., et al. (2007) *Linguistic inquiry and word count: LIWC2007: Operator's manual. LIWC.net* Accessed March 13, 2020.

Pickard, M. (2007) Reflections on relationships: the nature of partnership according to five NGOs in southern Mexico. *Development in Practice* 17 (4-5).

Pinker, S. (2012) *The better angels of our nature : a history of violence and humanity.* London: Penguin.

Platteau, J.-P. F. G. (2003) *Discipling local leaders in community-based development*. Namur.

Pluchon, P. (1987) *Vaudou, sorciers, empoisonneurs: de Saint-Domingue à Haiti.* Paris.

Plummer, B. G. (1988) The metropolitan connection: foreign and semiforeign elites in Haiti, 1900-1915. *Latin American research review* 19.

Plummer, B. G. (1992) *Haiti and the United States: the psychological moment.* University of Georgia Press.

Plutchik, R. and Kellerman, H. (1980) *Theories of emotion.* Emotion, theory, research, and experience. New York: Academic Press.

Popkin, J. D. (2012) *A concise history of the Haitian revolution.* John Wiley & Sons.

Power, S. (2008) *Chasing the flame : Sergio Vieira de Mello and the fight to save the world.* New York: Penguin Press.

Price-Mars, J. (1953) *Ainsi parla L'Oncle: essais d'ethnographie (1935).* New York, N. Y.:

Price-Mars, J. (1956) *Formation ethique, folklore, et culture du peuple haitien.* Port-au-Prince: Imprimerie N. A. Theodore.

Prinz, J. J. (2004) *Gut reactions.* Oxford University Press.

Punch, K. F. (1998) *Introduction to social research: quantitative and qualitative research.* Thousands Oaks: Sage.

Quijano, A. (2000) The coloniality of power and social classification. *Journal of world-systems research* 6 (2).

Quijano, A. (2007) Coloniality and modernity/rationality. *Cultural studies* 21 (2-3), 168-179.

Quintiliani, P. (2013) *Meeting with DINEPA.* 11/15/2013.

Rama, M. (2006) Deja vu or something else? Lessons for future peacebuilding from Haiti. *Security and peace* (24), 1.

Ramachandran, V. W., Jule (2015) Haiti: where has all the money gone? *Journal of haitian studies* 21 (1), 26-65.

Ramalinghan et al. (2013) *Missed opportunities: the case for strengthening national and local partnership-based humanitarian responses.* London: Chirstian Aid, CAFOD, Oxfam GB, TearFund and Action Aid.

Ranulf, S. (1938) *Moral indignation and middle-class psychology: A sociological study.* Copenhagen: Levin Munksgaard.

Rao, V., and Ibanex, A. M. (2001) *The impact of social funds in Jamaica: a mixed-method analysis of participation, targeting and collective action in community driven developmment.* The Word Bank.

Rapport, N. (1991) Writing fieldnotes: the conventionalities of note taking and taking note in the field. *Anthropology today* 7 (1), 10-13.

Rawls, J. (1971) *A theory of justice.* Boston: Harvard University Press.

Redfield, P. (2012) The unbearable lightness of ex-pats: Double Binds of Humanitarin Mobility. *Cultural anthropology* 27 (2), 358-382.

Redfield, P. and Bornstein, E. (2010) An introduction to the anthropology of humanitarianism. In Bornstein, E. and Redfield, P. (editors) *Humanitarianism between ethics and politics.* SAR Press. 3-30.

Reimann, K. D. (2005) Up to no good? Recent critics and critiques of NGOs. In Oliver, R. P. and Carey, H. F. (editors) *Subcontracting peace: the challenges of NGOs peacebuilding.* Ashgate publishing limited. 37-54.

Renda, M. A. (2001) *Taking Haiti: military occupation and the culture of U.S. imperialism, 1915-1940.* Gender and American Culture. University of North Carolina Press.

Richardson, L. (1997) *Kenbe Peyi a Aou Kontwol, Demokrasi nan Grangou-Men Politik USAID an Ayiti [Keep the country under control, starving democracy.* Boston: Grassroots International.

Richmond, O. P. (2001) *'Post Westphalian' peace building: the role of NGOs.* University of St. Andrews.

Riessman, C. K. (1993) *Narrative analysis.* Qualitative research methods. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Robinson, S. L. (1996) Trust and breach of the psychological contract. *Administrative science quarterly* 41, 574-599.

Rogers, C. (1959) *A theory of therapy, personality and interpersonal relationships as developed int the client-centered framework.* New York: McGraw Hill.

Roisin, S. (2009) Playing with principles in an era of securitized aid: negotiation humanitarian space in post-9/11 Afghanistan. *Progress in development studies* 9 (1), 15-36.

Ropers, N. (2001) Peacebuilding: a field guide. In Reychler, L. and Paffenholz, T. (editors) Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers : In association with the Field Diplomacy Initiative. xiv, 573 p.

Rousseau et al. (1998) Not so different after all: A cross-discipline view of trust. *Academy of management review* 23, 393-404.

Rowan, J. (1981) "The leaves of spring" by Aaron Esterson: an appreciation. In Reason, P. and Rowan, J. (editors) *Human inquiry: a sourcebook of new paradigm inquiry.* Wiley.

Russel, J. A. (1991) In defense of a prototype approach to emotion concepts. *Journal of personality and social psychology* 60.

Russell, B. (1938) *Power: a new social analysis.* 1st edition. Vol. 89. Routledge classics.

Sager, R. (2012) Transcendence through aesthetic experience: divining a common wellspring under conflicting Caribbean and African American religious value systems. *Black Music Research Journal* 12 (1), 22-67.

Said, E. W. (1995) *Orientalism : western conceptions of the Orient.* Penguin history. London ; New York: Penguin.

Saldana, J. (2009) *The coding manual for qualitative researchers.* SAGE Publication Ltd.

Salvado, r., R.; Folger, R.G. (2009) Business ethics and the brain. *Business ethic quarterly*.

Salvine, A. (1911) *Saint-Domingue à la veille de la révolution.* Paris:

Satterthwaite, M. L. (2012) Indicators in crisis: rights-based humanitarian indicators in post-earthquake Haiti. *International law and politics* 43.

Schalkwijk et al. (2016) Measuring shame regulations: validation of the compass of shame scale
. *Social behavior and personality* 44 (11), 1775-1791.

Scheff, T. J. (2003) Shame in self and society. *Symbolic interaction* 26 (2), 239-262.

Scheiber, R. S. (2001) The “how to” of grounded theory: avoiding the pitfalls. In Schreiber, R. S. N. S., P. (editor) *Using grounded theory in nursing.* New York: Springer.

Scheler, M. (1994) *Ressentiment.* New edition. Marquette studies in philosophy. Milwaukee, Wis.: Marquette University Press.

Scherer, K. R. (1984) On the nature and function of emotion: a component process approach. In Scherer, K. R. and Ekman, P. (editors) *Approaches to emotion.* Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Scherer, K. R. (1986) *Expereincing Emortions.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Schininà, G., Hosn, M.A., Ataya, A., Dieuveut, K. and Salem, M.A. (2010) Psychosocial response to the haiti earthquake: the experiences of international organization for migration. *Intervention* 8, 158-164.

Schloms, M. (2003) Humanitarian NGOs in peace processes. In Carey, H. F. and Richamond, O. P. (editors) *Mitigating conflict: the Role of NGOs.* London: Frank Cass.

Schmidt, H. (1971) *The United States occupation of Haiti 1915-1934.* Rutgers University Press.

Schuller, M. (2006) *Break the chains of Haiti's debt.* Jubilee USA Network. Accessed 11/17/2014.

Schuller, M. (2007a) Gluing globalization: NGOs as intermediaries in Haiti. *Political and legal anthropology review* 32 (1), 84-104.

Schuller, M. (2007b) Haiti's 200- Year ménage à trois: globalization, the state, and civil society. *Carribean studies* 35 (1), 141-179.

Schuller, M. (2012) *Killing with kindness: Haiti, international aid, and NGOs.* Rutgers University Press.

Schuller, M. (2016) *Humanitarian aftershocks in Haiti.* Rutgers University Press.

Scott, J. C. (1990) *Domination and the arts of resistance: hidden transcripts.* Yale University Press.

Scott, J. C. (2008) *Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of peasant resistance.* Yale University Press.

Seligman, A. B. (1997) *The problem of trust.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Serra, N., Shari Spiegel, and Joseph E. Stiglitz (2008) Introduction: from the Washington Consensus towards a new global governance. In Serra Narcis, S. E. J. (editor) *The Washington Consensus reconsidered: towards a new global governance.* Oxford University Press.

Sharp, J. (2009) Geography and gender: what belongs to feminist geography? Emotion, power and change. *Progress in human geography* 33 (1), 74-80.

Shaver et al. (2001) Emotional knowledge: further exploration of a prototype approach. In Parrott, G. (editor) *Emotions in social psychology: essential readings.* Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press. 26-56.

Sheikh, S. and Janoff-Bullman, R. (2010) The "should" and 'should nots" of moral emotions: a self-regulatory perspective on shame and guilt. *Personality and social psychology bulletin* 36, 231-224.

Sheller, M. (2004) You signed my name, but not my feet: paradoxes of peasant resistance and state control in post-revolutionary Haiti. *Journal of Haitian Studies* 10, 70-86.

Shibutani, T. (1966) *Improvised news: a sociological study of rumor.* Irvington publications.

Shockley-Zalabak P. et al. (1999) *Measuring organizational trust: trust and distrust across cultures: the organizational trust index.* Colorado Springs: University of Colorado at Colorado Springs.

Sitkin, S. B. and Roth, N. R. (1993) Explaining the limited effectiveness of legalistic "remedies" for trust/distrust. *Organizational science* 4, 367-392.

Skinner, R. and Lester, A. (2012) Humanitarianism and empire: new research agendas. *The journal of imperial and Commonwealth history* 40 (5), 729-747.

Sklar, R. (2003) Mixed government in African political studies. In Vaugan, O. (editor) *Indiginous political structures and governace in Africa.* Ibadan: Sefer Press.

Slemon, S. (1996) Post-colonial critical theories. In Bruce, K. (editor) *New national and post-colonial literatures: an introduction.* Clarendon. 178-97.

Slim, H. (2000) Dissolving the difference between humanitarianism and development: the
mixing of a rights-based solution. *Development in practice* 10 (3 & 4).

Slim, H. (2002) Claiming a humanitarian imperative: NGOs and the cultivation of humanitarian duty. *Refugee survey quarterly* 21 (3).

Slim, H. (2006) *Global welfare: a realistic expectation for the international humanitarian system?* ALNAP Review of humanitarian action.

Slolomon, R. C. (1993) *The passions.* Hackett.

Smillie, I. (2001) *Patronage or partnership : local capacity building in humanitarian crises.* Bloomfield, Conn.: Kumarian Press.

Smith, A. (2006) *The theory of moral sentiments.* (1759) pp. 551. A. Millar: London; A. Kincaid & J. Bell: Edinburgh.

Smith, G. (1995) Haiti: from intervention to intervasion. *Current History* 94 (589), 54-58.

Smucker et al. (2000) *Land tenure and the adoption of agricultural technology in Haiti.* Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute.

Soanes, C. and Stevenson, A. (2006) *Concise Oxford dictionary*. 11 edition. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Soguk, N. (1999) *States and strangers: refugees and displacements of statecraft.* Bordelines Series 11. Minneapolis: Universtiy of Minnesota Press.

Solomon, R. C. (1977) The logic of emotion. *Nous* 11, 41-49.

Solomon, R. C. (1993) *The passions: emotions and the meaning of life.* 2nd edition*.* Hackett.

Sorensen, R. B. (2008) Humanitarian NGOs and mediation of political order in Sri Lanka. *Critical Asians studies* 40 (1), 89-112.

Spector, P. E. (1997) *Job satisfaction: application, assessment, causes and consequences.* London: Sage.

The Sphere Project (2018) [Medium].Place Published: Updated Last Update Date. *http://www.spherehandbook.org/en/the-humanitarian-charter&display=print/* Accessed 4/10/2014.

Stein, N. and Levine, L. (1991) Making sense out of emotion. In Kessen, W. E. A. (editor) *Memories, thought, and emotions: essays in honor of George Mandler.* Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 295-322.

Stoddard, A. (2003) *Humanitarian NGOs: challenges and trends.* Overseas Development Institute.

Stoddard, A. (2004) *You say you want a devolution prospect for remodeling humanitarian assistance.* New York University.

Stotzky, I. P. (1997) *Silencing the guns in Haiti: the promise of deliberative democracy.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Strauss, A. L. and Corbin, J. (1990) *Basics of qualitative research: grounded theory procedures and techniques.* Sage.

Strubing, J. (2017) *Grounded theorizing: doing social research the pragmatist way.* Routledge Series on Interpretive Methods. Routledge.

Sunstein, C. R. V., A. (2009) Conspiracy theories; causes and cures. *Journal of political philosophy* 17, 202-227.

Svoboda, E. P., Sara (2015) *International and local/diaspora actors in the Syria response: a diverging set of systems?* Overseas Development Institute.

Swani, V. F., Adrian (2014) Political paranoia and conspiracy theories. In Van Prooijen, J. W. and Van Lange, P. a. M. (editors) *Power politics, and paranoia: why people are suspicious about their leaders.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 218-236.

Sweeny et al. (2016) Two definitions of waiting well. *Emotion* 16 (1), 129-143.

Sweller, J. (1988) Cognitive load during problem solving: effects on learning. *Cognitive science* 12 (2), 257-285.

Sznaider, N. (1998) The sociology of compassion: a study in the sociology of morals. *Cultural Values* 2 (1), 117-139.

Tajfel, H. and Turner, J. C. (1986) The social identity theory of inter-group behavior. In Worchel, S. and Austin, W. G. (editors) *Psychology of intergroup Relations.* Chicago: Nelson-Hall.

Tangney et al. (2014) Two faces of shame: the roles of shame and guilt in predicting recidivism. *Psychosocial science* 25 (3), 799-805.

Tangney, J. P. and Fischer, K. W. (1995) *Self-conscious emotions: the psycholdgy of shame, guilt, emarassment and pride.* New York: Guilford Press.

Tannenbaum, F. (1947) *Slave and citizens, the negro in the Americas.* New York: Knopf, A. A.

Taylor, C. (1989) *Sources of the self: the making of the modern identity.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Taylor, E. (1994) Intercultural competency: a transormative learning process. *Adult education quarterly* 44 (3), 154-174.

TenHouten, W. D. (2007) *General theory of emotions and social life.* Routledge.

Thamm, R. A. (2006) The classification of emotions. In Stets, J. E. and Turner, J. H. (editors) *Handbook of the sociology of emotions.* Boston: Springer.

Thelma, L. (2013) *Expert mission to evaluate risks to see prevention effects in MINUSTAH, UNMIL, MONUSCO, AND UNMISS.* New York: United Nations.

Thomas, K. (1983) *Man and the natural world: changing attitudes in England 1500-1800.* London: Penguin.

Thomas, W. I. and Thomas, D. S. (1928) *The child in America: behavior problems and programs.* New York: Knopf.

Ticktin, M. (2011) The gendered human of humanitarianism: medicalising and politising sexual violence. *Gender & history* 23 (4), 250-265.

Trouillot, M.-R. (1990) *Haiti, state against nation : the origins and legacy of Duvalierism.* New York: Monthly Review Press.

Tucker, J. B. (1982) The politics of refugees in somalia. *Horn of Africa* 5 (3), 20-30.

Tulane University (2012) *Haiti humanitarian assistance evaluation, from a resilience perspective.* Tulane University in collaboration with State University of Haiti.

Turner, M. (2011) Slave worker rebellions and revolution in the Americas to 1804. In Eltis, D. E., Stanley L. (editor) *The Cambridge world history of slavery.* Vol. 3. Cambridge University Press. 677-707.

Turner, S. (2004) Under the gaze of the 'Big Nations': refugees, rumours and the international community in Tanzania. *African affairs* 103, 227-247.

Twigg, J. (2025) *Disaster risk reduction.* https://goodpracticereview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/10/GPR-9-web-string-1.pdf Accessed August 5, 2019.

Strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations 2006

Restoring a secure and stable environment 2004

United Stages Agency for International Development (1982c) *Pricing, subsidies, and related policies in food and agriculture.* Washington, D.C.: AID

United Stages Agency for International Development (1984) *Country development strategy statement, Haiti.*

United Stages Agency for International Development (1985) *Food for development program PL 480 Title III.* USAID.

United States Department of Health and Human Services. (2003) *Developing cultural competence in disaster mental health programs: guiding principles and recommendations. (3828).* U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Rockville, MD: Center for Mental Health Services Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, .

Uscinski, J. E. and Parent, J. M. (2014) *American conspiracy theories.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Uvin, P. (1998) *Aiding violence : the development enterprise in Rwanda.* West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press.

van Prooijen, J.-W. and Douglas, K. M. (2018) Belief in conspiracy theories: basic principles of an emerging research domain. *European journal of social psychology* 48, 897-908.

Vandiver, F. E. (2005) *How America goes to war.* The modern military tradition, . Westport, Conn.: Praeger.

Vannier, C. N. (2009) Rational cooperation: situating Konbit labor practice in context , Vol. 15 Nos 1/2, pp. 333-349. *Journal of Haitian studies* 15 (1/2), 333-349.

Vaughan, O. (2003) *Chiefs, power and social change.* Africa World Press, Inc.

Victor, J. A. (1993) La réforme agraire à l'envers. In BarthéLemy, G. R. G., C. (editor) *La république Haitienne: état des lieux et perspectives.* Vol. ADEC-Karthala. Paris:

Vittrup, E. (2010) *Unclear land rights hinder Haiti's reconstruction.* United Nations.

Vogt, W. P. (1993) Durkeim's sociology of law: morality and the cult of the individual. In Turner, S. P. (editor) *Emile Durkheim: sociologist and moralist.* London: Routledge.

Wade, D. (1985) *The serpent and the rainbow.* New York: Simon and Schuster.

Weber, M. (1947) *The theory of social and economic organization.* 1st American edition. New York,: Oxford Univ. Press.

Weiner, B. (1980) The emotional consequences of causal attributions. In Clark, M. X. and T., F. S. (editors) *Affect and cognition.* London: Lawrence Erlbaum. 185-209.

Weiss, T. G. (2004) *Military-civilians interactions: humanitarian crisis and the responsibility to protect.* 2nd edition. Rowman & Littlefield.

Wernick, A. (2001) *Auguste Comte and the relition of humanity: the post-theistic program of French social theory.* Cambridge University Press.

Whitney, K. M. (1996) SIN, FRAPH, and the CIA: U.S. covert action in Haiti. *Southwerstern journal of law and trade in the Americas* (2), 303-333.

Why we need continuing MINUSTAH presence in Haiti. (2008) Department, U. S.

Whyte, W. F. (1960) Interviewing in field research. In Adamsn, R. N. and Preiss, J. J. (editors) *Human organization reserach.* Dorsey Press. 352-374.

Widmer, J. (2014) Water-related infrastructure in a region of post-earthquake Haiti: high levels of fecal contamination and need for ongoing monitoring. *American journal of tropical medecine hygiene* 91 (4), 790-7.

Wilentz, A. (2013) *Farewell Fred Voodoo.* Simon & Shusters Paperbacks.

Wilkinson, I. (2016) The problem of understanding modern humanitarianism and its sociological value. *International social science journal* 65.

Wilkinson, I. (2017) Social suffering and the enigma of humanitarianism. In Anderson, R. E. (editor) *Alleviating the world suffering: the challenge of negative quality of life.* Springer.

Williamson, J. (1993) Democracy and the "Washington Consensus". *World development* 21 (8), 1329-1336.

Wirtz, P. H. v. K., R.; Mohiyeddini, C. (2006) Low social support and poor emotional regulation are associated with increased stress hormone reactivity to mental stress in systemic hypertension. *Journal of clinical endocrinology and metabolism* 91, 3857-3865.

Wisner, e. a. (2003) *At risk: natural hazards, people's vulnerability and disasters.* New York: Routledge.

Wood et al. (2017) Community-based health needs assessment in Leogane and Gressier, Haiti: six years post-earthquake. *Journal of international humanitarian action* 2 (10).

Wood, G. D. and Schaffer, B. B. (1985) *Labelling in development policy : essays in honour of Bernard Schaffer.* Sage development studies. Sage.

Worchel, P. (1979) Trust and distrust. In Austin, W. G. and Worchel, S. (editors) *The social psychology of intergroup relations.* Wadsworth.

World Bank (1985) *Haiti agricultural sector study.* World Bank.

World Health Organization (2010) *Culture and mental health in Haiti: a literature review.* Geneva: McGill University.

World Health Organization and UNICEF (2012) Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) for Water Supply and Sanitation Progress on Drinking Water and Sanitation: 2012 Update. http://www.wssinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/resources/JMP-report-2012-en.pdf Accessed March 22, 2020

World Humanitarian Summit (2015) *Restoring humanitay: synthetisis of the consultation process for the World Humanitarian Summit.* New York: United Nations.

Wright, T. L. a. A., J. (1974) Interpersonal trust, political preference, and perception on the Watergate affair. *Personality and social psychology bulletin* 1, 168-170.

Young, A. W. B., V. (2011) Understanding person perception. *British journal of psychology* 102 (4), 959-974.

Zanotti, L. (2010) Cacophonies of Aid, Failed State Building and NGOs in Haiti: stting the stage for disaster, envisioning the furture. *Third World Quaterly* 31 (5), 755-771.

Zhang, Y. W., Barbara M. (2005) Unstructured Interviews.

Zyck, S. (2015) *Localising humanitarianism: improving effectiveness through inclusive action.* Overseas Development Institute.